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         Abstract  
   ULU AL AMR & AUTHORITY:  
                          THE CENTRAL PILLARS OF SUNNI POLITICAL THOUGHT 
 
          by  
            Hisseine Faradj 
 
Advisor: Susan Buck-Morss 
This dissertation evaluates the political history of Islam through the prism of the Sunni 
conception of authority. It finds an historical red thread that explains the legal and political 
evolution of different types of Islamic government that have, instead of a European-type 
sovereign, the Ulu Al Amr (those in authority). In addition, it argues that it is the authority of Ulu 
Al Amr that legitimizes temporal power via legal rulings such as Wilayah al ahed (allegiance to a 
dynastic monarchy) and Wlayah al qaher (obedience to coercive power and rule). Those rulings 
are essential to legitimating historical change. Historical legal opinions among Muslim scholars 
hold that the members of the Ulu Al Amr are the Ulama—those with knowledge, the learned, 
religious scholars with temporal power. This dissertation claims that contrary to the legal 
standards that changed historically in Fiqh al siyash al sharia (the branch Islamic jurisprudence 
that addresses political issues), it is the Ulama who were the Ulu Al Amr. It is Ulu Al Amr they 
and only they who decide on the exception through Ijma (consensus or agreement of the 
community, a source of Islamic law). This view of Ulu Al Amr is most consistent with the Sunni 
conception of authority that legitimates the force of temporal power. Finally, this dissertation 
argues that the historical evolution of the concept of authority and the legal role of Ulu Al Amr 
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are an outcome of political struggles and demands between the Ulu Al Amr (qua temporal power) 
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                      Glossary 
  
Ahl ar-ra'y   is an Arabic term that means 'people of opinion'. 
Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd another term of Ulu Al Amr those in authority  
Alim    see Ulama  
Amir al-mu’minin  commander of the faithful (the Khalifa title) 
Ammeh   commoners, public 
Al-malik   the king or sovereign 
Bay’a    (from Ba’a, to sell) contract in a form of an oath of allegiance to a leader  
Bayt al-mal  Treasury that is collected from Zakat and war booty  
Bid’a   innovation connoting impiety 
Faqih    see Fuqaha 
Fatwa    authorized legal opinion 
Fiqh    Islamic jurisprudence  
Fiqh al siyash al shariah  the branch Islamic jurisprudence that deals with political issues. Also  
   referred to as Al siyash al sharia    
Fitnah   secession, upheaval, and chaos  
Fuqaha    (sing. Faqih legal scholar) 
Hadith    reports or narrative of what the Prophet said or did 
Hila     guile 
Ijma   consensus or agreement of the community, a source of Islamic law 
Ijtihad   independent human reasoning in Sharia law 
Ilm    knowledge or learning, especially Religious Knowledge  
Imam   (see also Khalifa) leader of the Muslim community (also leader of  
congregational prayer, (modern) head of state 
x 
 
Jabariyah Muslims who deny free agency of the individual.  They take their denomination 
from Jabr, which signifies “necessity or compulsion;” because they hold a person 
to be necessarily and inevitably constrained to act as s/he does by force of God’s 
will which is eternal and immutable 
Jahiliyyah Pre-Islamic condition  
Jemaah   the collectivity of the Muslim community  
Jihad  holy war or personal striving in knowledge, charity, or public service 
Khalifa or Khalifat  (see also imam) (of Muhammad) serving as the head of state or leader of the 
Muslim community  
Khurooj   rebellion 
Malik ul mulk   king of kings or the absolute sovereign 
Maslaha  the principle that the intent of the law is the good of the community which should 
be taken into account more than the enforcement of the law 
Mawaly Muslims who are non-Arabs 
Mufti   expert authorized to issue Fatwa or a legal opinion  
Mujtahid   person carrying out independent interpretation of Islamic law 
Qadariyah Muslims who are adherents of the doctrine of free will. The word Qadar is 
derived from Qadr (power or rights). 
Qiyas    reasoning by analogy, a source of Islamic law 
Ra'y    personal opinion in adapting Sharia law 
Sharia Islamic law, religious law, Right, Rectitude, Code (the whole body of rules 
guiding the life of a Muslim in law, ethics and etiquette); the sources of the 
Sharia law found in the Qur’an, Hadith, and Sunna, as well as Fiqh. 
Shura    consultation among the members of the community 
Sunna   custom, religious tradition of the Prophet Muhammad 
Tafsir    is the literal meaning of the Qur’an or Hadith  
Taghut    transgressor 
Takfiri  leaving society that is considered infidel by isolating oneself from public life 
xi 
 
Taqlid  strictly following legal precedents of the past without any innovations or 
additions  
Taweel allegorical interpretation or departure from the manifest [Zahir] meaning of a text 
in favor of another meaning where there is evidence to justify the departure 
 
Ulama  (sing. Alim) those with knowledge, the learned, religious scholars and experts 
Ulu Al Amr those in authority 
Umma    the people or community (of Islam); (modern) nation  
Umara    people in command 
Wakeel   deputy or agent 
Waley    guardian 
Wilayah al ahed  allegiance to a dynastic monarchy  
Wlayah al qaher  obedience of the members of the community to whomever has captured power by 
force  
Zahir manifest meaning of a text or matter 
Zakat                              "that which purifies"
 
or alms-giving is the practice of charitable giving by 
Muslims based on accumulated wealth, and is obligatory for all who are able to 
do so. It is considered to be a personal responsibility for Muslims to ease 







                    Ulu Al Amr & Authority: the central Pillars of Sunni Political Thought  
 
Why and when should one obey authority? This is a universal question that transcends 
time and space. It is at the core of the discipline of political science and inevitably includes 
questions regarding the self, subjectivity, freedom, equality, and autonomy. Moral codes or laws 
require that authority limit arbitrary action. For freedom to have meaning, it must recognize its 
opposite: obedience. And for obedience to exist some form of authority must implement rules or 
laws.  
 Like obedience, authority is a universal concept limited by neither time nor space. For 
example, the contemporary opposites of the term obedience are liberty, autonomy, and freedom, 
which are limited to certain geographies and moments in history. Contemporary political 
discourse centers on these terms due to historical circumstances that have taken place in Western 
Europe since the middle ages. Obedience to authority and the good laws that subjects live under 
necessarily mean that they perceive themselves as free subjects. Conversely, bad authority and 
laws provide a framework for subjectivities to be constituted and developed through political 
struggles to correct bad laws. While obedience to authority and a set of laws or moral codes 
allows for a collectivity to exist, sociologically speaking, obedience regulates expectations and 
makes life possible.  
  Yet, while authority and obedience transcend time and space, obedience has particular 
characteristics that unfold in local geographies and specific moments in history. Identities, 
cultures, and nations develop around these local characteristics and produce the mosaic of 
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subjectivities and identities that are a testament to the creativity and malleability of the human 
subject.  Hence, every collectivity shares in common a minimum notion of “the good” of the 
community.  It is also disagreements on “the good” that become the bases of dissent in any given 
community. While obedience to good laws and struggles against bad ones is a universal 
condition, struggle and obedience unfold according to local contexts and qualities.  
 
 In the case of Western Europe, the womb that bore modernity, obedience to authority, 
historically evolved in a religious context that produced the legal arrangement of sovereignty.   
I argue that sovereignty is the core quality of European civilization and that it became globally 
hegemonic in confronting other forms of authority. Western Europe gave the world capitalism 
and industrialization through its local internal struggles with medieval forms of authority and 
obedience. More precisely, I mean the local struggles against the authority of and obedience to 
the Catholic Church and its role in politics that framed resistance projects.  According to Herbert 
Marcuse:  
The Protestantism of Luther and Calvin which gave the Christin doctrine of freedom its decisive 
form for bourgeois society, is bound up with the emergence of a new, “young” society which had 
first to conquer its right to exist in a bitter struggle against existing authorities. Faced with the 
universal bonds of traditionalist feudalism it absolutely required the liberation of the individual 
within the earthly order as well (the individual free subject of the economic sphere late essentially 
became the model of its concept of the individual) – it required the liberation of the territorial 
sovereign from the authority of an internationally centralized Church and a central imperial 
power. It further required the liberation of the “conscience” from numerous religious and ethical 
norms in order to clear the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie. In all these directions an 
antiauthoritarian attitude was necessary… (10) 
 
Thus, the evolution of local legal arrangements in Western Europe into the legal solution of 
sovereignty followed from local struggles against authority and obedience to the Catholic 
Church. After all, “sovereignty is a form of authority” and a replacement of one form of 
authority with another (Jackson 2007, 14). Historically, sovereignty as a legal concept evolved 
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from being the local core of European politics to the universal and global principle in 
international law. Sovereignty, “is a post-medieval and indeed, anti-medieval arrangement of 
governing authority” (Jackson 2007, 6). While sovereignty is anti-medieval in character, it is 
ultimately a reaction to religion and the consequence of the role of the Church in Western 
Europe.  
 Local struggles historically unfolded in a context dominated by the Catholic Church. 
They shaped the evolution of emancipatory political projects in a particular trajectory that was 
local in character and universal in its goals. Consequently, the political and religious character of 
sovereignty became the frame in which the evolution of expressions of rights, freedoms, 
equality, and the self unfolded, was locally grasped, and finally matured into its contemporary, 
secular, universal expression. A prime example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948). Similarly, ideas of obedience were shaped and reshaped as a consequence of these 
unfolding struggles. Elshtain illustrates this argument by claiming:  
As sovereign state is to sovereign God, so sovereign selves are to sovereign states. Given that 
sovereignty in the political sense “names” self-determination for a territorial, collective entity, it 
is altogether unsurprising that this logic of sovereignty came unbound and migrated, becoming 
attached more and more to notions of the self. (159) 
 
She traces the evolutionary character of the sovereign God who transferred the same authority to 
sovereign kings in Western Europe who set the path and the framework in which local actors 
could claim sovereignty for themselves against local kings. As a result, the West has given us 
two revolutions—the American and the French—that constitute the core of modernist 
expressions of sovereignty, a sovereignty of the people, the self, the mind, and reason. 
Emancipatory projects took on a local character of European sovereignty. Thus, “to be sovereign 
means to exercise absolute power over one's self and one's fate. But another way of putting this 
is that the sovereign—whether it is a god, a king, a state, or a mere self—cannot be held 
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answerable to anyone. When push comes to shove, sovereignty always trumps law and morals” 
(Adam Kirsch, 2008).  The point here is not to reduce the entirety of Western civilization to an 
essentialized character; on the contrary, the aim here is locate the local context through which 
meanings and significations of concepts such as freedom, equality, and autonomy unfold. It is 
through struggle that such concepts become meaningful to local subjects in a particular historical 
moment. Even after taming sovereign kings who claimed a divine right to rule, the sovereign 
domain was limited to other spheres such as the economy, which is sovereign as well. A good 
example is Adam Smith’s account of the rights-based state when arguing: 
concerns are equally clear and pronounced: in accordance with “the system of natural freedom” 
the sovereign has no more than three significant responsibilities, namely, the defence of society 
against external enemies, the protection of each individual against any harm inflicted upon him 
by another, and the undertaking of such public works as would not be carried out if entrusted to 
private profit. (Bobbio, 2005 17-18) 
 
So central is the concept of sovereignty to the Western legal and political context that even when 
it was logically incoherent and contradictory, the concept prevailed. More precisely, while 
sovereignty in a theological context is a logical, coherent idea—for example, the Sovereignty of 
God—once the concept is transferred to politics it becomes inconsistent. Jacques Maritain 
demonstrated the problems that logically arise when such transference is made:  
But in the political sphere, and with respect to the men or agencies in charge of guiding peoples 
toward their earthly destinies, there is no valid use of the concept of Sovereignty. Because, in the 
last analysis, no earthly power is the image of God and deputy for God. God is the very source of 
the authority with which the people invest those men or agencies, but they are not the vicars of 
God. They are the vicars of the people; then they cannot be divided from the people by any 
superior essential property. (50) 
 
Accordingly, the problem persists when the sovereign is the king, state, or the people, in the case 
of democracy. Susan Buck-Morss illustrates the circular logic of sovereignty when it is applied 
to democracies arguing that “if democracies could be self-constituting and self-reproducing, if 
they could realize the perfect closure of the Oroborus (snake consuming its tail), there would be 
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no decay and no history—but also no hope, no escape from the magic circle of power that is 
capable of mystifying any political regime, no matter how democratically conceived” (Buck-
Morss 2007, 1). Nevertheless, the legal concept of sovereignty prevails and has been historically 
globalized via the European imperial colonization of the globe and the creation of international 
law.  
 
 This dissertation aims at explaining the universal political concepts of authority and 
obedience as they have operated historically in the Sunni legal system with attention accorded to 
the local character of Sunni Islam. As was the case in the Western European context, Islam was 
founded and evolved around particular arrangements of authority and obedience that were 
simultaneously universal and particular according to local historical settings and circumstances.  
I argue that legal, academic, cultural, and economic problems arise when European historical 
struggles against authority are universalized and conflated with other civilizations. I question the 
idea that the sovereignty that is absent from other collectivities outside Western Europe becomes 
the standard against which modernity, human rights, freedom, equality, and autonomy of other 
cultures should be measured. As a result, there is the tendency to make evaluative judgments, 
such as:  
(1) the “Third World” [is] a singular essentialized entity not in terms of its own existing qualities, 
but in term of “First World” qualities which it lacks… 
(2) contemporary conditions in the Third World … [are] abstracted conditions of European 
historical experience; the Third World is seen as embodying aspects of Europe’s past (feudalism, 
etc.)…  
(3) only one essential path to modernity exists in the world, and Europe has experienced this path 
in advance of the non-Western world (Mirsepassi 2000, 8). 
 
It is the aim of this dissertation to avoid these generalities by locating the local quality and 
political language of the evolution of authority and obedience in Sunni Islam’s legal and political 
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history. My hope is to shed light on the political language of Sunni Islam according to its local 
qualities. But the task is not easy; it requires the reader to temporarily suspend her ideas of what 
is familiar in Western politics and put herself in the context of Sunni Islam’s historical political 
circumstances.  To quote Susan Buck-Morss, “this is not to say that translation among political 
languages is easily accomplished. Real differences exist. But promise lies in the apparent 
incommensurability, because the attempt forces each language to extend itself creatively, 
becoming more than it was, producing an open space in which a new politics might take root” 
(Buck-Morss 2003, 6). The aim here is not just to produce another discourse; instead, the aim is 
to emphasize and appreciate the universal project of opposition to the abuse of power and the 
possibility of democratic discussion in the global public sphere. The need for such democratic 
dialogue is not only global. It is most urgent now as the “Arab Spring” is turning from an 
emancipatory project against long ruling regime of dictatorships to an ideological battle between 
either Shia/Sunni or secularist/Islamist camps. These battles are fought as zero-sum game.  
This dissertation argues that the disagreements that led to the split between the two sides 
lack a political language that can facilitate a dialogue. The ideological gap that is created 
between secularists/liberals and Islamists is due, on one hand, to the ideological commitment by 
the secularists to universal concepts such popular sovereignty, human rights, and the autonomy 
of the individual, which have European sovereignty at their core, and on the other, to political 
Islam’s commitment to Sunni Islamic authority. 
  
The absence of sovereignty in the Islamic legal system, as chapter one demonstrates, 
shifts that attention from temporal power to the authority of Ulu Al Amr (those in authority).  The 
authority of Ulu Al Amr becomes the red thread that runs through accounts of the historical 
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evolution of the Islamic legal and political system. It runs from a city state, empire, fragmented 
competing monarchies to the nation state.  According to Ernest Gellner: 
The central doctrines of Islam contain an emphatic and severe monotheism, the view that the 
Message received by the Prophet is so to speak terminal, and that is contains both faith and 
morals – or, in other words, it is both doctrine and law, and that genuine further augmentation is 
to be countenanced. The points of doctrine and points of law are not separated, and Muslim 
learned scholars are best described as theologians/jurists. There is no cannon law, but simply 
divine law as such, applicable to the community of believers, rather than to the organization and 
members of some specialized agency. (6 -7) 
 
Thus, contrary to Western European experience, in Islam the absence of a church that speaks on 
behalf of the faith and Sharia was the feature that the Muslim subject used to limit the abuse of 
temporal power and authority. Unlike in Western Europe, resistance to abusive authority and 
temporal power was possible through clinging to and emphasizing the law and interpreting it in 
an emancipatory context that limits temporal power’s force and action. Consequently, 
emancipation of the collective and the self from the abuse of power has traditionally been 
affirmed through the law, which is historically prior to the state or any political organization. 
This local quality has grave consequences in understanding the differences in the role of religion 
in Western Europe and Islam. Moreover, this local quality casts a different shade on universal 
concepts of autonomy and freedom in relation to religion. More precisely, obedience to authority 
in Sunni Islam unfolded in local conditions where:  
A socially and politically transcendent standard of rectitude was ever accessible, beyond the reach 
of manipulation by political authority, and available for condemning the de facto authority if it 
sinned against it. It only needed for that standard to possess an earthly ally, endowed with armed 
might, for the sinning authority – if it was held to be sinful – to be in trouble. The political history 
of Islam does display the periodic emergence of such a daunting alliance of transcendent rectitude 
and earthly might. (Gellner 1992, 7-8) 
 
In this case, temporal power was starved from self-constituting legitimacy making it historically 
dependent on the Ulu Al Amr to rule and extract obedience from the Muslim subject.  
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Central to understanding authority and obedience in Sunni Islam is the evolution of the 
Ulu Al Amr’s authority in relationship to temporal power. This local quality has significant 
implications in how Sunni Islam constitutes human rights, freedom, equality, and ultimately the 
constitution of the self. Consequently, a question of why one should obey authority is directly 
related to Sunni’s historical arrangement of obedience to authority. For example, human nature 
in Islam is tied to the Qur’anic account of “the Fall” which frames subjectivities and notions of 
the self in a general frame and trajectory. The following verses in the Qur’an provide the context 
of the narrative: 
But Satan caused them to slip out of it and removed them from that [condition] in which they had 
been. And We said, "Go down, [all of you], as enemies to one another, and you will have upon 
the earth a place of settlement and provision for a time." 2:36 
Then Adam received from his Lord [some] words, and He accepted his repentance. Indeed, it is 
He who is the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful. 2:37 
We said, "Go down from it, all of you. And when guidance comes to you from Me, whoever 
follows My guidance - there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. 2:38 
 
This account of “the Fall” is not corrupting and political organization is not perceived as 
an institution that is designed to control the “evil” nature of persons. As a result, the subject is 
neither prone to be good nor bad but a subject that is free to choose or deny the right path. In this 
context, political institutions are established to make it easy for the subject to choose the right 
path and avoid error. Consequently, the nature of obedience to authority is framed around the 
“good” of both the individual and the collective, and who defines the good according to the text 
is where struggles against authority in the history of Islam are located. Thus, speaking on behalf 
of the text in the form of legal opinion/judgment is a claim of authority. As a result, the 
authoritative texts of the Qur’an and Sunna are central to struggles for freedom, equality, and 
autonomy are located. As such, obedience to political institutions is guided by Sharia but not 
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absolute. In fact, obedience in the Qur’an to someone other than God or the Prophet is 
mentioned but twice to “those in authority” (Ulu Al Amr in Arabic) in verses 4:59 and 4:83: 
Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between 
people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever 
Hearing and Seeing. 4:58 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59 
Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O 
Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to Taghut, while 
they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray. 4:60And when it is 
said to them, "Come to what Allah has revealed and to the Messenger," you see the hypocrites 
turning away from you in aversion. 4:61 
 
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around. 
But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to those of authority among them, then the 
ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it. And if not for the 
favor of Allah upon you and His mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for a few. 4:83 
 
There is no mention in the Qur’an or Sunna to unconditional obedience to a king or a monarch or 
any form of authority. This dissertation argues that historical and legal circumstances allowed 
Ulu Al Amr to assume the central role determining when and how a ruler can legally govern the 
Umma. Chapter two illustrates that the membership of Ulu Al Amr has changed historically 
according to changes in political circumstances. For example, at the founding period of Islam, 
due to their proximity to the Prophet, the Four Guided Caliphs were legal authorities and holders 
of temporal power. By the end of the Second Civil War (60-73 AH/680-692 CE) temporal power 
was a dynastic system of monarchical government. But most important, this dissertation argues, 
as chapter two demonstrates, that contrary to the legal standards that changed historically in Fiqh 
al siyash al shariah (the branch Islamic jurisprudence that deals with political issues), it is the 
Ulama (learned, religious scholars and experts) who were the Ulu Al Amr. It was Ulu Al Amr and 
only they who decided on the exception through Ijma (consensus or agreement of the 
community, a source of Islamic law.) Consequently, temporal power’s rule over the Umma was 
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legitimized only through the legal authority of Ulu Al Amr, not through conquest or war. Gellner 
points out the consequence of this authority type: 
It subordinates the executive to the (divine) legislature and, in actual practice, turns the 
theologians/lawyers into the monitors of political rectitude – whether or not they always have the 
power to enforce their verdicts. The principle that “the community will not agree on error” may 
endow communal consensus, rather than the political center, with a kind of legislative authority. 
Within this communal consensus, the voice of the learned is liable to possess special weight. 
After all, the community must heed an already existing law and it is natural to respect the opinion 
of those better informed. (7) 
 
Only then can the historical development of legal concepts in Fiqh al siyash al shariah, such as 
Wilayah al ahed (allegiance to a dynastic monarchy) and Wlayah al qaher (obedience to coercive 
power and rule) be appreciated and understood politically. Force alone cannot achieve legal 
legitimacy in Islam. Accordingly, power as a legitimate temporal quality exists only when it is 
bestowed via the authority of Ulu Al Amr. This local distinction between force and power is 
central in understanding Sunni political and legal writings. Both concepts were legally developed 
by Ulu Al Amr in a specific historical moment. Neither concept can be found in the Qur’an, 
Sunna, or Hadith. No temporal power in the history of Islam was able to display a European 
character of sovereign power because the qualities of the concept are alien to the legal codes of 
Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah. The influence of Ulu Al Amr on political issues is immense since 
legally “all major Sunni legal Ulama agree that the state is not a doctrinal pillar or a foundational 
part of the religion and as such it is the realm of opinion and disagreements” (Imarah 1988,  
208).
1
 This quality is present in Sunni Fiqh since members of Ulu Al Amr are considered to be 
scholars or learned individuals, and their “authority seems to be derived from the fact that the 
person wielding authority possesses superior knowledge, insight, or experience. The authority 
rests upon these givens, which are accompanied by the person’s ability to give extended reasons 
                                                          
1
علمائها مجمعون على أن ) الدولة ( ليست ) ركنا ( و ال ) أصال ( من أركان الدين و أصوله .كل تيارات الفكر االسالمي السنية و أعالم    
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for what he decides to say or do” (Friedrich 1972, 51). While in Shia Fiqh “Ulu Al Amr are those 
in charge of the affairs of the Muslim community and they are the leaders of the Umma, 
according to verse 4:59 obeying their command is a duty of all Muslims since the verse puts 
obedience to them in equal status to obedience of the Prophet that is derived from the obedience 
of God” (Al Fahrey 1986, 11).
2
 The difference in the quality of learned individuals and the status 
of prophecy underlines the difference in the conception of authority in Shia, which requires an 
entire study devoted to the subject matter.  
   
 This dissertation is primarily a legal study in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah focusing on 
authority and obedience in Islam. This study records historical events in the legal evolution of 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah and analyzes how that evolution took its particular trajectory. But this 
is not a historical study on the evolution of Fiqh al siyash al shariah. In fact, there are many 
significant changes and developments that took place in Fiqh al siyash al shariah that are 
unrelated to the dissertation topic. Surely, there are events that scholars deem important, but 
again this is not primarily a historical study. Nevertheless, historical events must be elucidated in 
a context that best demonstrates my argument. Finally, I rely on many contemporary Muslim 
legal thinkers to discuss and survey Fiqh al siyash al shariah and show what is commonly 
accepted as orthodoxy. My intention is to use a body of work that has gained consensus in the 
mainstream of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah.  
 In chapter one I discuss debates among legal scholars concerning the concept of 
sovereignty and the nation-state in relation to the Sharia.  The chapter illustrates the debate in 
Fiqh al siyash al sharia (Sharia-oriented public policy authorizes government leaders to conduct 
                                                          
2
 أما القضية الثانية فمترتبة على سيادة الشرع و هي عدم جواز تغيير األحكام الشرعية ال من قبل األمة و ال من قبل الدولة 
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government affairs in harmony with the spirit and purpose of Sharia, even at the expense of a 
temporary departure from its specific rules) concerning the location of sovereignty of the state as 
the highest authority in relation to the Sharia. The debate features three different legal opinions. 
The first opinion argues that the sovereignty of the nation-state is compatible with the Sharia.  
The second contends that sovereignty is incompatible with Sharia and as such is a heretical 
claim that there is an authority above the Sharia. The third and final opinion claims that the 
sovereignty and the Sharia are compatible, but that Sharia must provide the guideline to what is 
included in the constitution. The debate is ongoing without consensus among legal scholars. 
Chapter two investigates that evolution of both Ulu Al Amr and temporal power in the history of 
Sunni Islam as a consequence of social and political change. Historically, there is no clear Ijma 
or consensus in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah regarding who the Ulu Al Amr are. This chapter 
argues that it is the Ulama and not temporal power or the elite are Ulu Al Amr. Furthermore, the 
formation of the Ulu Al Amr as the Ulama evolved historically as a consequence of the First and 
Second Civil wars (35-40/656-661 and 60-73/680-692, respectively). In the absence of a fixed 
text or orthodoxy in Fiqh al siyash al shariah, this chapter challenges the academic utility of the 
concept of fundamentalism in political Islam. In fact, the very existence of Fiqh al siyash al 
shariah renders fundamentalism an oxymoron. Chapter three investigates the character of 
authority and obedience in Sunni Islam. The chapter argues that the character of the authority of 
Ulu Al-Amr is a consequence of social and political circumstances that produced a type of 
authority similar to that of experts in a particular field of knowledge. Consequently, obedience to 
authority in Sunni Islam is conditional and not absolute. This character of authority is 
emphasized further in the realm of Al siyash al shariah (Sharia-oriented public policy authorizes 
government leaders to conduct government affairs in harmony with the spirit and purpose of the 
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Sharia, even at the expense of a temporary departure from its specific rules) because it is a 
branch and not a root of Sharia. Fiqh al siyash al shariah is a realm of opinion, and 
disagreements on such topics do not undermine Sharia. Chapter four argues that historically the 
Ulu Al Amr provided to temporal power in Fiqh al siyash al shariah the special legal status of a 
state of permanent war as a part of the process of legitimating dynastic rule. Historically, this 
condition provided the legal legitimacy for a shift in the role and function of temporal power 
from one that is subservient to Sharia and the Umma to a condition were the Al siyash al shariah 
and the Umma are subservient to temporal power. This shift is most prevalent in the evolution of 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah, and it is indicative of the authority of Ulu Al Amr in this domain. 
Chapter five argues that modernity ushered in a global change in both in physical and 
metaphysical realms to all non- European cultures. In the case of Sunni Islam, modernity’s 
consequence is twofold: first, the logic of the sovereignty of the nation-state challenged Sunni 
authority by permanently centralizing the role of the Ulu Al Amr as part of the state bureaucracy; 
hence, the historical appearance of the legal post of the Grand Muftti. The logic of state 
sovereignty undermined Sunni authority and the legitimacy of the Ulu Al Amr, who lacked 
neutrality, to speak on behalf of Islam. Consequently, the nineteenth century witnessed the 
formation of a new and modern Ulu Al Amr. This new class, the modern Ulu Al Amr, challenged 
and opposed the traditional establishment of Ulu Al Amr, rejecting obedience to temporal power 
via Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher. The aim of this new class, autonomous and reflexive 
agents free from tradition, is to reinterpret Fiqh al siyash al shariah according to contemporary 
political and social conditions. Thus, modernity set Sunni authority free by democratizing the 




      CHAPTER I  




 2010, a local event in Sidi Bouzid, an impoverished town 190 miles 
(300 km) south of the capital Tunis, sparked what became a season of revolutions that swept the 
Arab region, toppling decades of dictators and regimes. Among those regimes were Bin Ali of 
Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, Gadhafi of Libya, and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, with presumably 
more to follow. The incident began with a young man, Mohammed Bouazizi, the breadwinner 
for his family of eight, who traveled to provincial headquarters in Sidi Bouzid, to complain to 
local municipality officials. They refused to see him. At 11:30 a.m., less than an hour after a 
confrontation with a policewoman, and without telling his family, Bouazizi returned to the 
elegant two-story white building with arched azure shutters, poured fuel over his body, and 
struck a match (Abouseid, 2011). Today the name of Bouazizi is a symbol of the changes that 
have coursed through the Arab world and surprised the rest of the globe. 
 The revolutions of what became known as "the Arab Spring" started with spontaneous 
uprisings that caught lay observers and academics unawares. The uprising challenged decades of 
repression and dictatorship. The masses that took to the streets and public squares were from 
every walk of life and hardly committed to any particular ideology or organized political party. 
Instead, they mobilized and came together to reject economic, social, and political conditions 
that they blamed on the ruling class.  
 Yet once the revolutionary process toppled the dictatorships, Islamic political 
parties gained decisive victories at the ballot box in both Egypt and Tunisia. The enthusiasm of 
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the mainstream, local, Arab, and Western media was dampened by the electoral victory of the 
political parties that are motivated by an Islamic outlook on politics. Many have argued that the 
“Arab Spring” has taken a turn for the worse and become an “Arab Winter.” The fear among 
observers is that both Tunis and Egypt will follow the path of the Iranian revolution of 1979. 
This concern has sparked old and new debates, and issues of political Islam, democracy, and 
modernity have assumed greater urgency as observers have tried to determine the direction of 
Prime Minster Hamadi Jebali’s Renaissance Movement Party (RMP) in Tunisia and the 
President Mohamed Morsi-led Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of Egypt. 
With both Tunisia and Egypt in the process of drafting new constitutions, the question 
looming in the mind of academics and political observers is what role religion has in both 
documents. The main concern is whether Islamic political parties can guarantee citizenship rights 
and liberties for women and religious minorities while simultaneously implementing economic 
policy geared toward more equitable social justice.  After all, religion was not the driving force 
behind the revolutions that swept the region. In fact, both the RMP in Tunisia and the FJP in 
Egypt, like every other political group, were astonished. And as the elections showed, liberal and 
socialist forces were unorganized. This was the case more so in Egypt than Tunisia. 
Religion was at the foundation of the RMP and the FJP electoral successes, and it is the 
reason why they stand in contrast to the secular political parties. Furthermore, both political 
parties are still considered prominent enemies of the old regime in the mind of the public. Beinin 
and Stork use the term “political Islam” to describe these movements which this dissertation 
applies when speaking about RMP and the FJP. Accordingly, they argue:  
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We term the movements in this volume “political Islam” because we regard their core concerns as 
temporal and political. They use the Qur’an, and hadiths (reports about the words and deeds of 
Muhammad and his Companions), and other canonical texts to justify their stances and actions. 
And they do so in all sincerity. (3) 
 
But what is the role of political Islam in the current revolutionary phase in Tunisia and Egypt 
when both countries are demanding economic and social change based on respect for civil rights 
and liberties? One way to answer this question is by examining the political writings of the 
forefathers of political Islam who championed the role of religion in the state as the correct 
approach to politics. One cannot properly and fully evaluate the significance of the writings of Al 
Maududi, Qutb, or Khomeni without understanding the challenge that the nation-state, with 
European sovereignty at its core, posed to Sharia-governed political entities in the context of 
colonial and postcolonial states. The theme of the relationship between state sovereignty and 
Islam can be traced back to the eighteenth century writings of Jamal Al Din Al Afghani and 
continues up to contemporary Muslim scholars and thinkers such as Rashed Al Ghannushi and 
Yusuf Al Qaradawi. Both Al Ghannushi and Al Qaradawi are considered the modern Ulu Al Amr 
(see chapter five) behind the RMP and FJP. In this sense, they are following their predecessors’ 
contributions regarding the role of popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of God. They ask, for 
example, how the modern conception of sovereignty can coexist with the following Qur’anic 
injunction: 
Say, "O Allah, Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will and You take 
sovereignty away from whom You will. You honor whom You will and You humble whom You 
will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things competent. (Qur’an, 3:26) 
It must be noted though that the contemporary lexical term “sovereignty” (Syaada) differs from 
what is used in the verse; instead, the Qur’an uses the word “domain” (Mulk). But the choice of 
the word sovereignty is correct because the context of the verse indicates that Mulk is the highest 
authority in relation to other legal entities. 
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 To illustrate the conflict between Qur’anic and modern Western concepts of sovereignty, 
consider the following statements. The first statement regarding sovereignty, made by two 
Islamic legal scholars, is that “Sharia actually nullifies the ability of the people or the state to 
change the law” (Mufti and Wakeel 1991, 9).
3
 The second statement by a Western academic 
scholar describes sovereignty as “a foundational idea of politics and law that can only be 
properly understood as, at one and the same time, both an idea of supreme authority in the state, 
and an idea of political and legal independence of geographically separate states” (Jackson 2007, 
x). The stark and irreconcilable differences are clear in relation to the legal logic of the modern 
nation state and international law.  
 The modern concept of sovereignty is defined as “the power or authority which 
comprises the attributes of an ultimate arbitral agent –whether a person or a body of persons 
entitled to make decisions and settle disputes within a political hierarchy with some degree of 
finality. A sovereign is a person or group of persons (including a representative assembly) 
possessed of sovereignty” (Miller, Coleman, Connolly, and Ryan 1987, 492). Accordingly, law 
and legitimacy emanate from the agent who is both a temporal and transcendental actor, the 
highest in power, the final power, general in effect, and finally independent.  It is this conception 
of sovereignty with its temporal/transcendental attributes that Sayyid Qutb describes as 
“Jahiliyyah” (pre Islamic or pagan).  He argues that “this Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against 
God’s sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely 
sovereignty and makes some men lords over others” (Qutb 2001, 11). While this view of 
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شؤون و يقومون بزعامتهم بأمر من هللا سبحانه، و بموجب هذه اآلية يتوجب على جميع و أولو األمر هم الذين يتولون أمور المسلمين في هذه ال 
 المسلمين االنقياد ألولي االمر بعد أن قرنت طاعتهم بطاعة رسول هللا التي تتفرع من طاعة هللا
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sovereignty is in accordance with Fiqh al siyash al shariah (Islamic jurisprudence), there are, as 
we shall see later in the chapter, contending legal views on the concept.  
 This conflict between Western and Qur’anic conceptions of sovereignty was at the heart 
of anxieties over the RMP and FJP drafting of constitutions in Tunisia and Egypt. While both 
parties claim that they want to be a part of building a modern state that respects civil rights and 
liberties, which the revolutions demanded and struggled to achieve, their initial success owed to 
their religious character and made it difficult for them to compromise on core issues such as the 
role of Sharia in relation to public life.  
 Many were skeptical that the RMP and FJP could succeed because of political Islam’s 
stand on Sharia in public life. Critics questioned whether its values would oppose equal 
citizenship rights and civil liberties. More clearly, the model of the modern state that secular 
academics and political parties see under threat was a product of historical circumstances that 
“required the liberation of the territorial sovereign from the authority of an internationally 
centralized church and a central imperial power” (Marcuse 2008, 10).  The modern state’s 
relationship with religion has its roots in European history, and as such it “is a post-medieval and 
indeed, anti-medieval arrangement of governing authority” (Jackson 2007, 6). Nevertheless, 
sovereignty remains at its root a reaction against the medieval theological arrangements of 
authority and not a rupture with it. Instead, sovereignty maintained the theological qualities of 
medieval authority by transferring them into secularized supernatural myths of the nation, 
nationalism, and popular sovereignty. Thus, modern sovereignty is inherently antagonistic to any 
competing authority, especially the authority of religion and the institution of the centralized 
church. Historically, this particular arrangement of authority in its relationship to religion has 
played an essential role in the rise of the modern concept of sovereignty. This conception of 
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sovereignty over time spread “in marked contrast to ideas of authority in other parts of the world 
before Western imperial states intervened and established themselves as a global, and no longer 
merely a European or Western system” (Jackson 2007, ix). No state today operates outside this 
system of state sovereignty. In fact, “sovereignty is the prevailing idea of political and legal 
authority of the modern era” (Jackson 2007, 7).  
 
 Yet, many contemporary legal scholars argue that state sovereignty is weakening and 
challenged by globalization, non-state actors, and political organizations. Consequently,  “the 
contemporary salience of religious movements around the globe, and the torrent of commentary 
on them by scholars and journalists, have made it plain that religion is by no means disappearing 
in the modern world” (Asad 2003,1).  In addition, many states today do not adhere to the above 
strict idea of sovereignty as the highest authority. For example, both Iran and Great Britain are 
sovereign states that operate with a pre-modern logic of authority. My point is to demonstrate 
that the strict definition of sovereignty provided by Jackson is constantly violated in the material 
world. Therefore, why should we accept that sovereignty could exist only in its modern form in 
relation to the past? “It is true that sovereignty is explicitly formulated in the modern 
period…but it does not follow that the reality of state sovereignty did not exist in earlier periods 
even though the concept itself had yet to be formulated” (Hoffman 1998, 35).The point here is 
not to question the modern concept and its relationship to the past and other forms of authority; 
instead, it is to demonstrate that other formulations of authority exist side-by-side with modern 
sovereignty. As such, modern sovereignty is a point on the continuum of forms of authority that 
have existed in European history and not a product of an abrupt appearance in history. This is an 
important point of disagreement among academics in the debate over the concept of sovereignty. 
20 
 
The results of this debate are important and much related to the subject matter of this dissertation 
since contemporary international law and human rights are directly related to the concept of 
sovereignty. 
 
 Yet, applying the strict definition of sovereignty provided above by Jackson to Islamic 
legal and political history is theoretically confusing and misleading at best. This methodological 
error overlooks the local characteristics of Sunni authority that are specific to the Islam in 
general and Sunni Islam in particular. More important, reducing Islamic legal and political 
history to a concept that has its historical roots in the history of Europe may lead to conclusions 
that are more relevant to European history than Islamic legal and political tradition. For example, 
a central of Islamic legal and political writings is derived from the fact that in Islam “Law is 
prior to the state” (Ahmed 1965, 481).  Consequently, “it is clear that in Islam the state has never 
been an end in itself: it has always been universal in character-not for one nation, but for all men 
of all nations of humanity” (Ahmed 483). As such, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate 
how the adherents of such a view act in a political environment organized around modern 
concepts such as state or popular sovereignty. A proper investigation into the concept of 
sovereignty and its relationship to any one European tradition should focus primarily on the local 
configuration of authority in the legal documents and historical configurations of authority and 
power. The aim is to escape the Eurocentric approach to the subject matter that “defines 
contemporary conditions in the ‘Third World’ in terms of abstracted condition of European 
experience” (Mirsepassi 2000, 8).  Adhering strictly to Eurocentric concepts deprives academic 
research of the opportunity to understand how other cultures constitute themselves in a world 
system dominated by international law, European sovereignty, globalization, capitalism, and 
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industrialized powers. How other systems of meaning and thought address sovereignty uncover 
the internal dynamic of these systems, as they address and interact within the international 
system of state sovereignty. This is less reductive than the academic approach that “defines the 
‘Third world’ as a singular essentialized entity not in terms of its own existing qualities, but in 
terms of ‘First World’ qualities which it lacks” (Mirsepassi 2000, 8).  
 Consequently, in avoiding these theoretical problems, one may overcome the problems of 
essentializing all non-European cultures into either/or categories compatible with modernity, 
democracy, and human rights. More specifically, the aim is to avoid overlooking the varieties 
within Islamic legal and political thought and essentialzing Islam into a singular entity. As Susan 
Buck-Morss has noted, the political impact of Islamism, “far from monolithic, has been 
reactionary, conservative, democratic, revolutionary, conspiratorial—depending on the specific 
and changing national and international contexts in which modern Islamism has developed over 
a period of several generations” (Buck-Morss 2003, 3).  This dissertation contends that the key to 
understanding the above variation in orientation toward politics is to investigate and comprehend 
how authority is constituted and how sovereignty is understood by Islamic legal and political 
thinkers.  
 This dissertation aims to investigate how European sovereignty operates and coexists 
with Sunni conceptions of authority. It draws on the ideat that “sovereignty is a form of 
authority” (Jackson 2007, 14). While there are universal characteristics of authority that both 
European sovereignty and Sunni authority share, the operation and configuration of how and why 
authority is recognized and obeyed is particular to the historical political and social conditions 
(both material and ideational) in any system of thought. Nevertheless, “the goal is not to 
‘understand’ some ‘other’ discourse, emanating from a ‘civilization’ that is intrinsically different 
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from ‘our own’” (Buck-Morss 2003, 4). Rather the goal is to evaluate and understand political 
Islam’s ideas of popular sovereignty, democracy, and human rights in light of the Islamic 
conception of sovereignty.  
 
 The academic research that theorizes sovereignty and state formation in Islamic political 
and social history through a Western prism may provide plausible narratives, but such an 
investigation overlooks the local qualities and configurations of authority that are innate in the 
character of another system of thought. Sovereignty in its Hobbesian relationship to violence, 
human nature, or a monopoly of violence faces limits when applied to Islamic political and social 
history. Its methodological limitations and problems arise when researching the rise of 
contemporary political Islam and Islamic political thought in general. Adding to its 
methodological problems the challenges of tracing social and political concepts across time and 
space while overlooking the local qualities of the subject matter renders the task daunting and 
unproductive. This dissertation argues that while authority and control are universal political 
concepts and present in all human collectivities, they must be grasped through their local context 
of meaning and significations. A good example of the universal character of authority and 
control is the following quote by Herbert Marcuse:  
Thus in the authority relationship, freedom and unfreedom, autonomy and heteronomy are yoked 
in the same concept and united in the single person of he who is subject. The recoginition of 
authority as a basic force of social praxis attacks the very roots of human freedom: it means (in a 
different sense in each case) the surrender of autonomy (of thought, will, action), the tying of the 
subject’s reason and will to pre-established contents, in such a way that these contents do not 
form the ‘material’ to be changed by the will of the individual but are taken over as they stand as 
the obligatory norms for his will. (7) 
 
This self-policing character is universal condition and present in the subject and every 
collectivity allowing the formation of the self and group identities that constitute the tribe, city, 
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state, and nation. Similarly, the formation of the self and group identities occurs in Islamic social 
and political history, as well. But to see how this formation of the self and group identities 
operates and how obedience is achieved in the Sunni Islamic context one must look at the local 
character of authority relationships. More precisely, the aim here is to understand how subjects 
are situated in relation to one another, i.e., how authority exerts obedience over the subject and 
maintains a collectivity with its system of meaning.  
 
 It is central to Islamic political thought that “law is prior to the state” (Ahmed 1965, 481). 
Islamic political thinking considers the purpose of the state to enforce the law, not the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of violence. It is a fact that neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna (an action or a 
statement by the Prophet narrated by legal sources) ordains Muslims to create a state or prescribe 
a particular system of government. The state is an expedient to implement Sharia. Consequently, 
the state is located under Sharia and not above it, and temporal authority or the Khalifa follows 
the same logic. The monopoly of violence is not prior to the state but a consequence of this fact. 
The following verses from the Qur’an illustrate the point: 
Say, "Indeed, I am on clear evidence from my Lord, and you have denied it. I do not have that for 
which you are impatient. The decision is only for Allah. He relates the truth, and He is the best of 
deciders." 6:57 
Follow, [O mankind], what has been revealed to you from your Lord and do not follow other than 
Him any allies. Little do you remember. 7:3 
And He is Allah; there is no deity except Him. To Him is [due all] praise in the first [life] and the 
Hereafter. And His is the [final] decision, and to Him you will be returned. 18:70 
 
These verses are foundational in Islamic legal and political writings. In fact, I argue that Fiqh al 
siyash al shariah, with the aid of actual historical circumstances surrounding the evolution of 
Sharia, is the proper area of investigation to understand the configuration of authority in Islam. 
The historian G.H. Bousquet, in answering the riddle behind the early success of the Islamic 
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conquest, pointed to the importance of Fiqh in understanding Islamic history. He argues against 
historical explanations that consider the early conquest of Islam as purely material in nature and 
downplay faith’s role. He contends that “a century after the conquest a new civilization was 
crystallizing around fiqh” (Donner 2008, xx). “Moreover, the fact that the conquerors did not 
stress conversion of subjects does not mean that conquerors were not motivated by religious idea 
(xx).”  This explains why Islamic empires up to the 19
th
 century such as Ottoman Empire 
allowed more than one set of legal codes to exist within the empire. Off course, exceptions exist 
in the history of Islam, but, nonetheless, Islamic authority, unlike European sovereignty, allowed 
plural legal codes and did not unify under one code of laws. 
 
 A lexical warning, I use the term Ulu Al Amr when speaking only about the Ulama 
(plural Alim legal scholars) or Grand Mufti (expert authorized to issue Fatwa, a legal opinion). 
Explaining the use and the argument that Ulu Al Amr are the Ulama or Grand Mufti will become 
abundantly clear in chapter two. But for the moment it is sufficient to state that according to Fiqh 
al siyash al shariah the term Ulu Al Amr includes the Ulama but the Ulama do not exclusively 
occupy this category. Historically, Ulu Al Amr at one moment in history includes the 
Companions of the Prophet and in some other moment in history legal opinions include in it the 
Khalifa or temporal power. The justification of this argument is the central topic of chapter two, 
which argues that the Ulama and the Companions of the Prophet are Ulu Al Amr and not 
temporal power. If, according to Carl Schmitt, the “sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception” (5), then sovereignty does not exist in Islamic legal and political writings. Legally, 
Ulu Al Amr is the body that is qualified to decide the exception via Ijma (consensus among 
Ulama as a source of Islamic law) yet they do not control the means of force. While the Khalifa 
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had the monopoly of force he does not decide the exception. This local character is central in 
understanding the Sunni legal and political system of meaning. Moreover, no one, including the 
Ulu Al Amr, can legally suspend Sharia entirely. Those are the two central characteristics of 
Sunni Fiqh al siyash al Shariah that must be understood to theorize accurately how obedience 
and control is historically achieved in Sunni Islam and why European sovereignty is a debatable 
concept in Fiqh al siyash al shariah.  This will become clearer in the following chapters but for 
the moment this dissertation uses the Ulu Al Amr as the Ulama.  
 
Historically, legal debates among Ulama (legal scholars) about the concept of 
sovereignty in relation to Sharia appeared abruptly in the eighteenth century. Debates on the 
concept of sovereignty in relation to Sharia appeared approximately during the colonial period, 
which started with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt 1798-1801 CE. Accordingly, “ the dominance 
of the idea of sovereignty on the thinking of political and constitutional scholars in the Muslim 
states led to the appearance of several legal views in locating the source of sovereignty in the 
contemporary Islamic thinking”(Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 21).
4
 Interest in the concept of 
sovereignty was shaped by the advent of the nation state during the colonial period but 
internationally the concept was operative in international law. Thus, interest and debates about 
sovereignty continued in the postcolonial era as well. According to Mufti and Wakeel, “since 
early twentieth century colonial powers propagated the concept of sovereignty as tool to 
establish their hegemony and laws for the purpose of secularizing Muslims and marginalizing 
Islam and Sharia. This process led the colonized states to establish the principle of popular 
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ي بالد المسلمين إلى ظهور عدة إتجاهات في تحديد لقد أدت سيطرة فكرة السيادة على التفكير السياسي لعلماء السياسة و رجال القانون الدستوري ف  
 مصدر السيادة في الفكر السياسي اإلسالمي المعاصر . و مع التأكيد بأن البحث أساسا في صاحب السيادة
26 
 
sovereignty and abandoned the Sharia to prove that their system of government is similar to 
Western states” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 7).
5
 Consequently, “Muslim legal scholars concentrated 
their efforts at theorizing about the concept of sovereignty in general and more precisely, the 
attribute of sovereignty as the highest authority and the consequences it holds in relation to the 
authority of the Sharia, the will of the Umma (community, or Muslims as a unit), and the state” 




 The Fuqaha agreed unanimously that modern sovereignty contradicts Sharia, which is 
superior in location to it. According to As-Sawy “the will of God alone is above any other 
competing will and as such Ijma (consensus of Fuqaha in a given age) was achieved on the 
subject matter. Ijma follows the Quran and Sunna as a source of law that regulates the Umma. 
Throughout the history of Islam there was no opposition to this principle from a minor or a major 
sect in Islam” (As-Sawy 2011, 31).
7
 If the previous statement sounds unequivocal, consider the 
following quote by Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (1058–1111 CE), the prominent Faqih in the twelfth 
Century, who argues “that in the process of answering who should govern, it becomes clear that 
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ين الغربيين فيها و تأصيل منذ أوائل القرن الحالي سعى اإلستعمار الغربي إلى نشر مفاهيمه عن السيادة في بالد المسلمين بهدف بسط الهيمنة و  القوان 
الشعبية إلظهار و  النزعة الالدينية إلقصاء اإلسالم عن واقع الحياة و التشريع ، مما جعل أغلب الدول المستعمرة و التابعة تسارع إلى قرار مبدأ السيادة
 تأكيد توافق أنظمتها مع األنظمة الغربية ، باإلضافة إلى تعطيل األحكام الشرعية
6
طرة فكرة السيادة على التفكير السياسي لعلماء السياسة و رجال القانون الدستوري في بالد المسلمين إلى ظهور عدة إتجاهات في تحديد لقد أدت سي 
 مصدر السيادة في الفكر السياسي اإلسالمي المعاصر . و مع التأكيد بأن البحث أساسا في صاحب السيادة
7
ت و السلطة التي تهيمن على جميع السلطات فيما تنظمه أو تقضي فيه سلطة أخرى تساويها أو تساميها ، إنما إن اإلرادة التي تعلو على جميع اإلرادا 
و ال ذكر و ال  هي إرادة هللا وحده ال شريك له.  و لقد إنعقد إجماع األمة كلها في مختلف األعصار و األمصار ، إجماعاً لم يشذ عنه كبير و ال صغير ،
أن  عبد و ال طائع و ال عاص .. إنه ال دين إال ما أوجبه هللا و ال شرع إال ما شرعه ، و ال حالل إال ما أحله و ال حرام اال ما حرمه ، وأنثى و ال حر و ال 
لندب .. فهو ا من جادل في هذه ) البنهية( فأحل ما حرمه هللا أو حرم ما أحله أو رد شيئا من حكمه ، أو أعطى غيره حق التحليل و التحريم و اإليجاب و
 مارق من الدين كافر بإجماع المسلمين
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there is not rule but God’s rule and neither the Prophet rule over Muslims nor a master over a 
slave is above that” (As-Sawy 2011, 31).
8
  
 Theologically, during the early period in the history of Islam, legal scholars or Ulu Al 
Amr had achieved consensus or Ijma that sovereignty belongs exclusively to God. Consequently, 
historically the issue has never been a matter of debate. But disagreements among legal scholars 
or Ulu Al Amr were evident beyond this understanding and especially in practical realm of 
implementation. Differences between the schools in legal opinions will be spelled out in the 
following two comprehensive legal studies compiled on the topic of the modern sovereignty in 
Fiqh.  
 The first survey by the Muslim legal scholars Mufti and Wakeel is divided roughly into 
three groups on the issue of modern sovereignty in Fiqh: 
First, the Umma and sovereignty legal opinion, which considers the Umma as a whole, is   source 
of sovereignty, or actually the sovereign. Legally, they justify their claim that the Umma alone is 
the source of authority and government in Islam. 
One of the scholars who advances this opinion is the prominent 20
th
 Century Muslim Faqih, 
Mohamed Al Ghazali Al Saqqa, [who was closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Egypt.] In his famous book published in 1949, Islam and Political Despotism, he advanced his 
Ijtihad (to exercise personal judgment based on the Qur'an and Sunna) that “the Umma alone is 
the source of authority and to disregard this fact amounts to a rebellion against both divine 




A similar legal opinion was advanced earlier in the nineteenth
 
century by Muhammad Bekhit Al 
Mut'aei, the grand Mufti (Sunni Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of Sharia) of 
Egypt (1915-1920), in his book The Truth of Islam and the Rules of Governing, in which he 
                                                          
8
تعالى و وضعه ، و في البحث عن الحاكم يتبين أنه ال حكم إال هلل ، و حكم للرسول و ال للسيد على العبد و ال لمخلوق على مخلوق ، بل كل ذلك حكم هللا  
 ال حكم غيره
9
مة صاحبة السيادة على أسا أن ) السلطة العامة لي لها سوى مصدر واحد و صاحب واحد األمة و السيادة  يرى أصحاب اإلتجاه االول : أن األ-أوال 
سيادة بقوله :  و هو األمة . و لقد أكد إتجاه سيادة األمة و إعتبارها مصدرا للسلطات عدد من الكتاب . حيث يعبر الشيخ محمد الغزالي عن هذا المفهوم لل
و النزول على إرادتها فريضة ، و الخروج على رأيها تمرد ،،، و نصوص الدين و تجارب الحياة تتضافر كلها من ثم فاألمة وحدها هي مصدر السلطة 
  على توكيد ذلك
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argued “that Muslims are among the first people to advance the legal principle that the authority 
is in the hand of the Umma” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 22).
10
 
 This opinion that sovereignty resides with the Umma is based on a number of legal 
principles, but most important is that according to Sharia, Muslims have the right to choose their 
ruler through Bay’a (a contract in a form of an oath of allegiance to a leader). The second 
principle is Ijma. This principle was constructed by Muslim scholars based on a number of 
Hadiths (plural for Hadith). Most important is the following Hadith: “My nation will not unite 
on error, so if you see them differing, follow the great majority.”
11
 This most-referred-to Hadith 
serves as the legal foundation of Ijma for the primacy of the Umma.  
 Second is “the dual sovereignty legal opinion group who considers the Umma and the 
Sharia both as constitutive of sovereignty in the Islamic state” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 25).
12
 
“This view of Fiqh differentiates between two sets of injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna; they 
are definitive injunctions and injunctions that are open to interpretations” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 
25).
13
 Accordingly, it is only when the injunctions are unclear and open to interpretations that the 
Umma acts as sovereign through the process of Ijma. This view is advanced by the contemporary 
scholar Hazim Abdel Mutaal Al Saeedi in his book The Islamic Theory of the State Compared 
with The State in Modern Jurisprudence.  He argues that “sovereignty in the Islamic state resides 
in the people…since the Umma is the source of authority and the ruler must obey its will. 
                                                          
10
 أن المسلمين هم أول أمة قالت بأن األمة هي مصدر السلطات كلها قبل أن يقول ذلك غيرها من األمم 
11
كم بالسواد األعظمإن أمتي ال تجتمع على ضاللة فإذا رأيتم اختالفا فعلي   
12
 أما أصحاب اإلتجاه الثاني : فيرون أن السيادة مزدوجة، فاألمة و الشريعة يمثالن مصدر السيادة في الدولة االسالمية 
13
و يفرق هؤالء بين مجال النص القطعي ، و مجال النص الظني أو عدم ورود نص ، فإذا وجد نص قطعي واضح أصبحت السيادة هلل و انتفى دور  
يعة فيما ال نص غلبية أو اإلجماع . أما إذا كان النص ظني الداللة فإن دور الجماعة يبرز ليهيمن على األمر و تصبح السيادة الشعبية مكملة لدور الشراأل
  فيه أو فيما فيه نص ظني أو غامض
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Nevertheless, it is Sharia that sets the limits on the sovereignty of the state or the people. 
Consequently, the Umma is free to legislate laws and organize the state accordingly but within 
the limits of Sharia” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 26).
14
Therefore, sovereignty is limited only by a 
clear injunction in the Qur’an or Sunna. Thus, it is a self-imposed limitation by the state and the 
people.  
 Third is the legal opinion that considers Sharia as the sole sovereign. Accordingly, the 
“Ijma of the Umma was achieved as a principle abiding on Muslims, that is, adherence to the 
Qur’an and Sunna and that the arbiter are the Book and the Sunna in any disagreement. As such 
it nullifies the sovereignty of the Umma whether limited or absolute” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 
28).
15
 Furthermore, “Sharia had emphasized the principle that sovereignty belongs to the law and 
not to the Umma. Instead, Sharia gives rights to the Umma only in the area of selecting the Imam 
(the leader, and in its highest form, refers to the head of the Islamic state) and scrutinizing his 
performance. Therefore, the state does not derive the authority to legislate from the Umma 
because it does not have it, and who does not own something cannot pass it to another entity” 
(Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 28-29).
16
 According to Fathi Al Derini, a leading contemporary scholar 
in Fiqh al siyasi (Islamic jurisprudence that deals with politics), “the Fiqh al siyasi historically 
was unconcerned with the concept of sovereignty as it was a major subject among Western 
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للحكام في الدولة االسالمية من األمر إال ما تريده األمة و  السيادة في الدولة اإلسالمية تكمن في الشعب فاألمة اإلسالمية هي مصدر السلطات ، و لي  
ة و لألمة ترضاه . أما عن حدود سيادة الدولة ، أو سيادة مجموع األفراد المكونين للدولة اإلسالمية ، فهي الحدود التي فرضتها الشريعة اإلسالمي
 اإلسالمية أن تضع نظمها و قوانينها في حدود هذه السيادة
15
بحث مبدأ سيادة الشرع مستندا على أصل مقطوع به مجمع عليه في الشريعة و هو وجوب إتباع ما جاء به الوحي من كتاب و سنة و أن الكتاب يؤكد ال 
عبيةو السنة حاكمان في كل أمر مختلف فيه . و بذلك يتقرر بطالن القول ) بسيادة األمة ( المطلقة أو المقيدة أو القول بنظرية السيادة الش   
16
و عزله ، فالدولة لقد أكدت تعاليم اإلسالم أن السيادة للشرع و ليست للشعب الذي يمتلك فقط السلطان المتمثل في توليه اإلمام ، و مراقبته ، و محاسبته  
فالفقه السياسي اإلسالمي لم  ال تستمد سلطة التشريع من األمة ، ألنها ال تملكها أصال ، و من ال يملك شيئا، لي بوسعه أن يملكه غيره بداهة ، و لذلك
ع . و قد أقرت يتناول مشكلة السيادة أو الشرعية السياسية كما تناولها ففقهاء السياسة الغربيون ، الن السيادة في النظرية السياسية اإلسالمية للشر
أن تزعزعت معالم الخالفة اإلسالميةالممارسة السياسية هذا المبدأ لفترة طويلة و لم يبدأ النظر في أصل السيادة و منشئها إال بعد   
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scholars since Sharia is the sovereign in Islamic jurisprudence. Furthermore, historically the 
principle  established precedent through the practice of politics by Islamic states and no one 
questioned the source of sovereignty or its roots until the fall of the last Islamic Khilafa” (Mufti 
& Wakeel 1991, 28-29).
17
 The author refers to the process of modernization that the Ottoman 
Empire embarked upon in its final decades before its collapse in World War I.  
 Thus, under this legal view of sovereignty, Sharia trumps popular sovereignty and state 
sovereignty as well.  According to Mufti and Wakeel, “the principle of abiding by the authority 
of Sharia ties the governor and the governed to the sovereignty of God; consequently, legislation 
is directly derived from the Sharia. Conversely, legislation by the state cannot violate Sharia on 
the basis that the Hakimiyyah (sovereignty) is for God” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 29).
18
 It is this 
same concept that both Al Maududi and Qutb use in their political writings, and it is to this 
school of Fiqh that they belong.  This legal opinion is indeed platonic and in the face of social 
and political change the most rigid among the other opinions. For example, Qutb argues “the 
revelation represented the unequivocal affirmation that the source of the Qur’anic message was 
the Allah; He is the sovereign of all sovereignty” (Khatab 2006, 32). Moreover, he states that 
“our primary purpose is to know what way of life is demanded of us by the Qur’an, the total 
view of the universe which the Qur’an wants us to have, what is the nature of our knowledge 
taught to us by the Qur’an, the kind of morals and manners which are enjoined by it, and the 
kind of legal and constitutional system it asks us to establish in the world. Thus the Sharia which 
                                                          
17
و عزله ، فالدولة لقد أكدت تعاليم اإلسالم أن السيادة للشرع و ليست للشعب الذي يمتلك فقط السلطان المتمثل في توليه اإلمام ، و مراقبته ، و محاسبته  
بوسعه أن يملكه غيره بداهة ، و لذلك فالفقه السياسي اإلسالمي لم  ال تستمد سلطة التشريع من األمة ، ألنها ال تملكها أصال ، و من ال يملك شيئا، لي 
ع . و قد أقرت يتناول مشكلة السيادة أو الشرعية السياسية كما تناولها ففقهاء السياسة الغربيون ، الن السيادة في النظرية السياسية اإلسالمية للشر
ظر في أصل السيادة و منشئها إال بعد أن تزعزعت معالم الخالفة اإلسالميةالممارسة السياسية هذا المبدأ لفترة طويلة و لم يبدأ الن   
18
مية ، و عدم و يهدف مبدأ سيادة الشرع إلى إقرار إلتزام الحاكم و المحكوم بشرع هللا سبحانه و تعالى ، و إلى إنبثاق التشريعات من الشريعة اإلسال 
ا قاعدة الحاكمية هلل و القانون المطبق في الدولةإحداث تشريعات أو ممارسات تخالف الشرع . و ذلك أس   
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God has given man to organize his life is also a universal law, as it is related to the general law 
of the universe and is harmonious with it” (Qutb 2005, 21&89). Qutb is unequivocally clear that 
the primary source for understanding politics and organizing the state is the Qur’an, the very 
expression of sovereignty, and as such it stands above human laws. The Fuqaha who adhere to 
this school of Fiqh usually argue that the Hakimiyyah of Sharia is clearly stated in the Qur’an. 
They refer to the following verses: 
Indeed, We sent down the Torah, in which was guidance and light. The prophets who submitted 
[to Allah] judged by it for the Jews, as did the rabbis and scholars by that with which they were 
entrusted of the Scripture of Allah, and they were witnesses thereto. So do not fear the people but 
fear Me, and do not exchange My verses for a small price. And whoever does not judge by what 
Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers. 5:44 
And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for 
an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his right as] 
charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then 
it is those who are the wrongdoers. 5:45 
And We sent, following in their footsteps, Jesus, the son of Mary, confirming that which came 
before him in the Torah; and We gave him the Gospel, in which was guidance and light and 
confirming that which preceded it of the Torah as guidance and instruction for the righteous. 5:46 
And let the People of the Gospel judge by what Allah has revealed therein. And whoever does not 
judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the defiantly disobedient. 5:47 
And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which 
preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has 
revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To 
each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one 
nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all 
that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that 
over which you used to differ. 5:48 
And judge, [O Muhammad], between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their 
inclinations and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from some of what Allah has revealed 
to you. And if they turn away - then know that Allah only intends to afflict them with some of 
their [own] sins. And indeed, many among the people are defiantly disobedient. 5:49 
 
Ample verses in the Qur’an illustrate the point, but I use these verses to provide the sequential 
detail of the injunction. This is even clearer in the verse “[O Muhammad] do not follow their 
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inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth” 5:48. The verse is usually presented as 
evidence against the previous two schools of Fiqh, arguing that God directly asked the prophet to 
implement the law as it was revealed.   
Nevertheless, Sharia and the Qur’an and the Sunna have little, if anything, to say about 
the state or politics. This legal opinion views the state as a mere executive mechanism that 
executes Sharia, which remains constant regardless of changing social and political 
circumstances. The political body that executes the law, on the other hand, changes according to 
social and political circumstance. Thus, the executive will change to accommodate Sharia. 
 
 The second survey is by the contemporary jurist and Faqih, Salah As-Sawy. He divides 
the scope of the debate into four genres instead of the three categories of Mufti and Wakeel. 
Most important, he argues that “none of the four legal opinions argued that God is not sovereign 
as it is the case according to the Western concept of sovereignty” (As-Sawy 2011, 52).
19
 The 
differences between the two surveys are insignificant, but it is worth demonstrating for the sake 
of an exhaustive assessment of the concept of sovereignty in Sharia. 
 The first genre contends that “God is the sovereign, while government is a human matter 
with God’s authorization” (As-Sawy 2011, 51).
20
 According to this legal view, “the Umma does 
not have the right to legislate new laws but it is free in the manner of the execution of Sharia” 
(As-Sawy 2011, 52).
21
 The Umma has the authority to choose its leader and to set the standard of 
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 أن واحدا منها لم يقرر أن السيادة المطلقة بمعناها السابق أي المصطلح عليه في الفكر الغربي ألحد من دون هللا 
20
 اإلتجاه األول : يرى أن السيادة هلل "ابتالء" أما موضع الحكم فهو بيد البشر ، بتفويض من هللا 
21
إنما  جاه األول : ال يتحدث عن دور األمة في التشريع المطلق ، أو في إنشاء شرع جديد ، فذلك الذي قرر تفرد الشرع به ، و أنه هلل إبتداء ،فاإلت 
 يتحدث عن دورها في التنظيم في دائرة المباح أو العفو
33 
 
accountability freely according to its needs. More precisely, the Umma is free to regulate and 
choose the manner and method of executing the Sharia. In a sense, the Umma is in charge of 
executive laws, organization of the state, and standards of implementation for the laws, but the 
Umma cannot legislate new Sharia.  
 Second, similar to Mufti and Wakeel’s first category, the “second current considers the 
Umma to be the sovereign” (As-Sawy 2011, 51).
22
 Yet, according to As-Sawy, “the adherents of 
this view of Fiqh do not conceptualize and produce sovereignty in the modern Western sense; 
instead, they arrived at the idea of Umma sovereignty by obeying Sharia’s injunctions” (As-
Sawy 2011, 52).
23
 In other words, the Fuqaha arrived at this position through the principle of 
Ijtihad and Ijma and not from a principle or ideal outside of Sharia.  
 Third, and similar to Mufti and Wakeel’s second category, sovereignty is dual in 
character. According to the adherents of this school “God is sovereign in areas with clear 
injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna, and areas with injunctions that are open to interpretation or 
without any injunctions are left for the Umma to regulate given that the new legislation does not 
contradict Sharia” (As-Sawy 2011, 53).
24
 Consequently, the Umma has the authority to legislate 
when faced with new circumstances that have no clear injunctions in the Qur’an, Sunna, or Ijma. 
Its sole restriction is that new laws not contradict an injunction in Sharia. 
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 االتجاه الثاني : و يذهب إلى أن السيادة لألمة 
23
نسب إليه الكاتب القول بأن السيادة لألمة يشترك عليه الكاتب نفسه بقوله : و مما يجب في هذا الصدد أن أصحاب هذا اإلتجاه  الذي : أما اإلتجاه الثاني 
ي ذهنهم ال يقصدون من هذا الرأي أن مبدأ السيادة في سياقه اإلسالمي يحمل نف مدلوله في السياق األوروبي ، بل أنهم ذهبوا إلى هذا الرأي و ف
الشرعيةضوابطه    
24
في دائرة  اإلتجاه الثالث : ال يتحدث عن سيادة األمة في دائرة الشرع المحكم ، فهو الذي قرر أن السيادة خالصة هلل، و لكنه يتحدث عن دور األمة 
كنها ملتزمة في األولى بقواعد المباح أو العفو ، و في حالة النص الذي يحتمل تأويله أوجها متعددة ، و سيأتي بيان أن هذه السيادة ليست مطلقة ، و ل
 الشريعة الكلية و مقاصدها العامة ، و ملتزمة في الثانية بضوابط الترجيح المعتبرة شرعا ، فال سيادة و ال إطالق
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 The last category according to As-Sawy is that the sovereign is the Umma. This is similar 
to Mufti and Wakeel’s first category “that as sovereign the Umma is the primary legislator since 
the Umma is the entity that chooses to be Muslim and decides to obey Sharia and legislate 
according to its principles” (As-Sawy 2011, 53).
25
 This view is primarily based on the legal 
principle that there is no compulsion in religion. Hence, if the Umma decides not to adhere to the 
Sharia or religion of Islam, implementing the law becomes meaningless. I argue that in this 
category belongs Rashed Al Ghannushi who argues that “God did not make faith a matter of 
force and compulsion; instead, it is a matter of understanding and choice. Compulsion by 
definition contradicts judgment day since it nullifies human responsibilities for their actions and 
most importantly stands in contradiction of Qura’nic verse [There shall be no compulsion in 
[acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever 
disbelieves in Taghut (transgressor) and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy 
handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. {2:256}]” (Al Ghannushi 
1993, 36).
26
  Accordingly, the Umma respects sovereignty as a category of choice and 
responsibility. The strict implementation of Sharia and the law is not going to create better 
Muslims since this understanding contradicts the above verse and nullifies the very purpose of 
Judgment Day.  
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أنها في هذه الدائرة هي  أما اإلتجاه الرابع : فهو أبعد هذه اإلتجاهات عند اإلطالق النه ال يتحدث إال عن إطالق اإلرادة في إختيار اإلسالم إبتداء ، و 
 صاحبة السيادة و صاحبة القرار فإذا هي إختارت اإلسالم فقد رضيت بالتقيد بكافة األحكام الشرعية ، و ألزمت نفسها بإتباع أحكامه
26
من يحاول فتنتهم عن دينهم ألحد يكره أهله الخروج عنه. و من أجل ضمان عدم اإلكراه أوجب اإلسالم على المسلمين التمكن من القوة للقيام في وجه  
ن على اإلجبار و أمر المسلمين أن يعتمدو في دعوة خصومهم أسلوب الحكمة و الموعظة الحسنة لتبيين الرشد من الغي . فإن هللا تعالى ما بني أمر اإليما
متحان . و نظير هذا قوله تعالى : )) فمن شاء هللا و القسر، و إنما بناه على التمكن و اإلختيار. إلن في القهر و اإلكراه على الدين بطالن معنى و اال
 فليؤمن و من شاء فليكفر (( كما ذهب إلى ذلك الرازي . و إذا كان اإلعتقاد محله القلب فاإلكراه فيه ممتنع أصال
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In general, what is the significance of these contending views on the concept of 
sovereignty?  
The concept of sovereignty and its two attributes, the source and location of authority, are 
the primary cause that divides legal schools. The significance of the configuration of authority 
cannot be overemphasized; however, what can be further emphasized is that the concept of 
authority in Fiqh is not static and cannot simply be essentialized into one legal view that is 
opposed to modern concepts of sovereignty.  The concepts of state and popular sovereignty may 
after all be compatible with at least one school of Fiqh. More precisely, it is possible to arrive at 
the Western conception of sovereignty from Fiqh al siyash al shariah, but that is neither the aim 
nor the argument of this dissertation.  
Second, according to contending views of sovereignty while there is Ijma on the principle 
that God is the sovereign, there is no Ijma in Fiqh about how the previous principle is related to 
modern sovereignty. The majority of Western academic literature overlooks this central character 
in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Consequently, it erroneously applies the label of 
fundamentalism to all forms of political Islam.  
Third, I argue that views of sovereignty differ according to whom the Fuqaha considers a 
legally qualified member of Ijma. The more inclusive legal opinion on who should be a member 
of Ijma will most likely be in accord with As-Sawy’s last category stipulating the Umma is the 
sovereign. Conversely, the more exclusive legal opinion on who should be a member of Ijma 
will more likely belong to the group that contends God is the sovereign and Sharia is the 
sovereign. This is a significant categorization since Ijma is not mentioned in the primary sources 
of the Qur’an and Sunna. Instead, it is a legal category that was created though Ijtihad. It is a fact 
that there is no Ijma in Fiqh on who should be included in Ijma.  
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Finally and most important, this dissertation argues that the concept of modern 
sovereignty is more accurately represented in the category of those who are in a position to 
constitute Ijma. In Islamic legal theory, those who are in charge of deciding who is included and 
excluded in Ijma are the highest authority and must be the focus of investigating authority 
configurations in Islam. While there is no Church in Islam, the authority that this group 
possesses emanates from the condition “that the legal idea cannot translate itself independently 
[which] is evident from the fact that it says nothing about who should apply it” (Schmitt 1985, 
31).  This is an accurate description of the category of Ulu Al Amr (Trustee or Custodians) that 
are mentioned in the Qur’an: 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59 
 
In fact, there is no legal consensus (Ijma) on who they are and how they are constituted, but 
“they are entitled to the affairs of the community and have this authority and the leadership of 
the Umma in accordance to the Sharia” (Al-Massari 2002, 14).
27
 The following section will 
briefly address the legal category of Ulu Al Amr, which is discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
 
In conclusion, what is the significance to the contending views of sovereignty, and what 
can we say about the concept of sovereignty according to Fiqh?  
First, it is evident that the concept of sovereignty as the highest authority is the primary 
cause that divides the legal schools into at least three different opinions. More precisely, it is the 
question, and the heart of the debate between the Fuqaha, whether Sharia or sovereignty is prior. 
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Moreover, that the Fuqaha hold different legal views regarding the relationship between Sharia 
and sovereignty belies the Eurocentric academic view that tends to essentialize non-European 
concepts into one category opposite itself.  In fact, as previously mentioned, there are at least 
three contending opinions. The concept of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty may after 
all be compatible with at least one opinion of Fiqh, which contends the Umma is the sovereign. 
Consequently, it is possible to arrive at a Eurocentric conception of sovereignty from different 
legal views and principles of Fiqh, but that is neither the aim nor the argument of this 
dissertation.  
Second, since there is no Ijma among the Fuqaha or legal scholars on the concept, all 
contending views are legally valid, and Muslims are legally able to follow any of these opinions. 
This implies there is no consensus among scholars on the compatibility of sovereignty with 
Sharia. Therefore, the debate is ongoing.  
Third, this dissertation argues that the statutory interpretations above differ according to 
who is legally qualified to establish Ijma. Accordingly, the more inclusive legal opinion 
regarding which parties can deliberate in the process of Ijma will likely belong to those who 
maintain that sovereignty belongs to the Umma. Conversely, the more exclusive or elitist legal 
opinion concerning who can deliberate in the process of Ijma will likely belong to the group that 
contends God is the sovereign and Sharia has sovereignty over the Umma. This is a significant 
categorization since Ijma as a principle is not mentioned in the primary sources of the Qur’an 
and Sunna. Instead, it is a legal category that was created though Ijtihad and became legal via 
Ijma. There is no Ijma in Fiqh determining who should be included to constitute Ijma.  
Finally and most important, this dissertation argues that sovereignty is not key to 
understanding authority in Islamic legal and political writings. Instead, the focus of this 
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investigation is on those historically in charge of deliberating on new legal circumstances, 
including whether or not state and popular sovereignty are compatible with Sharia. Moreover, 
the subject of my investigation is focused on the following questions and those who are 
historically in a position to designate Ijma: Who is this group that has the power of Ijma? How 
do they qualify to be a part of Ijma? Who decides when Ijma is reached? In what ways has Ijma 
changed? Most important, what is the historical relationship between Ijma, power, and authority?  
Why does any particular group wield influence over Ijma?  Each of these questions can be 
answered only if we move beyond an exclusive concern with sovereignty. 
This dissertation contends that answering these questions is theoretically more rewarding 
than investigating whether the concept of sovereignty is compatible with Sharia. Answering 
these questions may avoid the inherent methodological problems that come from accepting 
Eurocentric definitions—while overlooking local concepts—and then applying these concepts to 
other systems of thought. 
Primarily, this dissertation posits that the group that is in a position of constituting Ijma is 
the closest in structure and character to the sovereign. It follows that those who are in charge of 
deciding who is to be included and excluded from constituting Ijma are the highest and final 
authority; it is this group on which we focus our investigation into the function of authority in 
Islamic legal and political writings. In fact, this highest and final authority is derivative of the 
principle of Ijma in Fiqh. It is created by the same group for the sake of addressing changes (in 
other words, the exception) in the established law. Consider the following example from 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali: 
Siyasah (politics) in its widest sense has five purposes: the protection of the faith, life, intellect, 
lineage, and property. The Ulama are (religious scholars; theologians) unanimous on the point 
that the protection of these values constitutes the ultimate objective of Sharia itself, despite the 
fact that a specific reference to this group of values can be found neither in the Qur’an nor in the 
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Sunna. General consensus (Ijma) on the protection of these values is not based on any particular 
provision of the Qur’an or the Sunna, but on the overall contents of these source-texts and on the 
numerous commands and prohibitions that are designed to protect these values. The same can be 
said of the Qur’anic verses that enjoin the community in the pursuit of good and prevention of 
evil. The good and evil are nowhere listed exhaustively in the Qur’an or the Sunna but can be 
known through a general investigation of these sources. (146) 
 
So who is this group, and how did they come to occupy the highest point in the hierarchy of 
authority? According to Carl Schmitt, “this individual or group is the outcome of the fact that the 
legal idea cannot translate itself independently” (Schmitt 2005, 31). Therefore, this category of 
the sovereign is the outcome of the application of the law. Furthermore, the Qur’an actually 
acknowledges a group that should apply the legal idea. In the famous verse 4:58 in the Qur’an, 
which this undertaking maintains is the threshold of the political theory of the Qur’an, this 
faction is mentioned by name, Ulu Al Amr (trustees, guardians). In fact, this is the only instance 
in the Qur’an that Muslims are directed to obey an entity other than God or the Prophet. It is 
important to note that the verse is primarily concerned with temporal authority and to understand 
the scope of that authority the verse must be read sequentially for a fuller appreciation of the 
consequences of the order of obedience in verse 4:58 
Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between 
people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever 
Hearing and Seeing. 4:58 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59 
Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O 
Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to Taghut (a 
person who overstep boundaries of the law), while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan 
wishes to lead them far astray. 4:60 
 
Verse 4:58 reads: “that obedience [is] to be given as three levels: (a) Allah; (b) His Prophet; and 
(c) those charged with authority otherwise known as Ulu Al Amr or Sultan in Islamic terms” 
(Omotosho 2000, 1). Thus, obedience to Ulu Al Amr is conditional and tied to the other two 
higher sources of authority, who are God and the Prophet. It is also important to note that the 
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Qur’an does not mention obedience to a king, Amir, Sultan or any other temporal power. This 
dissertation argues that a proper investigation of authority in Islamic legal and political writing 
must focus on this group, the Ulu Al Amr as the highest and final authority in relation to temporal 
power and government. It is the Ulu Al Amr who have the power to give legitimacy to temporal 
power and government, whether it is the Amir, Khalifa, or Sultan. Actually, there is one more 
verse in the Qur’an that testifies to the authority of Ulu Al Amr in the matter of the law after the 
authority of God and the Prophet: 
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around. 
But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to those of authority among them, then the 
ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it. And if not for the 
favor of Allah upon you and His mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for a few. (4:83) 
 
This task that is assigned only to the Ulu Al Amr is beyond the domain of temporal power, 
whether a Khalifa or Amir. The exception to this rule is the period of the Four Guided Caliphs 
who were simultaneously included in both Ulu Al Amr and the Caliphs. But even then, they 
could not achieve Ijma since the term Ulu Al Amr is plural not singular. Again, the significance 
this exception will be clear in the following chapter. 
Yet, there is no Ijma directing who is to be included in Ulu Al Amr since the Qur’an and 
Sunna are mute on the matter. According to Al-Massari, “there are at least six different opinions 
in Fiqh on who should be included in Ulu Al Amr” (Al-Massari 2002, 15-14).
28
 This means that 
historically there is no Ijma clarifying who should be among Ulu Al Amr, and the constitution of 
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ة :  األول : ا المراد ))بأولي األمر(( في الشرع الواردة في اآلية السابقة فقد إختلف أهل العلم من المفسرين و غيرهم في ذلك األقوال ، أشهرها ستأم 
الخلف .   الثاني :  أنهم األمراء، قاله جمع من السلف منهم أبو هريسة و إبن عبا . و رجمة اإلمام الطبري ، قال النووي ، و هو قول جمهور السلف و
الث : أنهم أنهم العلماء ، و به قال جمع من السلف منهم جابر بن عبدهللا ، رضوان هللا و سالمه عليه ، و الحسن البصري و النخعي و غيرهم .   الث
مة .  الخام : قال ابن كثير : و الظاهر و أصحاب محمد صلى هللا عليه و سلم قاله مجاهد .   الرابع : أنهم أبوبكر و عمر ، رضي هللا عنهما ، قاله عكر
وزية ، و الشوكاني و هللا أعلم أنها عامة في كل األمراء و العلماء . و قد اختار هذا الرأي جمهرة من أهل العلم ، منهم أبو بكر العربي ، و ابن القيم الج
م ما هو أعم من العلماء و األمراء من زعماء و وجهاء و كل من كان الشيخ عبد الرحمن بن سعدي .   الساد : و يرى بعض أهل العلم أن المراد به
 متبوعا و هم المعروفون بأهل الحل و العقد
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the group changed historically from one period to another. Yet, Ulu Al Amr historically is the 
group who are entitled to make decisions on Sharia and have the authority over it. The following 























    CHAPTER II 
               Who are Ulu Al-Amr? 
 
On March 21, 2013“[a] large explosion killed at least 42 people inside a central 
Damascus mosque…including the top Sunni cleric in Syria, one of the major remaining Sunni 
supporters of President Bashar al-Assad’s embattled government in the civil war” (Mourtada and 
Gladstone, 2013). Mohammad Said Ramada al-Bouti, a contemporary example of a modern 
member (a state bureaucrat) of an establishment Ulu Al Amr, served as an essential source for 
theological legitimacy of Syria’s secular Ba'ath party government. His support for the Assad 
regime legitimated its rule and policies against the armed opposition that is currently battling for 
power. Al-Bouti’s role in Syria illustrates the historical importance of the legitimacy that the Ulu 
Al Amr has as an integral part of government rule over Muslims. For example, Turkey and Syria 
make the paradoxical claim that they are secular states yet entrust theological affairs to a 
governmental department that is a part of the state bureaucracy. Another example is the Ba'ath 
party in both Iraq and Syria always projected itself as Pan-Arab, modern, and secular. Yet both 
Saddam Hussein and Bashar Al-Assad during their crises appealed to religious figures, members 
of the state’s theological and bureaucratic establishment, for legitimacy. All contemporary Arab 
states and certainly some Western states such as Great Britain are riddled with this character, 
which violates Jackson’s account of sovereignty. But the question here is why in the Arab and 
Muslim world are theological affairs not left to private organizations but instead regulated by the 
state? The answer is that the state’s appeal for legitimacy requires an authoritative source in the 
eyes of Muslim subjects.  
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This chapter focuses on the authority Ulu Al Amr and its legal aspect. The argument is 
that it is a prominent historical feature of the political construction of Sunni Islam. Furthermore, 
the authority of this group of individuals has played a central role in Suuni Islamic politics 
throughout the contemporary period. With the advent of modernity and with it the nation-state 
the Ulu Al Amr group has been reduced to one individual, the Grand Mufti. Chapter four, the 
history of the formation of Ulu Al Amr, and chapter five describe the role of the Grand Mufti, 
who replaced the traditional Sunni class of Ulu Al Amr. 
 
The loss of Al-Bouti, according to experts, was a serious setback depriving the Syrian 
Ba'ath government of legitimacy in the midst of a violent armed struggle. Yet, what concerns us 
here is why a secular Ba'athist government needs, in the eyes of the Syrian people, the support of 
Al-Bouti to legitimize its rule and fight against the uprising. More generally, why do secular 
governments throughout the Middle East establish ministries of theological affairs while 
claiming to be secular? The answer lies in the legal role of Ulu Al Amr and the type of authority 
it has practiced throughout the political history of Islam. This chapter will focus on the historical 
foundation and the evolution of Ulu Al Amr, the scope of Ulu Al Amr authority, and its legal 
ability to defend the actions of temporal power.  
 
 In this chapter and the subsequent one, I will rely on the scholarship of Mohammed Al-
Massari in the area of Sharia in general and Fiqh al siyash al shariah in particular. Al-Massari is 
a Saudi political dissident and activist who is currently exiled in London. He is the founder of 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir and currently the Chairman of the Party of Islamic Renewal. The party’s mission 
is to bring about political and social reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Al- Massari is a 
Salafi but interestingly a critical opponent of the Wahhabi theological state establishment. His 
publications debates the Saudi Ulama’s legal claim over the legitimacy of the royal family and 
its practices. Al-Massari’s political activism and critique of the Royal family has led to charges 
by the establishment Wahhabi Ulama that he is a “libertine.” This dissertation considers Al-
Massari’s work, which is on the foundational legal sources of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah, as 
a reliable representation of Sunni orthodoxy. 
 
Linguistically, Ulu Al Amr is a compound of Ulu (those of or those who) and Al Amr 
(authority). “It is said that the word Ulu is a plural word that has no singular term but most likely 
this word is plural for the word ‘Walee’ meaning one who or one of. Both Ulu and Walee must 
appear in a compound words, for example (those with authority) or (those in charge of) or (those 
with intellect)” (Al-Massari 2002, 13).
29
 The plural linguistic character of the word Ulu in the 
legal term Ulu Al Amr signifies the basis for the argument that the principle of Shura 
(Consultation) necessitates that the category must be plural and cannot be reduced to one person.  
Consultation necessarily takes place among two or more individuals. “The second part of the 
term, Al Amr and the word in the Arabic language could mean either to order an action or to 
forbid an act” (Al-Massari 2002, 13).
30
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The term Ulu Al Amr is mentioned in the Qur’an in chapter 4 verses 59 and 83, and the 
term appears in the Hadith of the Prophet as well. In the Qur’an the verses are as follows: 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and Ulu Al Amr (those of 
authority) among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if 
you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59 
 
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around. 
But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to Ulu Al Amr (those of authority) among 
them, then the ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it. And 
if not for the favor of Allah upon you and His mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for 
a few. 4:83 
 
 
While in the Hadith Ulu Al Amr is mentioned as follow: “three habits that the heart of a Muslim 
should never be angry of, sincere labor, advice to those in the Ulu Al Amr, and to remain among 
the community…” (Al-Massari 2002, 13).
31
 Note that Muslim obedience to temporal authority is 
mentioned only in the verse 4:59 and even then, obedience is conditioned by the Sharia. Yet Al-
Massari explains that while “the term Ulu Al Amr is clearly present in the Qur’an and the Sunna, 
the exact legal meaning of the term is not quite clear and therefore remains unresolved among 
scholars of Sharia” (Al-Massari 2002, 14).
32
 Consequently, it is not clear from the Qur’an and 
Hadith which group of individuals Muslims should obey, and it is open to historical 
interpretation depending upon whom the Umma see the Ulu Al Amr fit to be among and 
represent.  Historically, the configuration of Ulu Al Amr concerning who is qualified to be 
among them changed according to social and political change. Thus, the legal evolution of the 
category of Ulu Al Amr challenges scholarship that applies the concept of fundamentalism to 
political Islam. If by fundamentalism we mean adherence to textual and theological orthodoxy, 
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أولي االمر في الشرع الواردة في اآلية السابقة فقد اختلفت أهل العلم من المفسرين و غيرهم في ذلك على أقوال، أشهرهااما المراد ب   . 
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then we will demonstrate that as an historical fixed category the achievement of Ijma (consensus) 
is an impossibility. Legally Ulu Al Amr in Sunni Fiqh and according to Sharia are “those in 
charge or concerned with legal matters of the Umma, thus they are the highest authority 
establishing the legality and legitimacy of matters that concern the community” (Al-Massari 
2002, 14).
33
 While it is legally accepted in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah that Ulu Al Amr 
means temporal power, those who are in charge of affairs of the Umma, I argue that this legal 
view was accurate only during the founding period when temporal power and the legal 
knowledge of the Ulama united in the persons of the Four Guided Caliphs. After the Second 
Civil War (60-73AH /680-692 AD) the two characteristics were permanently severed. Dynastic 
rule meant that only during the early history of Islam, the period of the Four Guided Caliphs, 
could an individual be simultaneously both a Khalifa and Alim [singular of Ulama]. Accordingly, 
once temporal power became dynastic the function of the post changed and became a mere 
executive branch of government, in charge only of executing and implementing Sharia. Since 
that historical moment the executive has been legally excluded from deciding on the exception. 
Moreover, from this point temporal power depended on the authority of the Ulama on their 
legitimacy to rule and be obeyed by the Umma. It is precisely this change that Ernest Gellner 
noted regarding the nature of government in Islam, but he failed to notice the evolutionary 
change that took place in the nature of government. He makes this point when he is discussing 
the Sharia by arguing that: 
The fact that, in this way, legislation is pre-empted by the deity has profound implications for 
Muslim life. It does not merely mean that a fundamentalist may have difficulties in accepting 
modern law and legislative practices; it also means that a certain kind of separation of powers was 
built into Muslim society from the very start, or very nearly from the start. This version of the 
separation of power did not need to wait for some Enlightenment doctrine concerning the 
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desirability of a pluralist social order and of the internal balance of independent institutions. It 
subordinates the executive to the (divine) legislature and, in actual practice, turns the 
theologians/lawyers into the monitors of political rectitude – whether or not they always have the 
power to enforce their verdicts. The principle that ‘the community will not agree on error’ may 
endow communal consensus, rather than the political doctrine, with a kind of legislative 
authority. Within this communal consensus, the voice of the learned is liable to possess special 
weight. After all, the community must heed an already existing law and it is natural to respect the 
opinion of those better informed. (7) 
 
Clearly, Gellner captures the dynamics of the evolution of Sharia but his argument at its core 
demonstrate sovereignty problematic logic, as chapter five demonstrates. He views the 
theologians/lawyers or the Ulama as referees of a divine law that is frozen in time and space. He 
fails to note the role of Ulama in harmonizing modernity and sovereignty with Sharia (see 
chapter one). This is precisely why he uses the term fundamentalism and argues that the 
“fundamentalist may have difficulties in accepting modern law and legislative practices.” 
Moreover, while Gellner accounts for Ijma (consensus) as a source of legitimacy that provides 
the Ulama with legitimate authority, his view does not capture the scope of harmonization 
between the modern and the Sharia, contrary to what chapter one demonstrates in regard to the 
concept of sovereignty. He sees modern law as encapsulated sovereign law that has to be 
accepted and implemented a wholesale.  
 Nevertheless, the purpose of referencing Gellner here is to demonstrate that the function 
and nature of temporal power changed historically by becoming a mere executive power and not 
a source of legitimacy. Thus, the Ulu Al Amr referred to in verse 4:59 cannot include dynastic 
temporal power, which is required to be obeyed by the Umma. It is precisely by the end of the 
Second Civil War that this change consolidated the legal role of the Ulama as the Ulu Al Amr 
(mentioned in verse 4:59). Obedience is limited to Sharia and not arbitrary laws. Consequently, 
this dissertation argues that Ulama are the logical legal members of the Ulu Al Amr because they 
and only they legally decide the exception.  
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Further evidence supports the argument that the Ulama decide who is legally to be excluded 
from the category of Ulama. The following section of the chapter demonstrates historically the 
legal power of the Ulama to define who is to be included and excluded from the category of Ulu 
Al Amr, who can be legally labeled as Ulu Al Amr and excluded from temporal power. 
 
Legally, Al-Massari provides a historical legal survey in Sunni Fiqh that includes six 
different legal opinions that guide legal scholars when explaining who or what constitutes Ulu Al 
Amr: 
The First, according to the Salaf (early scholars). Ulu Al Amr consisted of the Umara (people in 
command). Scholars upholding this opinion include: Abu Hurairah (603-681 CE), Abd Allah Ibn 
Abbas (619-687 CE), and Al Nawawi (1234-1278 CE).  
Second, according to some of the Salaf (a Sunni legal school) the scholars such as Jabir ibn 
Abdullah (d. 697), Al Hasan Al Basri (642–728 CE) and others, they are the ulama (religious 
scholars). 
Third group, according to a group of Mujtahids (religious scholars), Ulu Al Amr were the 
Companions of the Prophet.  
Fourth, according to Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl (d. 636 CE) a Companion of the Prophet, the Ulu Al 
Amr were only Abu Bakr (573-634 CE) and Umar ibn Al Khattab (579-644 CE) the first and the 
second Khulafa (plural for Khalifa).  
Fifth, according to Ibn Kathir (1301-1373 CE) Ulu Al Amr are both those in command of 
temporal power and the Ulama. Many scholars, among them Abu Bakr ibn al-Arabi (1076-1148 
CE), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350 CE), and Muhammad ash-Shawkani (1759-1834 
CE), followed this legal opinion. 
Sixth, other legal scholars argue that the term includes the Ulama, those in command, the elite, 
and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd or those in command among the leaders and the elite of the community 




Al-Massari’s list of legal opinions has several political and legal implications. First and the most 
important implication, is the clear lack of historical legal consensus on who are to be included 
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ن السلف منهم ابو هريرة و ابن عبا و رجمة االمام الطبري، قال النووي، و هو قول جمهور السلف و الخلف.   االول: انهم األمراء، قاله جمع م 
الثالث: أنهم  الثاني: انهم العلماء، و به قال جمع من السلف منهم جابر بن عبدهللا، رضوان هللا و سالمه عليه، و الحسن البصري و النخعي و غيرهم.  
قاله مجاهد.   الرابع: انهم أبو بكر و عمر، رضي هللا عنهما، قاله عكرمة.  الخام : قال ابن كثير و الظاهر و هللا  - عليه و سلمصلى هللا-أصحاب محمد
ي و الشيخ الشوكان اعلم انها عامة في كل األمراء و العلماء و قد اختار هذا الرأي جمهرة من أهل العلم ، منهم أبو بكر بن العربي و ابن القيم الجوزية و
تبوعا. و عبد الرحمن بن سعدي.  الساد : و يرى بعض أهل العلم أن المراد بهم ما هو أعم من العلماء و األمراء و الزعماء و وجهاء و كل من كان م
 هم المعروفون بأهل الحل العقد
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among the Ulu Al Amr in Sunni Islam. Accordingly, the Sunni Muslim subject is not clearly 
commanded by God to obey a particular form of government. Instead, the Muslim subject is 
commanded to obey the law or Sharia. Thus, the question of who should rule, who legitimately 
rules the Umma is an historical  and political question in Sunni Islam open to interpretation. Fred 
Donner argues that:  
In the generation after Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E. (that is, from about 31/650 until 73/692), 
the community of Believers was torn apart internally by a bitter dispute over the question of 
leadership. This dispute manifested itself particularly in two periods of open strife among the 
Arabian leadership of the Believers' movement, which we can call the First and Second Civil 
wars (35-40/656-661) and (60-73/680-692, respectively). (145) 
 
The political question of temporal power and its legitimacy was to be resolved not according to 
legal injunctions but according to historical circumstances and what Muslims viewed as a 
legitimate form of government. This explains the historical rise of the Ulu Al Amr whose central 
role was to serve as the Ulama and provide human resolution to questions of law that 
transcended temporal power and but were capable of furnishing temporal powers with 
legitimacy. This is precisely how the body of Sharia and Fiqh siyasah shariah (the branch Islamic 
jurisprudence that deals with political issues) evolved and grew over time addressing temporal and 
spatial change. 
It is imperative for academic scholarship to take into account these local characteristics of 
temporal power and the legal and historical frames that shaped their evolution. Only then can the 
centrality of the role of Ulu Al Amr become clear and provide a coherent reading of the political 
and social history of Sunni Islam. The role of Ulu Al Amr becomes marginal and insignificant, if 
academic scholarship views it through the prism of the European conceptions of temporal power 
or sovereignty.  
50 
 
 Except for the first legal opinion, Al-Massari’s list included the Ulama. The Ulama were 
not an issue in the first case because Abu Hurairah and Ibn Abbas were Companions of the 
Prophet and accordingly temporal power and Alim came together in the Four Guided Caliphs. In 
a technical sense the Ulama were present in the first opinion as well. As the Companions period 
drew to a close questions of piety and knowledge of faith became less important, which allowed 
for a dynastic Caliphate rule based purely on blood lineage. Donner explains this historical 
process: 
With the Second Civil War in particular, we are palpably moving into a new phase in the history 
of the community of Believers. The era of the companions of the prophet is rapidly drawing to a 
close, and the dramatis personae are now members of a younger generation who had no memory 
of the prophet or of the struggles that shaped his life. One senses an attenuation of the intensely 
charismatic quality of the early movement, with its clear-sighted concern for piety and observing 
God’s will; the commitment to piety is still there, but it has become more routinized and less 
personal and is tempered among many Believers with more practical and this worldly concerns. 
(190) 
 
Hence, we have the legal opinion of Al Nawawi who held that Ulu Al Amr was the Umara 
(people in command). Writing during the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258 CE) and during the violent 
sacking of Baghdad by the Mongol Hulagu Khan (1218 – 1265 CE) Al Nawawi stressed the 
importance of Umara [singular Amir] and the military. Accordingly, his legal opinion is an 
outlier and a response to the sacking of a Muslim empire for the first time.  
 Third, the legal opinions in the third and fourth categories hold that the Ulu Al Amr 
mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunna are associated with the Companions of the Prophet. 
According to Sharia, Muslims owe obedience only to temporal power. This legal view follows if 
one holds that obedience is only to Sharia and the role of temporal power is more or less to 
execute the law. Moreover, it appears that the third legal opinion questions whether a figure can 
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arise that can command authority similar to the Prophet’s Companions. Yet, the legal opinion 
may not exclude the role of Ulama’s Ijtihad over new legal issues facing the Umma. 
The fourth legal opinion was held by Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl who died early in the Battle of 
Yarmouk in 636 CE before the outbreak of the two Civil Wars. Accordingly, Ikrimah’s legal 
opinion was based on events where the transition of temporal power was executed smoothly and 
before violent disagreements took place among Muslims regarding who should rule over the 
Umma. At the time, the need of Ulama or Ulu Al Amr was not central to the Muslim community 
since the Companions of the Prophet were many and could address new circumstance 
authoritatively due to the their proximity to the Prophet.  
 
 Fourth, that the Ulama as Ulu Al Amr are included in the second, third, fifth, and sixth 
legal opinions supports my argument that the Ulama evolved to become the Ulu Al Amr 
mentioned in the Qur’an. Moreover, the scope of time that these legal opinions are expressed in 
is over a long span of time, making them more or less accurate reflections of the majority of 
legal opinions.  
 Fifth, in the sixth legal opinion there appears for the first time a new legal category, Al 
Hall Wal-Aqd in Fiqh siyasah al shariah. Al Hall Wal-Aqd includes Ulama, Umara, and the 
elite. This new legal category is investigated in detail later in the chapter, but what is relevant 
and significant at the moment is that Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd appeared in the third century in the 
Islmaic calendar and reflects the evolution of Fiqh siyasah al shariah, which has consistently 
included the Ulama as Ulu Al Amr even when the legal term changes.   
Consequently, temporal power in Islam is limited historically by certain legal constraints. 
Regardless of emergencies, Sharia cannot be entirely suspended. Debates regarding the 
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emergency powers of the executive and the ablitiy to suspend the law have yet to limit this 
ability in the most advanced democracies. The restriction of temporal power under Sharia 
historically necessitated the formation and crystallization of Ulu Al Amr as the authority that 
bestows legitimacy on temporal power. Hence, the acts that contradict the law are experienced as 
merely violence. They never set precedent but are tolerated and resisted as violence unless the 
Ulama who are the Ulu Al Amr legitimate them. There are ample examples in the history of 
Islam when pure violence and bloodshed by temporal powers occurred. When Muslims were 
unable to fight the illegitimate actions of temporal power, they tolerated them as violence.  
Historically, the consequences of force and violence never produced legitimate laws even when 
Caliphs were in complete control of their Muslim subjects. A good example is provided by 
Donner to make this case: 
we see in the civil wars—and particularly in the second—the emergence of those fissures that 
have, ever since, divided the once united community of Believers. Ali’s claims to be amiral-
muminin during the First Civil War become gradually transformed into the beginnings of a true 
sectarian movement, Shi'ism, that held the family of 'Ali in special reverence; it received its 
defining event in the massacre of 'Ali s son Husayn at Karbala' in the Second Civil War, an event 
that came to be commemorated by later Shi'ite groups, It would be a century and more before 
Shi'ism would fully refine many of its central concepts, such as the notion of the imamate or 
ideal, God-guided leader of the community, but the later movement has its roots in the First and 
Second Civil wars. These events thus became the starting point for the construction of two 
different narratives of legitimation in the Islamic community one Shi'ite, focusing on the family 
of Ali, and the other (eventually called Sunni) focusing on the sequence of actual power-holders, 
including the Umayyads. We have also seen how a third group, the ultra-pious Kharijites, 
emerged during the First Civil War; although constituting only a small minority of Muslims 
today, they were quite significant in the first several centuries of Islam. (190-191) 
 
In this case, the violence that temporal power perpetrated against the offspring of the Prophet and 
Companions was an example of total control over Muslims. Such violence was unable to gain 
legitimacy. In fact, the Umayyad dynasty was the first to rely on Ulu Al Amr to grant legitimacy 
to their dynastic rule, as chapter four demonstrates. In Sunni historical books this period of 
immense violence is usually referred to as Fitnah (upheaval and chaos) to venerate the Umayyad 
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dynasty especially the Companion Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan (602 – 680 CE) the founder of the 
dynasty. Donner explains how the Fitnah label was used as a justification for the violence: 
The traditional Muslim sources provide us with lengthy reports about the events of the mutiny 
and those that followed, which we call the First Civil War; our sources refer to these events as the 
first fitna, using a pejorative Qur’anic word meaning "temptation, seduction" (by the lure of 
worldly advantage). The goal of all these reports is either to demonstrate Uthman’s guilt or to 
exculpate him (or, similarly, to provide moral judgments on other participants in the events). 
(154) 
 
Note that the First Civil War started with the assassination of Uthman Ibn Affan (557- 656 CE). 
He was a Companion of the Prophet and the Third Guided Caliph, a clan member of Muawiyah, 
who in the name of avenging Uthman used the assassination as an excuse to overthrow the 
Fourth Guided Caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib (600- 661 CE), a Companion and the cousin of the 
Prophet.  
 The limitation of temporal power in Islam is demonstrated in the two different historical 
narratives that the Sunni and Shia have regarding these events. They serve as historical sources 
and foundations for the identity of both sects of Islam. Moreover, the lack of supernatural or 
theological justifications, at least in Sunni theological texts, for the massacre of the family of the 
Prophet and the establishment of the dynastic rule of Banu [house of] Umayya is a clear sign of 
the earthly character of the dynastic Caliphate that have ruled over the Muslim Umma ever since. 
Instead, the justification of the dynastic rule is explained in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah as the 
best outcome possible for the Umma among the worst possibilities, mainly civil strife and 
bloodshed. Even for Banu Abbas, who toppled the Umayyad dynasty in 750 CE and established 
the Abbasid dynastic rule, their justification was based of the corruption of the Umayyads. Never 
did they claim they were bestowed with a supernatural duty even though they were directly 
descended from the Prophet via his youngest uncle Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566–653 CE).  
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The key difference between temporal power in Sunni Islam and European sovereignty is 
precisely the key idea that Buck-Morss claims is fundamental to Christianity and absent from the 
Sunni Khalifs or members of Ulu Al Amr: the quality of the supernatural. Buck-Morss argues:  
The fundamental idea of Christianity is the Incarnation, the coming into visibility of the invisible 
and sovereign God. The veneration of icons became the practical manifestation of this idea, as the 
point of visibility of the relationships between divinity and humanity, Father and Son, Virgin 
Mother and Child, Redeemer and believer. The icon, wherein the Word (logos, that is, the ideal 
concept; in our case the political collective) takes on flesh, provides direct, experiential access to 
these enigmatic relationships. (4-5) 
In fact, the spirit/flesh distinction plays no role in the development of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al 
shariah. In Islam the flesh remained temporal and those who occupy the flesh are bound by the 
Qur’an and the Sunna as the expressions of God. But neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna speak 
directly to the Muslim subject. They are historically expressions of the learned experts, the 
Ulama who this dissertation argues are Ulu Al Amr. Moreover, the absence of and prohibition 
against icons forced temporal power in Islam to remain under Sharia, depriving them of a 
legitimate authority who spoke and acted on behalf of the divine.  While the Christian nomos as 
Buck-Morss argues “is virtual only: Paul’s nomos rules the realm of the spirit, leaving the 
material world unchanged. Obedience to the Roman imperial order is still binding; at the same 
time the term oikonomia, deployed in the spiritual realm, reasserts its law-preserving function by 
commanding the obedience of the ‘new man’ (Paul’s repeated term) to live according to 
Christianity’s predestined plan” (6). Applying oikonomia as a quality of temporal power 
produces this theoretical error. Academic scholarship overlooks the historical dilemma of 
temporal power in Islam, namely how legitimacy and obedience can be extracted from the 
Muslim subject or the Umma without the appeal to supernatural justification. The answer has 
been to look for a legal source with the authority to bestow legitimacy on the acts of temporal 
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power; hence Ulu Al Amr. It is important to note that the formation of the Ulu Al Amr was 
gradual and became central as the Companions of the Prophet died.  
 The consequences of the local quality of Sunni temporal authority are immense, and they 
require a political theorist to redefine political concepts such as freedom, tyranny, equality, and 
autonomy when investigating Islamic legal and political thought. More precisely, discussions of 
human rights and subjectivities must account for this quality of authority in Islam and the limits 
on the state that are embedded in Sharia and the role of Ulu Al Amr’s authority as a legitimating 
function.  Academic scholarship on political Islam usually claims that it is a return to pure forms 
of government from the founding period of Islam and the subsequent strict adherence to 
theological texts. This academic literature overlooks the rejection of movements associated with 
political Islam to orthodoxy. The logical context of this claim challenges the establishment of 
Ulu Al Amr’s authority, its part as the new Ulu Al Amr in the modern state bureaucracy. In other 
words, political Islam cannot be reduced to a purportedly fundamentalist movement because, in 
fact, it does not adhere to orthodoxy. On the contrary, it challenges orthodoxy by appealing to 
new interpretations of the law that may contradict Fiqh al siyasah shariah. In doing so, political 
Islam claims to have the correct interpretation of the law. Consequently, it claims that it is the 
legitimate Ulu Al Amr with the proper authority to overthrow temporal power. This claim, which 
will be thoroughly investigated in chapter five, finds its expression in the sovereignty of the 
modern state. 
It is important to restate that none of the legal opinions provided by Al-Massari 
established Ijma in Fiqh siyasah al shariah. A plurality of legal opinions has existed, and which 
opinion gains prominence in which historical period depends upon which particular school of 
Fiqh gains dominance via the support of temporal power. Thus, it is important to examine the 
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role of the temporal powers, which have historically assumed the enforcement role in the 
Ulama’s legal rulings. It is clear that the Khalifa, or temporal power, has a stake in advancing the 
legal opinions that serves its interest and confers legitimacy on its actions. The development of 
Fiqh siyasah al shariah has historically depended on the interaction of both institutions. It has 
emphasized obedience to temporal power by producing legal opinions at particular moments that 
decisively outlawed resistance to dynastic corruption as chapter four demonstrates. This 
emphasis on obedience to temporal power was particularly the case during historical periods 
when obedience to the Khalifa was treated as an article of faith, and any form of resistance or 
change was labeled an apostasy. Yet in the Qur’an and Sunna there is no reference to apostasy as 
such because the sacred texts and traditions of Islam have no reference to what type of 
government should be established or clear references to who exercises temporal power and how 
it is to be established. Historically, Muslims placed their trust in the Ulu Al Amr as custodian of 
the law who looked out for the good of the community by placing checks on temporal power. If 
Ulu Al Amr violated the trust of the Umma, other legal scholars would challenge and correct 
them. A good example is the Abbasid Caliphate’s use of legal opinions to overthrow the 
Umayyad dynasty.  Al Hasan Al Basri (642–728 CE) (see chapter four) and other legal scholars 
who challenged the corruption of temporal power and the establishment Ulu Al Amr provided 
early legal justification for the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty. Therefore, Ulu Al Amr never 
constituted a body that was considered to be a unified church and never had a monopoly on the 
meaning of the primary sources. In fact, Shia Islam views the rule of these dynastic empires as 
illegitimate and a corruption of the faith. The following section will briefly discuss the Shia 
account of Ulu Al Amr, how they view the legal status of Ulu Al Amr, and the nature of 
obedience to authority. 
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Shia Islam holds that after the death of the Prophet the issue of who governed the Umma 
was the greatest of all concerns. According to Imam Abu Ja'far ibn Ali al Baqir (676-733 CE) the 
most important matter of faith in Islam was obedience to the Imam of the Muslim community (Al 
Fahery 1986, 7).
35
 Unlike Sunni Islam, the nature of Siyasah al shariah in Shia Islam is divine, 
and temporal power resides in both the Imam, who is to be obeyed, and the temporal ruler. Sunni 
Islam considers the post of temporal power or Khilafa as a historical consequence derived from 
the principle of Maslaha. Shia Islam has a divine Imam. Al Fahrey explains the Shia Fiqh views 
on Ulu Al Amr as follow:  
Ulu Al Amr are those in charge of the affairs of the Muslim community and they are the leaders 
of the Umma. According to verse 4:59 obeying their command is incumbent upon all Muslims 
since the verse requires obedience to them, which is equal in status to obedience to the Prophet, 
which in turn is derived from obedience to God. But this verse did not clarify a number of points 
and left this task for Hadiths to provide the details of its meaning. The first is the importance of 
knowing who Ulu Al Amr is in any historical period so that Muslims will obey and be ruled by 
rulers in accordance to the Qur’anic verse. This command is clear from the Hadith of Ali Hamza 
who said: “Abu Ja'far said that those who worship Allah and those who do not know Allah are 
those who worship in vain. I said, so what is the knowledge of Allah? He said: to believe in Allah 
and the Prophet, and to take Ali and to take the Imams after him as your guidance and to be on 
their side for the sake of Allah. And to stand against their enemy for the sake of Allah; only then 




The question of Ulu Al Amr in Shia Islam has several consequences that separate it from the 
Sunni sect of Islam: First, it was the cause of the split among Muslims in the founding period that 
                                                          
35
نما يعبد هللا من يعرف هللا، و أما من ال يعرف هللا فإنما يعبده األحاديث األخر منها ما في الكافي عن أبي حمزة قال: قال لي أبو جعفر عليه السالم:  إ 
دى و البراءة هكذا ضالال. قلت : جعلت فداك فما معرفة هللا ؟ قال تصديق هللا عز و جل و تصديق رسوله ص و مواالة علي علي و االئتمام به و بأمة اله
 الى هللا عز و جل
36
والية االمر شرعيتها من اآلية الكريمة: ) أطيعو هللا و أطيعو الرسول و أولي االمر منكم ( أولي االمر لي  المراد من االمر في أولي االمر:  تستمد 
يا، و أولو األمر هم االمر في مقابل النهي، كما أن األمر بمعنى الشيء أيضاً لم يكن مرادا قطعا، بل األمر هنا بمعنى الشأن الراجح إلى أمور الدين.  الدن
لي لون أمور المسلمين في هذه الشؤون و يقومون بزعامتهم بأمر من هللا سبحانه، و بموجب هذه اآلية يتوجب على جميع المسلمين االنقياد ألوالذين يتو
ة معرفة روراالمر بعد أن قرنت طاعتهم بطاعة رسول هللا التي تتفرع من طاعة هللا   ضرورة معرفة ولي االمر :  النقطة األولى في هذا الميدان هي ض
قررة في ولي االمر في كل زمان ليلتزم المؤمنون طاعته و ينقادوا لحكمه تنفيذا لمضمون اآلية الكريمة التي انطلق منها البحث، و هذه الضرورة م
ي حمزة قال : قال لي أبو الحديث الشريف المتواتر )) من مات و لم يعرف إمام زمانه مات ميتة الجاهلية (( و في األحاديث االخر منها في الكافي عن أب
؟ قال تصديق هللا عز و جعفر عليه السالم : إنما يعبد هللا من يعرف هللا، و أما من ال يعرف هللا فإنما يعبده هكذا ضالال. قلت : جعلت فداك فما معرفة هللا 
و جلجل و تصديق رسوله ص و مواالة علي علي و االئتمام به و بأمة الهدى و البراءة الى هللا عز   
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historians call the First Civil War.  The split was over the question of who was to govern the 
Umma and what would the nature of the state and government be. Consequently, there is no 
distinction between Ulu Al Amr’s authority and temporal power in the Fiqh of Shia Islam. 
Second, in Shia Islam the Imam and his offspring are the Ulu Al Amr of a given historical period, 
and therefore membership is based on the lineage of the Prophet’s House and not on knowledge. 
Third, the issue of Imamates in Shia Fiqh is a sacred matter and obedience a religious duty. For 
the Shia obedience to the Imam and government is a matter faith and not derived from 
independent judgment based on the principle of Maslaha. As a result, the question of who is to 
govern and be obeyed was a contentious issue since the founding of the Islamic state. The 
contemporary divide in the Muslim community, or Umma, between Sunna and Shia is evidence 
of how deep the split was in the community over issues of authority, obedience, and temporal 
power in the early period of Islam.  It is clear that during its founding prominent members of the 
community were obliged to serve the community according to their proximity to the Prophet.   
The following section addresses the Sunni legal term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, which is 
mentioned in Al-Massari’s sixth legal opinion. The legal term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd appeared 
around the third century in history of Islam and was a substitute for the term Ulu Al Amr. The 
aim here to investigate the contractual language of this legal term in order to demonstrate the role 
Ulu Al Amr had in marginalizing the Umma or Muslims in choosing their rulers and participating 
in the political matters of the state. The evolution of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd is indicative of the 
legal role that Ulu Al Amr had in addressing social and economic changes. 
The legal term of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd has characteristics similar to Ulu Al Amr, but 
according to Al Tareeqy “the term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd historically appeared and developed late 
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in the history of Islam” (17).
37
 He further states that “similar to many legal concepts in 
jurisprudence, the historical origin of the term is vague, and once it appeared it became a popular 
term used frequently by the Ulama” (Al Tareeqy 1998, 17).
38
 Legally, jurists regard the term Ahl 
Al Hall Wal-Aqd as the product of Ijtihad since it does not appear in the Qur’an or the Sunna.  
The appearance of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd demonstrates the scope of the Ulu Al Amr’s 
authority, which gives legal legitimacy to newly invented terms, categories, and concepts that 
later become the legitimate orthodoxy and an essential part of Fiqh. This type of authority is 
something that temporal power could not achieve without Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. 
Power and violence have no authority and alone cannot give legitimacy to government, which 
Alyas Ahmed demonstrates by arguing that “in Islam, we already know that law is prior to the 
state, and that there is a perfect sovereignty of Law which cannot be changed by human hand” 
(481). This primary feature of Islamic juridical and political writings stands in contrast to the 
modern conception of the state under international law as it is represented in European 
sovereignty with its monopoly of violence in a given territory. Alyas Ahmed has in mind the 
clear junctions in the Qur’an and Sunna and not Siyasah al shariah, which is the area that is 
open to Ijtihad and Ijma since the primary sources are mute regarding how they are to be 
regulated. Consequently, the scope of Siyasah al shariah is limited only when it runs against 
clear injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna, and even then those injunctions may be violated in 
some circumstances under the principle of Maslaha.  
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نحو ذلكو هو اصطالح ظهر متقدما، و إن كان لم يرد في الشرع بهذا اللفظ، كألفاظ : اإلسالم ، و اإليمان، و الصالة و العلماء و أولي االمر و     
38
االحتساب و أهل الحسبة و لكنه اصطالح نشأ من قبل العلماء ، شأنه شأن كثير من المصطلحات مثل : أصول الفقه، و األصوليين و النحو و النحاة، و  
ن أهل و أهل االجتهاد و أهل اإلجماع ... و هكذا و قد استعمله طائفتان من أهل العلم : األصوليين و أهل الفقه السياسي، و عنهم أخذه كثير م
المصطلح من حيث التاريخ االختصاصات في العلوم االخرى. و لقد يصعب على الباحث مهما بذل من جهد أن يصل إلى نقطة البدء في استعمال هذا  
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 According to Al Tareeqy, “legal disagreements among scholars about the issue of 
membership of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd and who exactly is to be included and excluded in it have a 
long history. But all legal opinions incorporated what commonly came under the purview of the 
Ulama, the Companions of the Prophet, and the two Guided Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet 
in ruling the Umma” (Al Tareeqy 1998, 22).
39
 This lack of consensus is legally similar to the one 
discussed earlier about Ulu Al Amr. Moreover, like Ulu Al Amr, the linguistic root of Ahl Al Hall 
Wal-Aqd is similarly vague. These differences over who precisely is to be included and excluded 
among Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd are due to the absence of Ijma on the subject matter. As a result, 
those who are in authority maintain their status based on Ijtihad and based on injunctions in the 
Qur’an or the Sunna. Thus, the historical evolution of Ulu Al Amr to Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd 
indicates a response to social and political changes that indicate the success of temporal power to 
control the class of Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd.  
 Linguistically, the first word of the term, Ahl, refers to those who have the authority to 
decide a matter. The rest of the term combines two words Al Hall (to cancel) and Al Aqd (to 
contract). Both words in the term intended to refer to a contract by regarding general matters 
including Syasa (politics), logistics, the Sharia and the justice system…” (Al Tareeqy 1998, 
26).
40
 Linguistically the themes of commerce and contract are at the center of the meaning of the 
category. Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd divides the community into two sections. The first are those who 
are competent to enter into commerce and contracts. The second is the public which delegates 
                                                          
39
أنهم األمراء، و رجحه اإلمام الطبري. و قال النووي: هو قول الجمهور السلف و الخلف.    -١و قد اختلف في المراد بهم على أقوال من أشهرها :    
أنهم أبو بكر و  -٤هم أصحاب محمد )ص(   أن -٣أنهم العلماء و به قال بعض السلف منهم: جابر بن عبدهللا و الحسن البصري و النخعي و غيرهم.   -٢
 عمر
40
دارية و و الحاصل : أن هذا اللفظ قد جمع بين أمرين ، العقد و الحل . و المراد : عقد نظام جماعة المسلمين في شؤونهم العامة، السياسية و اإل 
 التشريعية و القضائية و نحوها ثم حل هذا
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the power to enter in commerce and contract to Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. Clearly, commerce here 
stands metaphorically for the industriousness that leads to the good life on earth and the reward 
of paradise in the afterlife.  
 Conceptually, according to Al Tareeqy, there are at least five legal opinions covering the 
concept of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd:  
First, they are the scholars who perform Ijtihad. The second, they are the Ulama and the 
leadership of the community and the elite. Third, they are those of honorable backgrounds and the 
elite. Fourth, they are the best of the community, who are trustworthy, and those entrusted with 
Muslim affairs. Fifth, they are Ulu Al Amr who are mentioned in verse 4:59 even though scholars 




Al Tareeqy’s list does not explain why the term Ulu Al Amr was replaced by Ahl Al Hall 
Wal-Aqd. Replacing terms did not solve the lack of Ijma and the legal vagueness of the concept. 
Yet, these five new legal opinions achieved two important goals: First, there must always be a 
body that commands and requires obedience, unlike the Ulu Al Amr in Al-Massari’s fourth 
category, which allowed for the possibility of the Umma as the source of authority. The second, 
there is no reference to the Umma at all as a source of authority, which eliminates any possibility 
for the public to be included among Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. Effectively, this legal demarcation 
creates a permanent division between two classes of people; the first is a class that is legally 
permitted to enter into contracts with temporal power and the general public who are out of this 
legal relationship.  Effectively, establishing a class structure where one class decides “the good” 
of the Umma and the other is to obey the outcome.  
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The language of the Qur’an, Islam’s ultimate legal source, is the idiom of commerce and 
contracts. I am arguing the Qur’an’s language incorporates three common themes based on 
commerce and the freedom of contract: the first is that the Qur’an speaks directly to Muslims 
and not to a particular person or a group that mediates between God and the Umma; instead, its 
language directly addresses Muslims, both individually and collectively, to choose the right 
religion and to act accordingly without reference to Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. This 
direct appeal to Muslims effectively removes the authority of any group from obstructing the 
duty of Muslims to bring about the good and forbid evil. The second is that because Meccan 
society was a mercantile culture the language of the Qur’an is largely expressed metaphorically 
in the language of commerce. It is a contract between the Prophet and God that provides rewards 
in the Hereafter in exchange for following religion rightly. According to the Qur’an, this contract 
requires Muslims to act according to the faith, and on Judgment Day deeds are judged and put on 
a scale to assess a fulfillment of obligations. Thus, to establish a legal category such as Ahl Al 
Hall Wal-Aqd is to establish a class that is able to enter into or forgive Aqd (contract), but most 
important the class acts as a delegate on behalf of the community thus denying members of the 
Umma the freedom to deliberate and engage directly in the process of establishing political 
agreements or Bay’a. This legal view directly changed the nature of obedience and authority in 
Islam by establishing two classes: one of free and mature Muslims who can engage in Bay’a and 
another, a majority, who are excluded from the process. The legal discourse produced to defend 
the new categorization is not to be found anywhere in the Qur’an. On the contrary, there is 
ample evidence in the Qur’an that all Muslims, including slaves, should  give Bay’a—enter into 
contract with God and the Prophet by a handshake—and in entering the faith defend it. The 
following are examples from Qur’an that speak to the claim: 
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Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for 
that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah , so they kill and are killed. [It is] a 
true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to 
his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that 
which is the great attainment. 9:111 
 
How wretched is that for which they sold themselves - that they would disbelieve in what Allah 
has revealed through [their] outrage that Allah would send down His favor upon whom He wills 
from among His servants. So they returned having [earned] wrath upon wrath. And for the 
disbelievers is a humiliating punishment. 2:90 
[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, 
"Our Lord is Allah." And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there 
would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name 
of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah 
is Powerful and Exalted in Might. 22:4 
 
[O Muhammad], tell My servants who have believed to establish prayer and spend from what We 
have provided them, secretly and publicly, before a Day comes in which there will be no 
exchange, nor any friendships. 14:31 
 
The third and most important commercial theme in the Qur’an is the reference to the 
literal scale upon which human deeds will be weighed and the fate of humanity, including 
Muslims, will be determined on the Day of Judgment. Unlike Christians, Muslims cannot be 
saved by the recognition of the divinity of God alone; action guided by belief is what determines 
faith. When a person cannot act, heartfelt intentions count. The duty to engage in direct action 
falls on the community and cannot be delegated to a class of people who will deliberate and act 
on behalf of the Umma. Thus, individual action throughout a person’s life is transformed into 
weighed units of good and evil to be measured against one another. Consequently, the individual 
determines his fate. The following verses in the Qur’an support this point: 
And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their 
due and do not commit abuse on the earth, spreading corruption. 11:85 
 
We have already sent Our messengers with clear evidence and sent down with them the Scripture 
and the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in justice. And We sent down iron, 
wherein is great military might and benefits for the people, and so that Allah may make evident 
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those who support Him and His messengers unseen. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in 
Might. 57:25 
 
And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their 
due and do not commit abuse on the earth, spreading corruption. 11:85 
 
The Most Merciful, Taught the Qur'an, Created man, [And] taught him eloquence. The sun and 
the moon [move] by precise calculation, And the stars and trees prostrate. And the heaven He 
raised and imposed the balance. That you not transgress within the balance. And establish weight 
in justice and do not make deficient the balance. 55: 1-9 
 
Therefore, the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd is limited by clear 
injunctions in the Qur’an and the Sunna, and as such Muslims are held accountable on the Day 
of Judgment for obedience contrary to the Sharia. Yet, as mentioned before in the realm of 
Siyasah al shariah, the scope of authority is much more extensive. Thus, in an effort to increase 
their scope of authority, and in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunna, Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd 
historically use Fiqh to emphasize obedience to authority over the duty of the Muslim subject to 
“ordain the good and forbid evil.”
42
 For example, the Bay’a became limited to the Ulama, the 
leadership of the community, and those who enjoy an elite status among the community. 
Consequently, resistance to the ruler or temporal power was outlawed even if the ruler is corrupt. 
Unless a clear apostasy is admitted by the ruler or temporal power, Muslims are to obey and not 
to resist. This argument is justified by a Hadith that a corrupt ruler is punishment from God, and 
Muslims are to scrutinize and correct their heart and action instead of resistance to corrupt rule. 
A good contemporary example is al-Bouti’s use of this exact argument to justify his support of 
Bashar Al Assad’s regime and simultaneously outlaw efforts to topple him from power 
(Mourtada and Gladstone, 2013). 
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 Again, Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd’s use of Islamic legal and political writings puts in question 
academic literature’s reliance on “fundamentalism” in addressing the social and political 
phenomena of political Islam. The term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd never appeared in the primary 
sources, yet the scope of their authority was established by Fiqh. Al Tareeqy argues that “the 
term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd was not mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunna but was developed by 
the Ulama as many other legal terms that are foundational such as those entitled to engage in 
Ijtihad, Ijma, and other legal terms used in the Sharia” (32).
43
 As a result, there is strong 
evidence for arguing that historically temporal power had an overwhelming interest in 
controlling the legal process in a matter that was most advantageous to temporal power. In most 
aspects of life the Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd are legally limited by Sharia when a legal 
matter is clear, for example in the areas of the penal code, inheritance, family law, property and 
commerce. But in the area of Siyasah al shariah, the matter is quite different since “All Muslim 
Sunni thinking currents including its prominent figures agree the “state” is not a pillar or 
foundation of the faith ….” (Imarah 1988, 208).
44
 Therefore, the omission of reference to 
government and state in the primary sources increases Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd’s scope of authority 
and in the area of Siyasah al shariah “since the principle of the sovereignty of the Sharia is 
aimed to govern the ruler and the ruled alike in accordance to both God’s Law. Accordingly, 
administrative laws are limited by the Sharia and nothing is legislated that would contradict 
God’s Law, which is precisely the meaning of the sovereignty of God” (Mufti and Wakeel 1991, 
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 This quote is a testament of the authority Ulu Al Amr as the experts who function as a 
monitoring body or a check on the acts of temporal power. Therefore, this dissertation argues 
that this check of Ulu Al Amr on temporal power is the most important character and theme in 
Islamic legal and political writings and to understand the political and social consequences of 
this feature is to understand the logic around which the entire edifice is organized.  
 Dynastic rule in Islam was secured through a restricting of Bay’a to a small group of 
individuals and marginalizing the public. Thus it is in the interest of temporal power to control 
the process and ensure an outcome that increases its power and control over Ulu Al Amr. For 
temporal power to control the process of inclusion/exclusion in the matters of Al siyasah and the 
Imamah is to ensure legitimacy to arbitrary power. The institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr and the 
faith by temporal powers is precisely the point over which modernist reformers—Jamal ad-Din 
al-Afghani (1838/1839 – 1897) and Mohammed Abduh (1849 -1905) and more recent figures 
like Hasan al-Banna (1906 – 1949) and Sayyed Qutb (1906 – 1966)—object. They all agree that 
the demise of the Islamic Caliphate and the spread of ignorance among Muslims are due to the 
Umma’s lack of control over temporal power, which governs arbitrarily with the blessing of the 
institutionalized religious establishment, the state Ulama. The political figures mentioned above 
demanded all Muslims be included in Bay’a and hoped they would be the source of authority 
they thought had existed during the early founding period. These figures wanted to restore the 
role of the Umma, have it included among Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, and have it participate and 
deliberate in Siyasah al shar’iyyah according to the principle of Maslaha (the good of the 
community).  Furthermore, they all agree that in the period of Ottoman rule the closed 
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membership of Ulu Al Amr via a Grand Mufti under temporal power would dampen reform 
attempts. These political figures were the new Ulu Al Amr, as chapter four demonstrates, who 
would challenge the establishment Ulu Al Amr over their authority to hold temporal power and 
their accountability to the Umma and Sharia. 
In sum, historically, the legal category of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd appears to include those 
who have social and political influence and status in society, but it has effectively left out the 
public or Umma.  Those with wealth, political influence, and most important, military might, are 
in charge of determining the good of the community and alone able to participate in the process 
of Shura. The average member of the Umma is secondary to these groups, and whatever the 
outcome of the Shura of the Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd the Umma expects to obey its mandates.  
The outcome of this legal change effectively introduced a new type of authority and 
obedience into the legal system of Sharia. Nevertheless, the legal practice of Ijma is conducted 
only by the Ulama who are members of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, and due to the legal knowledge 
they possess they are able to participate in this process alone. And it was the Ulama that actually 
established this new legal category, even though it is vague and historically did not achieve Ijma. 
Thus, it can be maintained that the Ulama are the class that constitutes the essential element for 
any legal legitimacy. They are the only legal class that remained unchanged in both categories of 
Ulu Al Amr and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. In fact, they are the only members in both legal categories 
that possess the legal authority to legitimize their own practices and legal status. They have the 
authority to include or exclude other social and political sectors in the Umma. Most important, is 
the ability of the members of Ulu Al Amr and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, through the principle of Ijma 
the Ulama, to label actions that they consider illegal as Bid’ah (innovation) and therefore label 
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them as evil and stoppable. Yet, due to a lack of legal consensus or Ijma, neither Ulu Al Amr nor 
Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd could establish themselves as clear legal categories.  
 
The following section investigates the relationship between temporal power and Ulu Al 
Amr. Historically, temporal power in the Islamic political system took different legal labels:  
among them Khalifa, Imam, Amir, and Sultan. To understand the significance of these labels and 
how temporal power is able to govern legitimately, we look to Ulu Al Amr legal opinions and 
historical interaction between them and temporal power. For example, the legal significance of 
“the Khalifa or Imam was historically a persistent source of major conflicts due to substantive 
disagreements among Muslim scholars both in the past and the present” (Nowar 1996, 7).
46
 The 
source of disagreement can be divided into the following categories: “the method of selecting of 
the Khalifa or Imam and the duties and obligations of the post. The source of discord among Ulu 
Al Amr is over the precise characteristics of the Khalifa or Imam” (Nowar 1996, 7).
47
 “Al-
Shahristani (1086–1153 CE) argued that the greatest source of disagreement that divided 
Muslims was over the method of the selection of the Khalifa or Imam.” (Nowar 1996, 7).
48
 This 
disagreement is because neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna addresses such legal matters 
practically. They leave the question of the Khalifa’s character open to Al siyasah al shar’iyyah, 
which evolves according to social and political change. Consequently, temporal power in Islam 
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 ان خالفهم هذا يمثل أعظم خالف فكري في االسالم 
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 زمان و مكان
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is a legal category without a clear historical definition settled by practice and legal precedents. 
The precedents that developed in the history of Fiqh Al siyasah al shariah in accordance to 
special social and political circumstances are then treated as foundational legal opinions for 
future generations to follow. These legal opinions, which legitimize new practices, do not 
contradict a clear injunction in the Qur’an or Sunna, which confirms that “historically the 
Prophet did not clarify the matters and methods of the Khilafa or Imamah and died without 
nominating any person to occupy his legal position” (Nowar 1996, 7).
49
 This understanding is 
consistent with the Sunni Fiqh, which affirms that “the Prophet did not discuss the standards or 
qualifications for such a post or a method for Muslims to choose this post” (Nowar 1996, 7-8).
50
 
The matter was left for the Umma to regulate, a task which Ulu Al Amr assigned to themselves.  
Because matters of obedience and governance were not determined by the Quran and the 
Sunna, historical circumstances gave rise to Ulu Al Amr who instituted  the expert authority over 
legal texts and a particular type of obedience from the Umma. Historically, Ulu Al Amr is the 
legal body that legitimized and set the qualifications and limits for the post of temporal power to 
rule the Umma. Consequently, temporal power derived its authority from Ulu Al Amr and as a 
consequence lacked legitimacy of its own. What legitimacy accrued to it came from the consent 
of Ulu Al Amr or at other times was extracted through force and violence. Thus, the lack of 
definition or qualification in the original sources of temporal power is evidence that temporal 
power or the Khalifa was not intended to be a source of law. This is the opposite in character of 
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the type of sovereign power that had historically developed in Europe where “for long time, one 
of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a 
formal sense, it derived no doubt from ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the 
Roman family the right to ‘dispose’ of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given 
them life, so he could take it away” (Foucault 1978, 135). Conversely, temporal power’s function 
is to best execute the laws in accordance with Sharia and through the process of the Shura of Ulu 
Al Amr and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd.  Moreover, who is qualified for temporal power and how he is 
selected increased the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr through the legal practice of Ijma. 
Temporal power in Islamic legal and political writings was never the source of the law, the legal 
source of life and death.  
Scholars have argued that the Ulu Al Amr’s disagreement over the post of the Khalifa is 
important for two reasons: Al Mawardi (972-1058 CE), among others legal scholars, contended 
that the legitimacy of the post is based on a rational foundation. Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328 CE) 
and a second group of scholars argued that temporal power is based on the law and not rational 
faculties (11). These different legal opinion demonstrate the scope of the authority of Ulu Al 
Amr, who are able to debate on foundational legal issues that are absent in the Qur’an and Sunna 
and give legitimacy to the temporal power rule over the Umma and demands its obedience.  
The first opinion justifies temporal power via rational faculty and argues that “if it was 
not for the ruler, the people would live in chaos and negligence” (11).  It is a deductive line of 
reasoning by the Ulama to arrive at a legally binding ruling that will be referenced by future 
legal scholars as a part of Fiqh. This process is possible because Ijma on the subject matter has 
never been achieved. This lack of consensus provides judges with the space and freedom to base 
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their opinions on the circumstances that they are facing. Thus, according to the first opinion, 
government is necessary for the purpose of executing Sharia. Consequently, the form and nature 
of government is secondary to its function. The Caliphate in this sense is a tool to execute the 
law that has no theological character. As such, the Caliphate is based on a rational justification 
absent of religious duty. 
While the second opinion is legally justified based on“the obligation where temporal 
power is trusted with guarding and implementing Sharia; consequently, the Khilafa is a duty that 
the Sharia requires Muslims to create” (Nowar 1996, 10).
51
 Thus, it is Sharia, law that requires 
the establishment of a Caliphate free from lineages, clans, or statuses. In fact, the establishment 
of the Caliphate is a religious duty. According to Al-Turtushi (1059 – 1127 CE), “God required 
the community to create the post of Khalifa or Sultan on earth so that the strong will not oppress 
the weak and to correct injustice among Muslims” (Nowar 1996, 10).
52
 Accordingly, temporal 
power was created out of necessity, the necessity to implement Sharia. Consequently, the legal 
bases that Ulu Al Amr use to justify temporal power is Sharia, which protects the weak from the 
strong. The rationalist jurists Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 CE) argued that the Khilafa “according to 
rational views is the best method of achieving worldly benefits and shielding subjects from harm 
according to the Sharia” (Nowar 1996, 12).
53
 The two legal opinions divided the Ulama, and 
neither achieved Ijma regarding the Khalifa’s requirements and obligations.   
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It is important at this point in the chapter to focus on the legal principle of Ijma. It is 
important to note that Ijma is the foundation of the authority of Ulu Al Amr and puts it at the 
apex of the state, which in turn furnishes temporal power with the legitimacy to govern. While 
establishment of temporal power and the state are not mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunna; 
“the majority of Muslims regard the establishment of Imamah or Khilafa a religious duty” 
(Nowar 1996, 13).
54
 In fact, it is the sudden death of the Prophet that necessitated the 
necessitated the invention of the post of Khalifa. This is a good example to demonstrate the 
historical role of Ulu Al Amr’s authority in making the establishment of Imamah of Khilafa a 
religious duty. Ulu Al Amr possesses legal legitimacy through Ijma to introduce innovative 
practices of temporal power in social, political, and religious matters. Once consensus is 
achieved regarding a new social, political, or religious issue, the legal opinion will become part 
of Fiqh and the legal justification for future similar circumstances. The Ijma is one of Islam’s 
dominant sources of law, and its authority is only eclipsed by the Qur’an and Sunna. 
Accordingly, “Ijma during the time of the Companions of the Prophet was based on two legal 
foundations: first, that the Ijma is the third legal source after the Qur’an and the Sunna. Second, 
understanding Sharia necessitates knowledge of the Ijma of the Fuqaha that is established in the 
historical evolution of Fiqh” (Al Gassass 1983, 18).
55
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 During the early period of Islam the legal concept and practice of Ijma had not been 
settled upon because the method and concept of Ijma were not found in the Qur’an or in Sunna. 
Ijma became the third source for law and has developed historically with the evolution of Fiqh. 
Al Gassass further provides a Hadith by the Prophet that legally supports the claim of the Hadith 
of Muaz “when the Prophet asked him: what would be your judgment, if you are asked to judge 
on a matter? Muaz answered, I will judge in accordance to the Qur’an, the Sunna and if the 
matter is not to be found there, then through my Ijtihad on the situation at hand in accordance to 
my opinion. The Prophet pat him on the chest and said, thank God who guided you the 
messenger of the Messenger to what pleases God” (Al Gassass 1983, 10).
56
  This is evidence that 
the role and the authority of Ulu Al Amr developed in an evolutionary matter. More precisely, 
Ulu Al Amr were able to carve their legal role without clear reference to legal injunctions in the 
primary sources. Ulu Al Amr created Ijma and gave it legal importance after the Qur’an and the 
Sunna. Accordingly: 
After the Prophet’s death and during the early period of Islam, if a new situation occurred that 
required a legal justification, the Companions of the Prophet would primarily look in the Qur’an 
for an answer. If that is not possible, they will look in the Hadith and if they could not find an 
answer there (and here were the differences in opinion would appear) the Khalifa summoned the 
prominent members of the Companions and takes their Shura or advice. If the sum of the 
opinions achieve consensus, then Ijma is achieved and the matter becomes the legal ruling for 
future similar circumstances, but if they were unable to achieve consensus then the Khalifa makes 
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عليه و سلم: كيف تقضي ان عرض لك قضاء، قال: اقضي بكتاب هللا،  حين سأله رسول هللا صلي هللا -رضي هللا عنه  -و هذا ما ورد في حديث معاذ  
م، قال: اجتهد رأيي قال: فاءن لم يكن في كتاب هللا، قال: فبسنة رسول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سلم، قال: فاءن لم يكن في سنة رسول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سل
ول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سلم لما يرضيو ال الو. قال: فضرب صدري، فقال الحمد هلل الذي وفق رس  
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فكانت اذا وقعت الحادثة ينظرون في كتاب هللا، فاءن لم يجدوا حكمها التمسوا ذلك في احداث الرسول، فان لم  -اما بعد وفاته صلي هللا عليه و سلم  
الصحابة و حفاظهم فيشاورهم في االمر، فإذا اتفقوا علي امر كان يجدوا ) و هنا يظهر الخالف بطريقة االستدالل مع العصر السابق ( جمع الخليفة كبار 
 الرأي الجماعي هو المرجع، و اال حسم الخليفة الخالف
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Accordingly, Ijma has a central role as a legal role in the evolution of the Sharia.  This is 
precisely why “Muslim scholars had a great interest in Ijma by studying its origins and created 
subfields within the legal principle and studied and commented on the disagreement between the 
schools of Fiqh in its legal implications … until Ijma became a legal branch of science in its own 
right” (Al Gassass 1983, 18).
58
 The legal principle of Ijma is a testament to the scope of the 
authority of Ulu Al Amr, which historically solely developed Sharia under new political 
circumstances. Moreover, the careful treatment that Ijma historically received is due to its direct 
relationship to the foundations of the religion, thus, some Ulama charged Bid’a (innovation) for 
those who deny the authority of Ijma since it has the same weight as the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
Again, this is a clear example of the scope of authority that Ulu Al Amr has as the source of 
legitimacy which temporal power must rely on to govern and extract obedience from the Umma. 
It is Ulu Al Amr who decide the conditions of obedience and the legitimacy of the temporal 
power. Yet, their authority is not unlimited, and there are historical examples where they lost 
their authority over the community.   
 
 In conclusion, this chapter set out to demonstrate the historical legal changes in temporal 
power and Ulu Al Amr were a response to temporal and material conditions. The absence of 
theological injunctions in the Qur’an and the Sunna regarding a particular form of government or 
a type of temporal power over the Umma allowed for variations in forms of governments 
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، و احتجوا و بعد هذا نستطيع القول ان اظهر علماء المسلمين اهتماما بالغا باإلجماع، فدرسوا أصوله و فرعوا مساءله المجملة، و مثلوا لكل مساءله 
تيسر لهم من ادلة، و قارنها ذلك بمذاهب الفرق االسالمية، فعرضوا لخالفاتهم، و ما ينبني عليها.... ثم وضعوا خالصات هي زبدة جهدهم، لها بما 
الثالث  الدليلفوصل إلينا اإلجماع علما كامال متكامالإلجماع في عصر الصحابة و التابعين لم يكن له غير قاعدتن أصوليتين فقط: اوال: ان اإلجماع هو 
 بغد القران و السنة. و ثانيا: انه البد النعقاد اإلجماع من معرفة أقوال ذوي الرأي من الفقهاء
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throughout the history of Islam. More important, Ulu Al Amr (as the only body mentioned in the 
Qur’an to command obedience from Muslims) established their authority over Al siyash al 
shariah which played a central role in the development of the body of Fiqh al siyash al shariah. 
This dissertation argues that the legal category of Ulu Al Amr is central in properly 
understanding and appreciating the local characteristic of Sunni Islamic political thought. 
Therefore, using the Western conception of sovereignty with its historical circumstance on Sunni 
Islamic legal and political history is faulty and misleading. Understanding the legal role of Ulu 
Al Amr provides coherence to the development of Fiqh al siyash al shariah and the central 
importance of the subject in the legitimacy of temporal power.  
    
 The significance of the role of Ulu Al Amr and the type of authority they have over Fiqh 
al siyash al shariah is twofold. First, temporal power in Sunni Islam possesses qualities different 
from European kings and monarchs and forms of legitimacy that bind and secure the obedience 
of the Christian subject to the temporal sword. Historically, temporal power in Sunni Islam 
remained subject to the authority of Ulu Al Amr from which it acquired legitimacy and the ability 
to secure obedience of the Muslim subject. In fact, the reliance on Ulu Al Amr for legitimacy is a 
permanent feature of the history of Muslim governments. The issue of legitimacy remains a 
problem for modern state governance. Even the founder of modern secular Turkey, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk created a department of theological affairs, whose existence ran contrary to the 
constitutional principles enshrined in the Turkish Constitution. This topic is discussed in chapter 
five, but for now my aim is to demonstrate that Sunni Islam has historically had a form of power 
that is different in structure than Western types of power. Power never generates legitimacy but 
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exists as force unless it is legitimate and proper according to Sharia. It is up to Ulu Al Amr to 
decide the exception when necessary. Temporal power in Sunni Islam lacks the Byzantium or the 
Roman quality that surrounds the monarch with a supernatural aura. This supernatural quality 
historically provided European monarchs a quality that is absent in Sunni Islam or Islam in 
general. Of course that does not mean that these qualities are historically are essential and 
unchanging. Such claims are reductionist and inaccurate. After all, natural law and the writings 
of St. Thomas Aquinas and other Christina thinkers including Luther and Calvin are testament to 
the limitations of obedience in Christian legal and political thought. Instead, what is intended 
here is to demonstrate that at the core of Western legal and political writings resides a generative 
frame of legitimacy that allows for the unfolding of politics and power in a coherent frame that 
may produce endless verities addressing time/space change. For example, Susan Buck-Morss 
explains a core theological quality that surrounds the sovereign. While the office historically 
changes from King to president to Volk or proletariat there are coherent qualities that are present 
with us today. She argues that: 
More than the sum of merely empirical individuals of which Hobbes’s Leviathan is composed, 
sovereignty is a transcendent category. The sovereign is an icon in the theological sense. He (or 
she) embodies an enigma—precisely the power of the collective to constitute itself. The sovereign 
figure as personification of the collective demonstrates the power of the visible image to close the 
circle between constituting and constituted power, explaining why even when the illegalities of an 
individual sovereign are exposed, the faith of the believer is still not shaken. As long as the circle 
appears closed, sovereign power remains intact; likewise, and conversely, as long as sovereign power 
remains intact, the circle appears closed. The closing of the circle demands a miracle, and the icon of the 
sovereign figure provides it. As a metaphysical figure, the sovereign connects the world of lived 
politics with the Platonic world of eternal forms. The legitimacy of political power continues 
even in secular modernity to maintain this ideal connection In US political experience, “the 
American people” is the Platonic form that operates, an imaginary collective to which George W. 
Bush habitually appeals. In Hitler’s Germany, it was the ethnic Volk. In the Soviet Union, the 
“proletariat” was no less a metaphysical concept: the Bolshevik Party ruled in the name of the 




The metaphysical aura that surrounds the European sovereign furnished the post with local 
European characteristics enabling it to play an essential role in the historical on evolution of the 
state. While in Sunni Islam both the Khalifa and Ulu Al Amr are merely temporal individuals 
who are entrusted with a certain task to perform and likely to face resistance, if they overstep this 
task (see chapter five). Thus, to read the history of Sunni Islam as a history of state formation 
similar to European history, and to judge it according to the European qualities it lacks. is to 
overlook local context and qualities.  
Furthermore, contrary to the idea that the sovereign represents the personification of the 
collective in the West, in Islam and particularly in Sunni Islam Sharia personifies the collective’s 
adherence to monotheism. Miracles and the supernatural are not qualities that signify legitimate 
rule and obedience. Instead it is the law and Ulu Al Amr’s authority that furnish temporal power 
with legitimacy. Historically, it is possible to find examples in Islam of saints and figures who 
claimed supernatural powers, but the omnipresence of the law namely Sharia has stripped 
temporal power the ability to be the source of the law. In fact, no one, including Ulu Al Amr, can 
decide exceptions during crises by suspending Sharia as a contemporary sovereign might wish. 
Central to the Sunni legal system is this limitation, which academic scholars must take into 
account when making theoretical judgments about political Islam or Islam in general. 
Historically European sovereigns, as Jean B. Elshtain explains, possessed supernatural qualities 
that were central to the evolution of European legal system. She elaborates on Kantorowicz’s and 
explains: 
This personalization of earthly rule is documented masterfully in Ernest Kantorowicz’s classic, 
The King’s Two Bodies, as he unpacks the king’s “twinned nature,” embodied in mortal “natural” 
man and the office which perdures in perpetuity with another “body” holding that office when a 
previous fleshy monarch dies: the King is dead. Long live the King! The king comes to supplant 
the pope as the mediator between the earthly and the divine. Thus, in the embodied account, “the 
king appears the perfect christomimetes … with regard to power, since his power is the same as 
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that of Christ... the One who is God and Anointed by nature, acts through his royal vicar who is 
‘God and Christ by Grace.” The will of the ruler brings the body to life. The head must “literally 
be an individual mind or will. Most clearly of all, supreme power we cannot be except…in one,” 
else it would be supreme. (63)  
 
These qualities in Sunni Islam were not bestowed on the members of the Prophet’s family or his 
Companion. While many figures in Islam claimed Prophet-hood and supernatural qualities and 
tried to rule the Muslim Umma accordingly, few were able to achieve the minor and limited 
success of the Ahmadiyya movement that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) founded during 
India’s colonial period. But even in this case the legal characteristics of the European sovereign 
were alien to what Mirza claimed. More precisely, the supernatural quality is not an end in itself 
but an end for the purpose of the establishment of legal legitimacy that commands obedience and 
authority. Thus: 
The state of superhuman ‘absolute perfection’ of this royal persona ficta is, so to speak, the result 
of a fiction within a fiction: it is inseparable from a peculiar aspect of corporational concepts, the 
corporation sole. Blackstone gives credit entirely to the Romans for having invented the idea of 
corporation-"but our laws have considerably refined and improved upon the invention, according 
to the usual genius of the English nation: particularly with regard to sole corporations, consisting 
of one person only, of which the Roman lawyers had no notion." That kind of man-made 
irreality-indeed, that strange construction of a human mind which finally becomes slave to its 
own fictions-we are normally more ready to find in the religious sphere than in the allegedly 
sober and realistic realms of law, politics, and constitution; and therefore Maitland's often caustic 
criticisms are understandable and appear fully justified. (Kantorowicz 1957, 5) 
 
 While, persons with supernatural qualities and miracles can be found in the Qur’an, Muslims 
view the Qur’an as the direct expression of God and it renders supernatural powers secondary in 
importance. In a sense, Islamic temporal power or the Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the 
Faithful or Leader of the Faithful), Khalifa, or Sultan remained weaker and more vulnerable in 
comparison to the divine qualities that European sovereign historically possessed. Consequently, 
to speak of a king that is sovereign in Islam is to confuse European history with the history of 
Islam. This confusion is quite important, and will become clearer in chapter, five when the 
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quality of the sovereign is transferred from the sovereign king to the sovereign state or the 
people.  
In short, this condition, which is specific to Sunni Islam, necessitates the rise of Ulu Al 
Amr in a moment of history after the passage of the Companions of the Prophet. It plays a central 
role in the development of Islamic legal and political writings and practice. Ulu Al Amr, as will 
be demonstrated in chapter four, played a central role in legitimizing a dynastic monarchy that 
had no foundation in the Qur’an or the Sunna; an issue that was directly behind the two civil 
wars in the early history of Islam. The ripples of the violence they caused resulted from the 
questioning of the legitimacy of temporal power to rule over Muslims. It is today personified in 
the division of Muslims into Sunni and Shia Islam. As a response to these painful historical 
events Ulu Al Amr literally invented the two legal principles that guarantee dynastic rule in the 
history of Islam. This historical fact is important because it confirms the central arguments of the 
chapter, first, that Ulu Al Amr are legally the Ulama. Second, this chapter challenges the 
academic scholarship that applies the concept of fundamentalism to contemporary forms of 
political Islam that claim an adherence to theological orthodoxy. It asks how such a claim can be 
justified in the absence of a negative view of human nature or legal injunctions for a specific 
form of government or political institution.  This important metaphysical/theological difference 
regarding human nature and government is discussed in detail in chapter three.   
 Secondly, it is important to note that Ulu Al Amr never achieved a sacred status. Ulu Al 
Amr are learned individuals whose authority is limited to the authority of experts in theological 
juridical matters. More precisely, even though Ulu Al Amr are legally “to decide the exception” 
they are revered for their expert knowledge without sacred or supernatural qualities attached to 
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their persons. Thus, the authority that Ulu Al Amr possesses is limited to expert authority and not 
a religious injunction. Only, when a legal matter achieves Ijma in a particular moment in history 
does that legal matter become binding on Muslims. The Second Civil War and the Umayyad’s 
downfall is an example of the limitations of temporal power manipulation by the Ulu Al Amr. 
The authority of Ulu Al Amr is the topic of the following chapter, which will demonstrate the 















         CHAPTER III 
                                           Authority and Obedience in Sunni Islam 
 
In chapter one we established that European colonialism and the advent of the modern 
nation-state made the concept of sovereignty exogenous to Sharia because “sovereignty is a type 
of authority relationship” and competes in hierarchy and finality with other forms of authority 
(Lake 2003, 304). The debates were foremost about the primacy of sovereignty in relation to 
Sharia, and they appeared abruptly during the colonial period with the arrival of the modern 
European state. Modern Fuqaha and legal jurists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
addressed sovereignty, but its lack of a connection to the early Fiqh in Sunni or Shia 
jurisprudence lends little merit to a historical investigation into Islamic legal and political 
writings. My aim is to avoid superimposing concepts that had historically developed in a specific 
spatial and temporal trajectory and later became hegemonically global in a context where the 
concepts do not merit similar attention. 
 This dissertation argues that the focus should instead be on the concept of authority that 
is endogenous to Fiqh al siyash al shariah. A clarification is necessary before embarking on the 
investigation at hand. This chapter does not advance the thesis that Sunni authority is entirely or 
exclusively local in character; on the contrary, Sunni authority shares universal qualities with 
other systems of meaning. For example, obedience and rule enforcement are universal in any 
collectivity. Yet, the question of why and how an agent is obeyed is embedded in a local context 
of political and social struggles. Accordingly, we must investigate the concept of authority in 
general, i.e., its universal character and then narrow the scope to what is relevant to the Qur’an, 
Sunna, and Fiqh. The aim here is not to investigate a concept only in relation to Western 
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sovereignty but also to understand the characteristics of Islamic authority that hold are both 
universal and local.  
According to Lake, “authority can be generally defined in a social environment as X 
demands Y to adhere to X’s rules, and Y freely follows these rules” (Lake 2003, 304). This 
definition has similarities to “Dahl’s definition of power where A commands B to do something 
she would not do otherwise” (Lukes 1974, 11). Their similarity is the source of academic 
difficulty in clearly defining the two separate concepts.  This dissertation will be no different, but 
the aim here is that once the act of obedience by the Muslim subject in relation to Ulu Al Amr is 
explained, the concept of authority in Islamic and legal writings will be mapped and constructed. 
Ulu Al Amr’s character and constitution, which have been subject to historical struggles for 
temporal power, have made defining its authority difficult.  
Yet there are still certain universal theoretical characteristics of authority that are present 
in every collectivity and social and political settings. Lake argues that there are three hallmarks 
of authority that are related to this issue. First, “authority is based on free consent of the actor or 
a degree of consent. Second, authority involves an absence of force. And finally, authority is 
never unlimited or unrestrained” (Lake 2003, 304-05). These parameters distinguish the concepts 
of power and authority by avoiding their collapse into each other. The first characteristic of 
authority as free consent to authority accurately describes Muslims who voluntarily adhere to 
Islam and obey Sharia as an affirmation of faith. Accordingly, Sharia represents the moral 
standard of right and wrong with which the subject makes senses of her social and political 
environment. Furthermore, the question of force is settled in the Qur’an:  
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There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear 
from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut (transgressor) and believes in Allah has 
grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. 
2:256 
Apostasy in Islam is not relevant here since apostasy by definition negates volunteerism and do 
not recognize authority. The third characteristic actually describes the limitation that Ulu Al-Amr 
had to address historically since Islam and “Muslims can understand transparently what they 
need to understand, how they need to act, to be saved” (Gould 2008, 12). Furthermore, “the 
absence of definitive interpretations breeds a certain tolerance, for example, among the four 
orthodox schools of law in Sunni Islam, because the differences do not matter” (Gould 2008, 12). 
Definitive interpretations in Islam do not exist because there is no authoritative body or a church 
that exercises a monopoly (Gellner 1981, 1). Consequently, total obedience in temporal and 
spiritual realms (realms that in Islam are actually one) does not exist in Sunni Islam. Instead, the 
relationship between authority and obedience has been historically shaped by struggles over 
interpretations of injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna. “Authority seems to be derived from the 
fact that the person wielding authority possesses superior knowledge, insight, or experience. The 
authority rests upon these givens, which are accompanied by the person’s ability to give 
extended reasons for what he decides to say or do” (Friedrich 1972, 51). This quality is 
applicable to the authority that Ulu Al Amr legally possesses in developing Fiqh. Accordingly, 
Fiqh, as a legal discourse regulating the relationship between Ulu Al Amr and the Muslim 
subject, constitutes a form of authoritative communication. Therefore, disagreements over 
authoritative communication take place not only among experts but also, though rarely, among 
the public.  
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Historically, disagreements among Ulu Al Amr over the meaning of a particular political 
verse in the Qur’an have had social and political significance. A prime example are the 
disagreements over the scope of obedience of Ulu Al Amr in verse 4:59 of the Qur’an: 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you 
(Ulu Al-Amr). And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you 
should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 
 
The scope and weight of the authority becomes doubly significant when legal or expert reasons 
provided by Ulu Al Amr address a matter about which the Qur’an and Sunna are mute or vague. 
In fact, neither the Qur’an nor Sunna posits a clear theological injunction regarding the duty of 
Muslims to create government to protect the faith. Historically, the forms of governments that 
existed in Islam are the consequence of expediency and struggles among warring factions. 
Consequently, the role of the expert scholar in history as a member of Ulu Al Amr defines the 
scope of authority and obedience it requires of the Muslim subject to these new forms of 
governments in accordance with Sharia. Khadduri illustrates the scope of the authority Ulu Al 
Amr has over the executive power and the Umma as it relates to governance and justice:  
In the Traditions (Sunna & Hadith), the Prophet sought to explain the meaning of the abstract 
maxims of justice enunciated in the Qur’an by specific examples, expressed in legal and ethical 
terms, to distinguish between just and unjust acts as well as to set underlying rules indicating 
what scale of justice ought to be .Since the Prophet dealt essentially with particular questions, the 
theologians and other scholars found in the Traditions precedents on the strength of which they 
formulated their theories of justice. However, neither in the Qur’an nor in the Tradition are these 
specific measures to indicate what are the constituent elements of justice or how justice can be 
realized on Earth. Thus the task of working out what the standard of justice ought to be fell upon 
the scholars who ought to draw its elements from the divers authoritative sources and the rulings 
and acts embodied in the works of commentators. (10-11) 
 
This is precisely the location of temporal power’s historical struggles to control the 
membership of Ulu Al Amr. This struggle is doubly important because, first, neither the Qur’an 
nor Sunna designates who are precisely designated as “those in authority” or Ulu A Amr. Second, 
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membership in Ulu A Amr changed historically in Fiqh al siyash al shariah as chapter two 
demonstrates. Consequently, this lack of consensus made it possible for temporal power to 
control the Ulu Al Amr’s independence and restrict its membership.  
 
 Let us now focus on the linguistic meaning of “authority” in Arabic. We are immediately 
faced with a linguistic challenge since the term has no direct equivalent in Arabic. For example, 
according to the Al Mawrid dictionary, Sulta is the literal Arabic translation for the term 
authority. Sulta shares the same root with the word Sultan, which in Arabic is equivalent in 
English to a prince or princely power. Most important, the word Sultan appears twelve times in 
the Qur’an, which is the most important authentic linguistic source in Arabic.
59
 The word Sulta, 
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 7:71 [Hud] said, "Already have defilement and anger fallen upon you from your Lord. Do you dispute 
with me concerning [mere] names you have named them, you and your fathers, for which Allah has not 
sent down any authority? Then wait; indeed, I am with you among those who wait." 
10:68 They have said, "Allah has taken a son." Exalted is He; He is the [one] Free of need. To Him 
belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth. You have no authority for this [claim]. 
Do you say about Allah that which you do not know? 
12:40 You worship not besides Him except [mere] names you have named them, you and your fathers, for 
which Allah has sent down no authority. Legislation is not but for Allah. He has commanded that you 
worship not except Him. That is the correct religion, but most of the people do not know. 
14:22 And Satan will say when the matter has been concluded, "Indeed, Allah had promised you the 
promise of truth. And I promised you, but I betrayed you. But I had no authority over you except that I 
invited you, and you responded to me. So do not blame me; but blame yourselves. I cannot be called to 
your aid, nor can you be called to my aid. Indeed, I deny your association of me [with Allah] before. 
Indeed, for the wrongdoers is a painful punishment." 
15:42 Indeed, My servants - no authority will you have over them, except those who follow you of the 
deviators. 
16:99 Indeed, there is for him no authority over those who have believed and rely upon their Lord. 
17:65 Indeed, over My [believing] servants there is for you no authority. And sufficient is your Lord as 
Disposer of affairs. 
34:21 And he had over them no authority except [it was decreed] that We might make evident who 
believes in the Hereafter from who is thereof in doubt. And your Lord, over all things, is Guardian. 
37:30 And we had over you no authority, but you were a transgressing people. 
37: 156 Or do you have a clear authority? 
40:35 Those who dispute concerning the signs of Allah without an authority having come to them - great 
is hatred [of them] in the sight of Allah and in the sight of those who have believed. Thus does Allah seal 
over every heart [belonging to] an arrogant tyrant. 
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in contrast, does not appear in the Qur’an, which makes the term most likely a modern one. Sulta 
probably appeared during the arrival of the modern state system in the Arab world. It appears in 
descriptions of the sovereign and authority in the modern nation-state. Furthermore, when 
examining the term Sultan, depending on the context of the verse the word could mean, rule, 
command, influence, control, or power. Therefore, to avoid the possible confusions that may 
arise from investigating the concept of authority linguistically in Islamic legal and political 
writings, the focus of this investigation is on the outcome of authority as a result of the faithful 
subject’s voluntary obedience . In addition, obedience is required for all variations of the term 
Sultan. As an outcome of authority, obedience should be viewed in the light of Friedrich’s three 
characteristics of authority to avoid collapsing authority and power. The aim here is to 
investigate the nature of obedience that is voluntary and simultaneously constitutes the subject 
who is acting according to authority on behalf of the faith.  
 
 “The Arabic term for obedience, ‘Al taah,’ is mentioned many times in the Qur’an and 
Sunna” (Al-Massari 2002, 11).
60
 It is a legal term, but it is mentioned only once in the context of 
obeying someone other than God or the Prophet. According to verse 4:59—“O you who have 
believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you 
disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
40:56 Indeed, those who dispute concerning the signs of Allah without [any] authority having come to 
them - there is not within their breasts except pride, [the extent of] which they cannot reach. So seek 
refuge in Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Seeing. 
53:23 They are not but [mere] names you have named them - you and your forefathers - for which Allah 
has sent down no authority. They follow not except assumption and what [their] souls desire, and there 
has already come to them from their Lord guidance. 
60
 المعنى الشرعي : ورد لفظ الطاعة في القران الكريم و في السنة النبوية 
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the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result”—Accordingly Muslims are ordered to 
obey those in authority. Al-Massari argues that “linguistically the word al taah in the Arabic 
tongue means the opposite of the word coercion ‘Al kurh’” (11).
61
  Moreover, “conceptually the 
word Al taah in Sharia means the act of adherence to whatever is ordained or forbidden by Ulu 
Al Amr, rulers, or those who govern according to the Sharia without resistance or objection 
regardless if orders are advantageous or not to the subject who obeys” (Al-Massari 2002, 12).
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The English term “obedience” shares with the Arabic term Al taah” a sense of constraint on 
action. Accordingly, authority’s central quality is the power to influence and command thought, 
opinion, or behavior. 
 
 What is the significance of obedience in Islam? How does Sharia regulate it, and what 
limits to obedience does the Muslim subject impose on authorities? According to Ibn Taymiyyah 
(1263-1328 CE), “because God made it a duty of Muslims to ordain the good and forbid evil, 
this condition is impossible without power and government, and the same can be said about 
Jihad, justice, and Haj…cannot be performed without the power of government (Al-Massari 
2002, 33).
63
 For Ibn Taymiyyah the limit of obedience is directly tied to proper implementation 
of Sharia. A proper authority requires a standpoint that binds both strong and weak members of a 
collectivity. Therefore, the Muslim subject’s quest for salvation, the duty to ordain the good and 
forbid evil, is doubly significant; first, it is the authority of Ulu Al Amr that define the scope and 
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  و في لسان العرب : الطوع : نقيض الكره ... و قال ابن سيدة : و طاع يطاع و أطاع : الن و انقاد ، و أطاعه إطاعة ، و إنطاع له ، كذلك 
62
بالطاعة هنا : االستجابة و االنقياد لما يأمر به و ينهى عنه ولي األمر ، أو األمر ذي الوالية المعنى اإلصطالحي المراد في البحث :  و المراد  
  الشرعية ، و ذلك بإمتثال األمر و النهي دون منازعة و معارضة ، سواء أمر بما يوافق الطبع ، أو لم يوافقه  بشرط أن ال يأمر بمعصية
63
النهي عن المنكر ، و ال يتم ذلك بقوة و إمارة ، و كذلك سائر ما أوجبه من الجهاد و العدل و إقامة الحج و  و ألن هللا تعالى أوجب االمر بالمعروف و  
 الجمع و األعياد و نصر المظلوم و إقامة الحدود ال تتم إال بالقوة و اإلمارة
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proper actions toward ordaining the “good” and forbidding “evil” especially, in the realm of 
governance. Second, Ulu Al Amr, which acts as an executive responsible for the implementation 
of Sharia, provides us with the purpose and function of government in Islam. Islam emphasizes 
that salvation is primarily achieved through a subject’s good works. The responsibility of 
temporal power is to provide the environment where such action can flourish. This characteristic 
and function of the state is directly tied to the specificity of the concept of authority, which limits 
the scope of obedience to both Ulu Al Amr and temporal power. This dissertation argues that a 
clear understanding of the character of authority and obedience is essential in understanding 
Islamic legal and political writings. Mahmud Al-Alusi (1802 – 1854 CE) in his commentary on 
the Qur’an verse 4:59 states that the meaning of obedience to Ulu Al-Amr is limited to obedience 
to God. “Obedience is linked to God and the Prophet and not independent of the injunctions of 
the Qur’an and Sunna” (Al-Massari 2002, 35).
64
 Obedience is limited to what is exoterically 
clear in Sharia, to what guarantees salvation in the next world.  This fact is illustrated in the 
Qur’an, 99:1-8: 
When the earth is shaken with its [final] earthquake (1) And the earth discharges its burdens (2) 
And man says, "What is [wrong] with it?" (3) That Day, it will report its news (4) Because your 
Lord has commanded it.  (5) That Day, the people will depart separated [into categories] to be 
shown [the result of] their deeds. (6) So whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, (7) 
And whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it. (8) 
Accordingly, Muslims and non-Muslims will stand in judgment responsible for their actions in 
the temporal world, and only through repentance will their bad deeds be forgiven. These bad 
deeds must be followed by good deeds unless physically it is impossible to act accordingly; only 
then will intentionality substitute for action.  
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معصية فقد إتفق أهل العلم على أن الطاعة في المعصية ال تجوز إذن فطاعة أولي األمر تابعة لطاعة هللا و رسوله ، و ليست مستقلة ، أما الطاعة في ال 
 كما ذكر النووي في صحيح مسلم
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In sum, according to Sharia, action in the temporal world is the path through which 
Muslims achieve salvation. This fact limits obedience simultaneously to arbitrary authority and 
temporal power and produces a specific character and arrangement of both authority and 
obedience. The Prophet’s Hadith “there is no obedience to a creature of God in disobedience of 
the Creator” (Kamali 2002, 24) illustrates the character of authority and obedience. Another 
Hadith amplifies the sentiment: “when you see my community afraid of telling a tyrant, ‘O 
tyrant’, then it is not worth belonging to it anymore” (Kamali 2002, 24). Clearly these Hadiths 
set a limit on the scope of authority and obedience to the expert authority that Ulu Al Amr 
historically had. Yet as we moved away from the founding period of the Four Guided Caliphs 
emphasis on obedience to authority became prominent.  This development was simultaneously 
accompanied by a legal emphasis on the concept of the Ammeh (commoners) as subjects whose 
duty was the unconditional obedience to Ulu Al Amr and temporal power.   
Nevertheless, there are groups of Hadiths that illustrate absolute and unquestionable 
obedience to temporal power and Ulu Al Amr, but, according to these same Hadiths, Sharia 
limits obedience. Unlimited obedience is demanded, though, in areas where the Qur’an and 
Sunna remain silent, and those areas are immense especially in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. It is in 
questions about the state or government that the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr is greatest 
because neither the Qur’an nor Sunna address those topics. It has been over this matter that 
historically Ulu Al Amr divided into at least two groups regarding the limits of temporal power 
and government. This division will become more apparent as evidence unfolds that the opposing 
the opposite views backed by Hadiths are less significant in Sharia in general while in Al siyasah 
al shariah their significance cannot be overemphasized.  
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Again, the Hadiths concerned with obedience to authority stand in at least two 
oppositional categories, which have historically divided the Ulu Al-Amr. Omotosho argues: 
Muslim scholars are divided on the issue. While some of them see the power of “those charged 
with authority” (Ulu Al-Amr) as a limited one and therefore object to absolute obedience, others 
hold the view that with available Qur’anic evidence and Hadith of the Prophet in support of their 
rights, they deserve full and unquestionable obedience.  
Their difference seems to have emanated from their understanding of the available references – 
Qur’an and Hadith alike. Both Q4:59 and at least six out of the available Hadith ask the faithful 
to obey his leader without any condition attached. So, some of the jurists rely on this and 
therefore insist that obedience to the instruction of the Ulu Al-Amr is absolute. (3) 
 
Historically, this division over obedience to authority runs up to the present and sometimes 
appears within the same schools of Fiqh. For example, among the Salafi/Wahabi schools in 
Saudi Arabia, the division is clearly present between the Jamiah Salafism and the Salafi-Jihadi 
school. The Salafi-Jihadi holds that Muslims have a duty to correct the actions of temporal 
power that contradict Sharia, by force if necessary. Conversely, the Ulu Al-Amr of the Jamiah 
Salafism demand absolute and unconditional obedience to temporal power, whether it contradicts 
Sharia or not. The division between those who sought to intervene as Muslims in temporal 
power versus those granted absolute and unconditional obedience came to the fore during the 
First Persian Gulf War (1990-1991). The disagreement was over the role of the United States as 
an ally fighting on behalf of the Gulf monarchies against Iraq. While the matter was a blatant 
violation of Sharia, nevertheless, the Grand Mufti of the Saudi kingdom emphasized the legality 
of the matter and demanded the total obedience of the people to the monarchs in accordance with 
Sharia. The Salafi-Jihadi school, in contrast, considered the Fatwa (considered opinion given by 
a qualified scholar, i.e., a Mufti) a sign of the corrupt nature of temporal rulers and the 
establishment Ulu Al Amr, which was a part of the state bureaucracy and a rubberstamp to 
temporal power.  
91 
 
 Second the concept of politics or Al siyasah al shariah in relation to Ulu Al Amr and 
Sharia overall has a distinctive relationship to authority and obedience. According to Ilyas 
Ahmed: 
In Islam, we already know that Law is prior to state, and that there is a perfect sovereignty of Law 
which cannot be changed by human hands …Thus it is clear that in Islam the state has never been 
an end in itself: it has always been universal in character-not for one nation, but for all men of all 
nations and humanity. (481) 
Thus, Islamic public and administrative laws temporal laws are the product of human agency in 
accordance with the Maslaha or “good” of the community. Al siyasah al shariah plays a 
different role and has a different character and domain than in the European tradition. Sharia 
which is prior to the state is different from Canon law in that its scope covers both public and 
private realms. Therefore, when investigating politics in Islamic legal and political writings the 
European conception of the political with its plurality of definitions must be abandoned in favor 
of Al siyasah al shariah, which has a stricter scope and meaning in Islamic political and legal 
writings. As Ahmed points out, Al siyasah al shariah is directly related to those duties and 
obligations that the executive is limited to in implementing Sharia. Al siyasah al shariah is an 
entire branch of Fiqh under Sharia and cannot overcome its hegemony. Kamali illustrates this 
point: 
This [Al siyasah al shar’iyyah] is a broad doctrine of Islamic public law that authorizes rulers and 
judges, that is, the Ulu Al –Amr, to determine the manner in which the Sharia should be 
administered. A ruler may accordingly take discretionary measures, enact rules and initiate 
policies as he deems appropriate in the interests of good government, provided that no substantive 
principle of the Sharia is thereby violated. (142) 
This means that Al siyasah al shariah can be labeled as public or administrative laws as long as it 
remains tied to the principles of Sharia. Thus, politics has never been an independent domain of 
Sharia or permanently regulated by an ethical reference point of the Sharia. For example, if we 
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can imagine Machiavelli writing in Al siyasah al shariah then his advice to “the prince” must be 
according to the ends of Sharia and not primarily to achieve princely power and consequently 
stability and peace. In fact, the Realpolitik school of thought contradicts the existence of moral 
law. There are periods in history where a ruthless Khalifa is better than a weak and pious 
Khalifa. Nevertheless, once the ruthless Khalifa is in power, he must obey Sharia and implement 
it according to Ulu Al Amr’s legal interpretation of the law. Ibn Qayyim Al Jawziya (1292-1350 
CE) a Sunni Hanbali jurist defined Al siyasah al shariah as “whatever action that orients the 
people closer to the good and steers them away from corruption, even if the issue at hand is not 
Sunna and Qur’an” (Imarah 1988, 55-56).
65
 Historically, this definition has achieved consensus 
among Sunni Fuqaha but not the Shia who consider obedience to the Imamah (leader of the 
Muslim community) an article of faith.  
 There is more freedom and space for Al siyasah al shariah in Sunni Islam than in Shia 
Islam. Unlike in Sunni Islam, the state and the leadership of the community according to Shia 
Islam are not a sub branch of Sharia but a primary source of faith. Conversely, in Sunni Islam 
because the state and leadership of the community are sub branches of Al siyasah al shariah 
there is greater acceptance of disagreement. In brief, Sunni Islam is an outward and public 
oriented religion; yet neither the Qur’an nor Sunna entail or promote a specific form of 
government. Overall, the Sharia restricts and set limitations to all forms of government that 
developed historically in Sunni Islam.  
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( الذي يحدد لنا معنى الشريعة ، و دور الجهد البشري في صنع السياسة ، ١٣٥١-١٢٩٢هـ ١٥١-١٩١و من هؤالء األئمة االمام ابن قيم الجوزية )  
) بكسر الحاء و  -مصالح النا و مقررة للعدل بينهم ، يقول : ) إن الشريعة : مبناها و أساسها على الحكم التي هي جزء من الشريعة إذا كانت محققة ل
و مصالح العباد ...و السياسة : ما كان من األفعال بحيث يكون النا معه أقرب إلى الصالح و أبعد عن  -فتح الكاف ، أي الحكمة و العلة و السبب ( 
ه الرسول و ال نزل به وحيالفساد ، و ان لم يشرع  
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Furthermore, Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (1058-1111 CE) argued that “the theory of the 
Imamah is not a foundational part of the faith; instead, it is secondary, a branch, and, therefore, it 
is in the domain of Fiqh a subject to deliberation” (Imarah 1988, 52-53).
66
 The state and 
leadership of the community and forms of government are not in the domain of faith so long as 
they do not contradict the principles of Sharia. It is precisely over issues of state and leadership 
where disagreements may arise because primary sources are mute. The authority of Ulu Al Amr, 
and the unchecked authority of the expert, trumps temporal power and is a source of legitimacy. 
Historically, temporal power has struggled to control and to shift the type of authority that 
emphasizes correct action in accordance with Sharia to a type of authority that emphasizes 
obedience to temporal power.  
For Muslims, the state and governance are executive tools to achieve what is in accord 
with the ends of the law. Most important, the state and leadership posts were established in early 
Islam as tools to implement Sharia and protect the faith from external attacks by neighboring 
states. Thus, “Islam as a religion, belief, and Sharia including the foundational five pillars of the 
faith, plus the Qur’an and Sunna all are Divine injunctions and no believer can claim the 
contrary. But Islam as a religion never ordained a particular system of government due to the 
logic that Islam is applicable regardless of time and space. Therefore, the constant evolving 
human mind is entrusted to construct systems of governments according to benefit of the 
collective and in accordance to the general principles of the faith” (Imarah 1988, 53-54).
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 يكرر الغزالي هذا المعنى فيقول : إن نظرية اإلمامة. ليست من المهمات ، و ليست من فن المعقوالت فيها ، بل من الفقهيات  
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بها الرسول عليه الصالة و و بأركانه الخمسة التي بني عليها و بكتابه المعجز ، و بسنته التشريعية التي بلغ  -عقيدة و شريعة  -إن اإلسالم ، كدين  
سالم كدين السالم تفصيالت ما أجمله الوحي .. إن ذلك كله ) وضع إلهي ( ، و لي لمؤمن أن يدعي أن شيئا من ذلك هو من  )وضع االنسان ( .. لكن اال
النظم المتجددة قطعا بحكم التطور للعقل  ، لم يحدد للمسلمين نظاما محددا للحكم ، الن منطق صالحية الدين اإلسالمي لكل زمان و مكان يقتضي ترك
 اإلنساني الرشيد ، يصوغها وفق مصلحة المجموع ، و في إطار الوصايا العامة و القواعد الكلية التي قررها هذا الدين
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Historically, the evolution of Fiqh al siyash al shariah led to a gradual increase in 
obedience to temporal power and the state and underlay the original purpose that the state and 
temporal power were assigned to serve. This evolution will become clearer in chapters four and 
five. This evolutionary shift entailed a change in expert authority from one that emphasized right 
action in accordance with Al siyasah al shariah to one that emphasized obedience in the name of 
Maslaha of the Umma, particularly obedience to temporal power, over actions of ordaining the 
“good” and forbidding “evil.” A good example is the marginalization of the Muslim subject’s 
role in the Bay’a by gradually making it exclusive among few people to legitimize temporal 
power rule.  
It is precisely in the area of governance that Fiqh al siyasah al shariah can accommodate 
the different views regarding who can legally govern the Umma without violating the principles 
of Sharia. It is in this realm that the authority of Ulu Al Amr is at its peak. Consequently, they 
historically possessed the authority to demarcate the parameters of debates and struggles on 
which type of government and political organization best served the implementation of Sharia 
and the good of the Umma (the people or community of Islam). Imarah argues that the “omission 
of details regarding governance, politics, and the state from the Qur’an is intentional” (54).
68
 As 
a result, Al siyasah al shariah is a flexible field shaped by human reason in accordance to the 
Maslaha of the Umma. The authority of Ulu Al Amr in this realm decides the exception which 
cast a particular and central character to Sunni form of authority.  
The character of Ulu Al Amr authority in the realm of Al siyasah al shariah differs from 
its authority in the realm of Sharia. Ulu Al Amr’s flexibility and freedom in the former are much 
                                                          
68
 و نحن نعتقد أن صمت القرآن الكريم عن تفصيل نظم الحكم و السياسة للمسلمين هو موقف إلهي مقصود 
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wider and allow for personal views and interests to be expressed. Consequently, Ulu Al Amr 
were able to widen the scope of Al siyasah al shariah, and Al siyasah al shariah evolved into a 
branch of Fiqh. Kamali provides an account of the wide scope of Al siyasah al shariah arguing 
that:  
Siyasah in its widest sense has five purposes: the protection of faith, life, intellect, lineage, and 
property. The “uluma” are unanimous on the point that the protection of these values constitutes 
the ultimate objective of Sharia itself, despite the fact that a specific reference to this group of 
values can be found neither in the Qur’an nor in Sunna. General consensus (ijma) on the 
protection of these values is not based on any particular provision of the Qur’an or Sunna, but on 
the overall contents of these source-texts and on the numerous commands and prohibitions that 
are designed to protect these values. The same can be said of the Qur’anic verses that enjoin on 
the community the pursuit of good and prevention of evil. Good and evil are nowhere listed 
exhaustively in the Qur’an or Sunna, but can be known through a general investigation of these 
sources. (146) 
 
This passage demonstrates the elasticity of the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr over Al siyasah 
al shariah, which covers and defines Sharia itself.  
 It is important at this point to state that the above evidence and arguments present a 
challenge to the academic literature that applies the term fundamentalism equally to Islam and 
other religions. It overlooks local historical, legal and geographical configurations. This 
academic genre must answer the question of how religions across time and space share the same 
internal operational configurations and dynamic. The aim here is to emphasize the argument of 
the dissertation that while religion across time and space has universal characteristics; its 
particular configurations in any given time and space produce different systems of meaning and 
signification. Karl Lowith demonstrates in the following quotation the particular internal 
configurations of Western systems of meaning that remain Jewish and Christian in character; he 
states: 
We of today concerned with the unity of universal history and with its progress toward an 
ultimate goal or at least toward a “better world,” are still in the line of prophetic and messianic 
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monotheism; we are still Jews and Christians, however little we may think of ourselves in those 
terms. But within this predominant tradition we are also the heirs of classic wisdom. We are in the 
line of classical polytheism when we are concerned with the plurality of various cultures as such, 
exploring with boundless curiosity the whole natural and historical world for the sake of 
disinterested knowledge which is quite untouched by any interest in redemption. (19) 
This argument is doubly important; first is the idea that contemporary political concepts 
ultimately have their roots in religion, which shapes the internal character and configuration of 
contemporary secular concepts. As such, the academic’s use of the universal concept of 
fundamentalism becomes problematic because it refers to notions of obedience to authority that 
is local to Western systems of meaning.  Second, that Islam today exists in a world 
hegemonically dominated by Western standards of morality and human rights results in political 
questions about the compatibility of Islam with modernity and democracy. Western critiques 
overlook the historical roots of Islam in their contemporary context or assume that they do not 
exist.  
Lowith’s argument is directly tied to contemporary debates on revolutions in Tunisia, 
Yemen, Libya, and Egypt, the so-called “Arab Spring.” For example, the ideological division 
between the Islamist and secular political parties over the draft of constitutions in both Tunisia 
and Egypt has its roots in the Sunni authority versus European sovereignty ideological division. 
As a matter of fact, the collapse of political dialogue in both countries has led to massive 
demonstrations and violence on the streets and in public squares by Islamists, secular forces, and 
counter-revolutionary forces of the old regimes. In Egypt, the conflicts eventually led to the 3
rd
 
of July coup.  
The gridlock between the two sides is directly tied to the Islamic legal conception of 
authority and its manifestation, obedience in relation to secular modernity. The conflict has its 
roots in the Islamic concept of authority and the historical Western conception of sovereignty. 
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The two concepts give us various subjectivities on how modernity, freedom, autonomy, and 
citizenship are constituted and dispensed. This gap between Western sovereignty and Sunni 
authority at the conceptual level is presently overlooked due to the absence of political language 
on both sides that can facilitate and allow for a democratic dialogue. The “Arab Spring” abrupt 
arrival exposed the absence and lack of political language on both sides that enable a successful 
transition to democratic governance. Similarly, the ideological division over the role of Islam in 
public life is clear in public and social media, which believe that they hold irreconcilable 
worldviews. This impasse is a hallmark of colonialism, which hegemonically introduced and 
nurtured intellectuals who adopted modern subjectivities without democratic debates with those 
representing local political and social structures. Similarly, Islamic political and legal writings 
made little effort to address the modern European idea of sovereignty, which is at the core of the 
institution of the modern nation-state, civil rights, and liberties. Secular forces suspect that 
political Islam in its haste to reject Western subjectivities and modernity has also rejected basic 
principles of freedom and equality. Behind the tension between political Islam and secular forces 
are two causes. The first is the absence of political language on both sides that can allow for a 
common platform to be achieved. Instead, all political parties are focusing on the political action 
level of elections and organizing on the ground or looking of alliances that could advance there 
electoral gains. The second is tied to historical resistance to colonialism and the arrival of 
modernity and the modern state. This is the central topic of chapter five. 
The abrupt arrival of the revolutions took everyone by surprise and made plain that 
theoretical dialogues between both sides were nonexistent. The lack of dialogue was due to the 
historical role and success of the old regimes in pitting the two groups against one another so that 
any possible coalition to challenge the status quo would be impossible. The old regimes’ strategy 
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was carried out at every political and societal level including in education, the media, the 
economy, and legal system.  
 
 This brings us to the second cause which is tied to colonialism, modernity, and local 
resistance. The violent military imposition of the modern state and with it the values of European 
modernity have created an intellectual split in the postcolonial intelligentsia. On the one hand, 
local intellectuals adopted Western subjectivities such as nationalism, and on the other hand, 
Muslim intellectuals produced an Islamic discourse that rejected European Western subjectivities 
as a toxic influence on the Muslim world. The main character of this split is the exclusionary 
discourse between those who adopted Western subjectivities and those who hold the Sharia as 
the main shield protecting the Umma from the intellectual hegemony of the West. A good 
example of the new sovereignty and the nation-state project is the role Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of 
Turkey and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran had in reconstituting local subjectivities into 
Western colonial subjectivities and identities similar subjectivities and identities. They swept 
away local legal codes and subjectivities by force to clear the way for Western sovereignty and 
subjectivities. Historically, political Islam resisted the process of physically and intellectually 
Westernizing Muslim values. During the period of resistance to colonial European powers, 
secularists who were part of the resistance viewed the Caliphate and Islamists as symbols of 
weakness tied to decline and colonization by European powers.  
 Similarly, today, secularists view contemporary Islamic political parties as hijackers of 
the revolution who want to prevent the values of modernity, the Enlightenment, and human 
rights from taking root in Tunisia and Egypt. This dynamic will be developed in the final 
chapter, which deals with the modern state and this dialectic between both sides. But for the time 
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being, it is important to emphasize that the gridlock that followed the Arab Spring is due to a 
lack of theoretical debates about Western sovereignty and Islamic conceptions of authority and 
obedience. 
 
 Let us now turn the focus of the chapter on the concept of obedience as a manifestation of 
authority. It is also important to reiterate the idea stated earlier, mainly that authority is different 
from power, which requires coercion or the threat of force to secure obedience. While obedience 
in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah is obedience to expert opinion, authority emanates from the 
same source that guides individuals’ moral standards. This moral standard acts like a glue that 
holds collectivities together and makes their existence as voluntary associations possible. 
Obedience takes the character of acting in accordance with what is moral and rightful. 
 What is more important is that concepts of authority and obedience have a religious 
character and belong to the subject of political theology. The internal character of both concepts 
has its roots in religious experience. This dissertation argues that the political concepts of 
authority, obedience, freedom, autonomy, and human rights are characteristically Christian in 
their configurations, operation, and character. Carl Schmitt argues this point:  
all significant concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts not only 
because of their historical development—in which they were transformed from theology to the 
theory of state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but 
also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of the concepts. (36) 
Similarly, this dissertation argues that both authority and obedience in Sunni systems of meaning 
have Islamic characteristics that are still operative today but, as chapter five demonstrates, under 
the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. This condition is due to the colonization of the 
Muslim empires and the imposition of the modern states structure by force and legally via 
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international law. This dissertation maintains that the best place to map the genealogical 
difference of these concepts, at least in the case of the three monotheist religions, is “the Fall” of 
Adam.  
The account of the Fall that is shared among the three monotheist religions is also the 
point where the religions develop different roots, take various directions, and give us 
heterogeneous political theologies and different subjectivities.  While there are many themes in 
the sacred texts that lead to fruitful insights, this dissertation asserts that each account of the Fall 
of Adam is significant due to its direct relation and influence on the concepts of the proper forms 
of authority and obedience. After all, the three monotheist religions hold that Adam was cast out 
of Heaven after the Fall, hence populating the Earth. The different accounts of the Fall shaped 
political concepts and are still with us today in the Western tradition whose secular discourse has 
its roots in theology.  
It is important to state here that my aim is not to reduce Western thought into essential 
characters and qualities. Instead, I intend to demonstrate that heterogeneous cultures and 
subcultures within the West are a testament to the endless varieties and creative differences that 
spring from the same genealogical roots. What I propose here is to refer to the a priori 
assumptions that operate in these systems of meaning. Most relevant to this investigation is the 
theological account of the Fall that is at the core of authority, obedience, freedom, autonomy, 
progress, and human rights in general. According to Karl Lowith: 
one must ultimately refer back to this idea of man if the “sociological” investigations of Weber 
and Marx are to be understood in their fundamental and radical significance. “To be radical is to 
grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself.” The radically thisworldly view of 
man expressed here is a presupposition for both Marx and Weber.  
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“Man, who has found in a fantastic reality of heaven, where he sought a supernatural being, only 
his own reflection, will no longer be tempted to find only semblance of himself—a non-human-
being—where he seeks and must seek his true reality” (Marx). (42-43) 
Thus, while the genealogical roots of “what a person is” share the same reference points for 
Marx and Weber, the two theoretical views are quite different, and their theorists produced 
different explanations and analyses of capitalism. Similarly, the same dynamic applies to Islamic 
legal and political writings. Consequently, the argument here is that theological accounts of the 
Fall in the Qur’an have a direct influence on how authority and obedience are constituted and 
framed and produce various subjectivities in Islam. It is precisely the influence of the conception 
of a person in the Islamic narrative in general and in Sunni Islam in particular that renders 
European sovereignty alien to Islam’s system of meaning and signification.  
 Let us now examine theological accounts of the Fall in the Qur’an. First, the Qur’an 
provides us with a narrative of a dialogue between God and the Angels regarding knowledge of 
“Adam’s Fall” before the event took place. The Qur’an narrates the Fall as follow: 
And [mention, O Muhammad], when your Lord said to the angels, "Indeed, I will make upon the 
earth a successive authority." They said, "Will You place upon it one who causes corruption 
therein and sheds blood, while we declare Your praise and sanctify You?" Allah said, "Indeed, I 
know that which you do not know. 2:30 
The significance of such an account is that even though it was known by God according to the 
verse before Adam was created that the Fall was imminent, Adam was still created. The purpose 
of this act is for Adam and his descendants to become the “successive authority” on earth to 
carry and implement God’s law. A “successive authority” means to be God’s Khalif on earth. 
The following four verses reveal other reasons behind that act of creation: 
And He taught Adam the names - all of them. Then He showed them to the angels and said, 
"Inform Me of the names of these, if you are truthful." 2:31 
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They said, "Exalted are You; we have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, it 
is You who is the Knowing, the Wise." 2:32 
He said, "O Adam, inform them of their names." And when he had informed them of their names, 
He said, "Did I not tell you that I know the unseen [aspects] of the heavens and the earth? And I 
know what you reveal and what you have concealed." 2:33 
And [mention] when We said to the angels, "Prostrate before Adam"; so they prostrated, except 
for Iblees (devil). He refused and was arrogant and became of the disbelievers. 2:34 
Thus, unlike the Christian accounts, knowledge is not the product of the Fall but the reason that, 
despite murder and bloodshed, Adam was created. It is not helpful to apply our understanding of 
knowledge on these verses. Knowledge here has a particular context regarding the ability to 
discern right from wrong, and to seek knowledge as an attribute is more important than the 
capability to kill and shed blood. Consequently, this particular account of knowledge describes 
the constitution of human nature in Islam. This idea has double significance when it comes to the 
relationship between knowledge and action after the Fall.  The verses that follow give us an 
important account regarding the nature of Adam and Eve’s being:  
And We said, "O Adam, dwell, you and your wife, in Paradise and eat therefrom in [ease and] 
abundance from wherever you will. But do not approach this tree, lest you be among the 
wrongdoers." 2:35 
But Satan caused them to slip out of it and removed them from that [condition] in which they had 
been. And We said, "Go down, [all of you], as enemies to one another, and you will have upon 
the earth a place of settlement and provision for a time." 2:36 
The materiality of existence is already in the original state in which Adam and Eve were created. 
Their material body is not a product of the Fall.  The duality of existence between the spiritual 
and the physical is absent from this account of Adam. This narrative contrasts with the Christian 
account of the original state of creation, which is spiritual.  In Islam the meaning of heaven is not 
limited to an eternal and ethereal Godly bliss, but it also includes the enjoyment of eternal 
rewards and an abundance of physical pleasures. This includes sex, food, and eternal youth and 
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beauty. This dissertation argues that the dualistic approach is absent in the Islamic orientation 
toward being and politics due to the absence of “original sin.”  Therefore, “unlike Christianity, 
where original sin precludes salvation without God’s grace, here each person’s nature enables 
her to act in ways that merits God’s grace” (Gould 2008, 4).  
 Most important, in Islam, the Fall never damaged human nature. The following verses 
illustrate this account: 
Then Adam received from his Lord [some] words, and He accepted his repentance. Indeed, it is 
He who is the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful. 2:37 
We said, "Go down from it, all of you. And when guidance comes to you from Me, whoever 
follows My guidance - there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. 2:38 
These verses assume a certain type of human nature that gives rise to subjectivities that are 
different in character and configurations than in Western political and social writings. More 
precisely, what we are investigating here is how Christian and Islamic political theologies frame 
the original state of the subject.  
In Islam the symbolic and the biological were not remained severed forever due to their 
immaterial sovereignty. Accordingly, symbolic (God) never took the form of flesh in Islam or 
interfered in the biological realm of existence. The physical body of a king or a priest remains 
worldly and profane in Sunni Islam and does not share any divine qualities. Consequently, 
institutions as well remain profane and lack divine or supernatural qualities that require 
obedience. On the contrary, institutions of Caliphate and Ulu Al Amr remain profane, limited to 
authority over expert knowledge. The sovereign remains in heaven, never descending in the flesh 
to earth, rendering all institutions profane, and preventing the figure of a sovereign from 
appearing in Sunni Islam. The following verse in the Qur’an demonstrates the idea: 
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Say, "O Allah, Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will and You take 
sovereignty away from whom You will. You honor whom You will and You humble whom You 
will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things competent.3:26 
 God (the symbolic) never stepped into the biological realm; thus, the flesh or blood remained 
profane in significance limiting claims to the divine right to rule. Thus, temporal power never 
possessed a divine quality in Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the Qur’an implores: “Say, ‘He is Allah, 
[who is] One, Allah, the Eternal Refuge, He neither begets nor is born, Nor is there to Him any 
equivalent” (112:1-4). This account of sovereignty has prevented a similar sovereign in Western 
legal and political sense from emerging in Islamic political and legal writings. The idea that God 
is the only sovereign means sovereignty has always remained in the symbolic realm and never 
taken on a physical reality. Accordingly, obedience to temporal authority must be limited to the 
expert model. “Hence, the real question which is being asked by who wishes to question 
authority is not ‘Why should I obey?’ but ‘Why should I agree?’ It is the capacity for reasoning 
or, more precisely put the capacity for reasoned elaboration of communication matters” 
(Friedrich 1972, 53). This is precisely why chapter one rejected the focus on sovereignty in Islam 
for a focus on Ulu Al Amr. The scope of authority and obedience to Ulu Al Amr has historically 
remained at the level of the expert over esoteric knowledge.  
 
 The argument here is not to set up a political theology in Islam in binary opposition to 
Christianity’s. Instead, the argument here is to underline the problems that arise from using 
political concepts without investigating their internal configurations and historical dynamics in 
different systems of meaning. For example, Marcuse gives us an account of Protestant Christian 
conceptions of authority and freedom on Earth, which later become the foundation of bourgeois 
concepts of freedom. He argues:   
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Man is embedded in a system of earthly order which by no means corresponds to the fundamental 
teachings of Christianity. This contradiction provides a function for “double morality” as 
combined with the sharp distinction between the “Christian” and the worldly human existence, 
between “Christian” morality, and “external morality, which is the motive force in offices and 
works.” The former refers only to the “inner” man: his “inner” freedom and equality, his “inner” 
poverty, love and happiness (as its clearest in Luther’s interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, 
1530). The “external” order, on the other hand, is measured completely by the rules to which 
praxis and works are subjected when taken in isolation from the person. It is very characteristic 
that here- in accordance with the idea of praxis  as the discipline and service performed by an 
utterly sinful existence the earthly order appears essentially as a system of “authorities” and 
“offices,” as an order of universal subordination, and that these authorities and offices in turn 
essentially appear under the sign of the sword.” (15-16) 
This type of obedience to temporal authority has a specific worldview regarding earthly 
existence that has its roots in the Christian account of the Fall. But I think that the split between 
heaven/earth in the above account is to some extent contradicted by the political theology of the 
Christian God’s son as God in the flesh, on earth. “This thought reappears in a secularized form 
in Kant: man’s freedom as a rational being can only be ‘saved’ if as a sensual being he is entirely 
abandoned to natural necessity” (Marcuse 2008, 8). Consequently, the logic of the contemporary 
political concepts of human rights of freedom and autonomy follows a similar line. The logic of 
the dual existence of the self versus temporal world is absent in Islam with the exception of some 
of the schools of Sufism. The temporal world is the place to achieve salvation, which takes place 
without the guidance of a church or clergy. Earthly existence underlies the logic of salvation, 
authority, and obedience in Islam. Consider the following verses, which make the point that 
authority is not absolute and the subject is held accountable to praxis or deeds in accordance with 
Sharia:   
And [yet], among the people are those who take other than Allah as equals [to Him]. They love 
them as they [should] love Allah . But those who believe are stronger in love for Allah . And if 
only they who have wronged would consider [that] when they see the punishment, [they will be 
certain] that all power belongs to Allah and that Allah is severe in punishment. 2:65 
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[And they should consider that] when those who have been followed disassociate themselves 
from those who followed [them], and they [all] see the punishment, and cut off from them are the 
ties [of relationship], 2:66 
Those who followed will say, "If only we had another turn [at worldly life] so we could 
disassociate ourselves from them as they have disassociated themselves from us." Thus will Allah 
show them their deeds as regrets upon them. And they are never to emerge from the Fire. 2:67 
Accordingly and contrary to the Christian account of the Fall, in Sunni Islam people are assumed 
to have a sound nature and knowledge and able to make sound judgments regarding obedience to 
authority. Thus, obedience on Earth is not absolute since praxis is ultimately what achieves 
salvation. Therefore, praxis in accordance with Sharia guarantees salvation. Sayyid Qutb argues 
that this is actually the foundation of monotheism, which is to follow one law that is above 
people and does not enslave one group to the other. He writes:  
Indeed, He knows that there is no other way. The way is not to free earth from Roman and 
Persian tyranny in order to replace it with Arab tyranny. All tyranny is wicked! The earth belongs 
to God and should be purified for God, and it cannot be purified for him unless the banner “No 
deity except God,” is unfurled across the earth. Man is servant to God alone and he can remain so 
only if he unfurls the banner, “No deity except God—“La ilaha illa Allah”—as an Arab with the 
knowledge of his language understood it: no sovereignty except God’s, no law except from God, 
and no authority of one man over another as the authority in all respects belong to God, The 
“grouping” of men which Islam proclaims is based on this faith alone, the faith in which all 
peoples of any race or color—Arabs, Romans or Persians—are equal under the banner of God. 
(26) 
This quote presents us with an account of authority and obedience that produces different 
accounts of subjectivities and new views about freedom of the subject and the limits of 
obedience to authority. Accordingly, only by submitting themselves to God, can Muslim subjects 
actually be free, meaning that subjugation is as an act of free will, a conversion that one has 
chosen to impose on oneself. The collective that adheres to Sharia cannot subjugate others nor 
can individuals subjugate others. This verse from the Qur’an illustrates the idea: 
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And Satan will say when the matter has been concluded, "Indeed, Allah had promised you the 
promise of truth. And I promised you, but I betrayed you. But I had no authority over you except 
that I invited you, and you responded to me. So do not blame me; but blame yourselves. I cannot 
be called to your aid, nor can you be called to my aid. Indeed, I deny your association of me [with 
Allah ] before. Indeed, for the wrongdoers is a painful punishment." 14:22 
Thus, obeying laws that contradict the Sharia is a voluntary act by which the subject is held 
accountable and judged. Every act is judged according to adherence to the law. According to the 
Qur’an:  
So whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it. And whoever does an atom's weight of evil 
will see it. 99:7-8 
This type of judgment emphasizes praxis and simultaneously limits the scope of earthly power, 
authority, and obedience. Obedience that is tied to praxis guarantees the achievement of 
salvation and sets limitations on temporal power political control. Therefore, the word “freedom” 
never received attention similar to that paid it in Western political thought, meaning that for a 
Muslim to follow God’s law is to be free from arbitrary earthly laws. Freedom or liberty has 
never been a central theme in Islamic Fiqh because obedience to God’s Law addresses the same 
concerns that the concept of freedom does in Western political writings. Montgomery-Watt 
echoes the argument: 
freedom has never has any place in Islamic thought. There is a word for freedom, namely 
hurriyyah, but this refers to the condition of the freemen (hurr) as contrasted with the slave 
(‘abd). ..despite such points, however, it seems likely that there is a combination of ideas 
somewhere in Islamic thought, which performs much the same function as the concept of 
freedom does in the West. (Kamali 2002, 8) 
Yet, his argument overlooks possibilities that may arise if the concepts of Hurr and Abd are 
scrutinized linguistically in relation to one another before and after the advent of Islam.  
 At this point I would like to warren the reader that this chapter and the subsequent one 
rely heavily on the writing of Hakim Al-Mutairi who is contemporary Kuwaiti Salafi Islamic 
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thinker and political activist and a member of Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami). Through 
his party he is aiming to reform the Kuwaiti monarchy, hoping to bring about constitutional 
changes that limit monarchical power in government and politics. The justification of choosing 
Al-Mutairi’s work is the relevance of his research to the topic of this dissertation. As a Salafi he 
belongs to the most orthodox schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Accordingly, he is expected to be 
the least critical of Islamic traditional legal sources and the Sharia .Yet, his work is primarily on 
freedom from tyranny and autonomy of the Muslim subject. Accordingly, his research is ideal 
for the purpose of demonstrating how local qualities of freedom and equality framed and argued 
in Sunni Islam context. 
 
Al-Mutairi argues that “Hurr (freedom) in classical Arabic and the language of the 
Qur’an has a wider meaning than the Western and contemporary use of the term. In the Arabic 
tongue, Hurr (free) is the opposite of Abd (slave) and Tahreer (to free) a child is by raising him 
obedient to God” (b).
69
 Accordingly, freedom is not an act to possess an object or achieve a 
desire.  Moreover, freedom is not to act or think without a constraint. Instead, freedom is a 
characteristic that a person may or may not possess. Instead, Al-Mutairi argues that “the free 
person (Hurr) is the highest in honor and the best among his/her people and the most honest and 
generous regardless of wealth” (b).
70
 This means a person who holds this character is a person 
who is free to keep a promise and act according to these treats without fear of consequences. 
Such a person has no master but her/himself. Accordingly, being free is an innate quality that 
                                                          
69
ي لغة العرب و لغة القران معنى أشمل و أرحب يختلف اختالفا جذريا عن معناها في الثقافة الغربية األوروبية التي تشيع اليوم ، ففي غير ان للحرية ف 
 لسان العرب الحر نقيض العبد ، و تحرير الولد : أن يفرده لطاعة هللا
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كل شي أعتقه أي أكرمه و أجوده و أحسنهالحر من النا خيارهم و أفاضلهم ، و حرية العرب أشرفهم ، و الحر من     
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flows in the opposite direction of the material environment; from an inward to outward direction. 
Therefore, the Hurr label holds more than the quality of being physically free, for a person can 
be free but act in a slavish manner. Thus, being free requires action in accordance with the 
collective standard of being Hurr. This description of the freedom is before the advent of Islam 
and after Islam the qualities of freedom are emphasized further by God and revelation. Al-
Mutairi claims that to be free is “to be free from the enslavement of other. Thus, whoever obeys 
other next to God; he is an idol worshiper of that person whether that person is a king or 
clergyman” (b-g).
71
 Conversely, the word Abd (slave) has the opposite connotation since by 
definition a person who is a slave is unable to act according to his/her own innate character. So a 
person can be a slave to material conditions if it prevents her innate moral character from being 
expressed. Hence, a free person is one who shapes the environment and not shaped by it. 
However, historically Ulu Al-Amr in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah emphasized less this 
character of freedom and demanded obedience form the Muslim subject in in accordance to 
Maslaha. This idea is illustrated in chapters two, four, and five.  
 This is the logic behind the argument that Islam has equalized relationships between the 
master and the slave. Sharia holds both master and slave are equal in value and legally both must 
obey Sharia. Of course, this argument has to answer many questions and concerns regarding the 
institution of slavery in general, but that is not the aim of this investigation. Here we are 
concerned with authority and obedience, which are never absolute in a master-slave relationship. 
Thus, one who acts in accordance with Sharia is the Hurr, and one who follows the law of 
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another person is a slave to that person. As a matter of fact a Muslim cannot be a Muslim unless 
she accepts Islam as a free act.  Consider the following verse one more time: 
There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear 
from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most 
trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. 2:253 
Faith secures freedom from arbitrary laws by temporal power. And the free act of becoming a 
Muslim, a necessary condition, ensures action in accordance with the standard of the religion and 
gives legal legitimacy to acts of resistance.  The freedom from being ruled by the laws of other 
persons was the ethos of pre-Islamic Arabia and remained so in a different context after the 
advent of Islam. It is these types of relationships between authority and obedience that temporal 
power has historically struggled to change. In manipulating Ulu Al-Amr, it has sought to 
emphasize obedience to temporal power over action.  
 In sum, we have established in this chapter the local and particular legal characteristics 
of authority and obedience in Sunni Islam. Sunni Islam has a universal character that is present in 
all collectivities whether theologically sacred or profane and secular. Its most important 
universal character is obedience to a set of rules that Sharia represents as “good” and avoidance 
of others that are “bad or evil.” Universally, rules and some basic agreement on the “good” are 
necessary for a collectivity to come into existence. It is hard to conceive of a collectivity that 
does not follow some general rules or laws that allow for the constitution of meaningful relations 
and interactions among its members. Consequently, members of a collectivity must obey at least 
a minimal set of rules that govern the collective. Logically, an agency must hold authority to 
enforce a collectivity’s rules. Therefore, some type of obedience to authority is a universal 
quality that is present in every collectivity.  
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This dissertation argues that these universal characteristics of authority and obedience 
exist in every collectivity across time and space, but to understand how authority and obedience 
operate one must account for the local legal, social, and political frames of a collective setting. In 
the context of Western European history, authority and obedience evolved into the legal principle 
of sovereignty, which is currently a basic principle of international law. Only by understanding 
the religious roots of contemporary Western secular states can the sovereignty of the nation state 
and the people be grasped.  
Similarly, authority and obedience in Sunni Islam have a local and particular quality that 
allows for the universal characteristics to operate coherently. This chapter has established that 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah in Sunni Islam has evolved from the authority of Ulu Al Amr as a body 
of legal experts. Legally, Ulu Al Amr in Sunni Islam are profane in character and lack divine or 
supernatural qualities in understanding and speaking on behalf of the text. They are learned 
expert judges who gain their authority from other judges by recognition of their grasp of the 
subject matter. Consequently, obedience in Sunni Islam is limited to Sharia that instructs how to 
ordain the “good” and to forbid “evil.” Moreover, because the Muslim subject achieves salvation 
through praxis and not grace obedience to authority is limited to the understanding the legal 
injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna. Authority in Sunni Islam lacks supernatural qualities. As a 
result, challengers who understand sacred texts differently subject the Ulu Al Amr to constant 
scrutiny and limitation.  
The highest degree of obedience to the authority of Ulu Al Amr in Sunni is in the realm of 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah. This legal branch of Sharia evolved to accommodate political change 
through the historical sediment of legal opinions according to Maslaha. The central role of Ulu 
Al Amr, a profane authority, regulates Muslim obedience to temporal power, be it a city state, 
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dynastic empire, principality, or finally the modern sovereign nation-state. It is the combination 
of expertise in Sharia and the evolution of Fiqh al siyash al shariah that provides the basis for 
legal opinions that other experts can use to achieve Ijma regarding new legal matters. 
Historically, temporal power was able to extract obedience from Muslim subjects or the Umma 
via the legal legitimacy Ulu Al Amr had over the text and over political and legal issues, such as 
the form of government, which had no reference in the Qur’an or Sunna. Empires and other 
forms of government were toppled on the legal claim that they had no legitimacy. They lacked 
legitimacy because the Ulu Al Amr at the time were corrupt and had lost their authority due to 

















       CHAPTER IV 
                                      Ulu Al Amr, Temporal Power and Wilayah al Ahed 
 
Nearly two decades after accession to power, the emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani was set to hand control of a transformed country to his son and heir apparent 
Sheikh Tamim (Aljazeera 24 June 2013). Tamim was to receive Wilayah al ahed from his father 
in the year 2003 (Aljazeera 24 June 2013). The historic event signified the legal continuation of 
concept that appeared in the history of Islam in the year 56 AH (676 CE) and still provide the 
legal foundation today for all Arab monarchies. As Al-Mawardi (972-1058 CE) relates, 
“Imamate comes exists in two manners: the first by election of those in social power and 
influence and the second by the delegation of the previous Imam” (Al-Mawardi 2005, 12). 
Wilayah al ahed is the Arabic term for “delegation of power” in Fiqh al siyash al shariah.  
This chapter focuses on the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed to demonstrate the 
particularities and unique character in the Islamic legal conception of temporal power. More 
important, it further clarifies the historical role of Ulu Al Amr’s authority in providing 
governmental legitimacy in Islam. Neither the Qur’an nor Sunna provides any reference to the 
type of government or means through which temporal power is delegated from one person to 
another. Fulfilling this task falls to the authority of Ulu Al Amr.  
 
 I would like to start with preliminary remarks regarding the use of the historical method. 
Since this chapter relies extensively on historical events that have legal consequences for the 
development of Fiqh, I will clarify how this historical record is treated as evidence. First, the 
record’s authenticity is of secondary importance. I am unconcerned with questions of historical 
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authenticity but intend to investigate the historical layers of legal discourse of Fiqh that are 
accepted by Muslim intellectuals and jurists who abide by Fiqh and constitute Islam’s 
“tradition.” This means that whatever the Ulu Al Amr has considered legally binding through 
Ijma is treated by this dissertation as valid evidence. Hence, the focus here is on how Fiqh 
evolved as a foundational tradition for the development of legal rulings. This includes the 
historical evolution of the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed, which later morphed into Wlayah 
al qaher. 
 An example that elucidates the method above is the statement of the Grand Imam of Al-
Azhar of Egypt Ahmed El-Tayeb. On the 30
th
 of June 2013 he provided legal legitimacy to the 
military coup that ousted President Morsi of Egypt claiming it was the lesser of two evils. This 
lesser evil is founded in the principle of Fiqh whereby ousting a legitimate president can be 
justified to prevent the greater evil of civil war and bloodshed. In other words, Wlayah al qaher 
legally binds the Umma to obey whoever usurped the state by force since obedience of the 
community ideally would prevent further bloodshed. As such, whether the foundational principle 
in early Islam is authentic or not is unimportant. What is important is that such a principle 
remains legally valid in Fiqh in 2013. Regardless of the criticism that the Grand Imam received 
for arriving at his Fatwa, my aim is to demonstrate the traditional basis for contemporary law.  
 
 Before discussing the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed—the delegation of power—it is 
beneficial for the sake of clarity to investigate Al siyash al shariah, a subfield of Fiqh and the 
locus of the historical development and evolution of Wilayah al ahed. Wilayah al ahed is shaped 
by the general principles of Sharia.  Meaning, Al siyash al shariah is a subfield that is governed 
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by Sharia’s overall objectives, limited by it. Once this clarification is achieved, it easier to follow 
the historical evolution of the principle of Wilayah al ahed in Fiqh. According to John Esposito:  
In its broad scope, Shariah-oriented public policy (siyasah shariyyah) authorizes government 
leaders to conduct government affairs in harmony with the spirit and purpose of the Shariah, even 
at the expense of a temporary departure from its specific rules. The two most important objectives 
of this policy are the realization of social benefit and the prevention of evil. Shariah-oriented 
policy is an instrument of good government, and it applies both within and outside the parameters 
of the established Shariah, although some ulama have held that there is no policy outside the 
Shariah itself. (143) 
 
Accordingly, Al siyash al shariah is an instrument for the realization of Sharia and a subfield of 
Fiqh that historically elevated Ulu Al Amr authority as the ultimate source of legitimacy of 
temporal power. Furthermore, Esposito’s account of Al siyash al shariah is comprehensive but 
lacks the agency that is in charge of implementing the standard of the “government affairs in 
harmony with the spirit and purpose of the Shariah” (143). Hence, this dissertation argues that 
historically Ulu Al Amr’s authority provided the legitimacy to temporal power according to the 
Sharia and sometimes beyond it. Even though, historically there was a lack of consensus 
regarding the legal capacity of Ulu Al Amr to depart from Sharia. This lack of consensus was 
clear in chapter one regarding the three legal opinions on state sovereignty. Historically, 
important jurists have held strong views regarding the legal ability of Ulama to depart form the 
Sharia. The scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350 CE / 691–751 AH), the student and 
closest disciple and successor of ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 CE/ 662 AH-729 AH), argued: 
Siyasah shariyyah includes all measures [including Wilayah al ahed] which bring the people 
closer to beneficence and furthest away from corruption, even if it has not been approved by the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) nor regulated by divine revelation. Anyone who says that there is no 
siyasah shariyyah where the Shariah itself is silent is wrong. . . .(Espsito, 2001) 
 
This statement illustrates how Wilayah al ahed became an established legal practice even 
though it is neither found in the Qur’an nor Sunna. The principle of Wilayah al ahed was first 
advanced as a legal solution under the principle of Maslaha for the realization of social stability 
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and the prevention of further civil wars by discouraging competing groups from seeking the post 
of Khilafa. Yet, historically the legal outcome of Wilayah al ahed placed Maslaha or “the good” 
of the community above the legal restrictions of obedience to temporal power. More precisely, 
unlimited obedience to the temporal power suddenly became a pillar of faith. A pious Muslim is 
the one who remains in Jama’ah (the theological or physical main body of Muslims) and avoid 
starting Fitnah (connotations of secession, upheaval, and chaos) demanding and fighting for full 
legal rights such as a public Bay’a and the practice of Shura by the Khalifa. To secure unlimited 
obedience to temporal power, Ulu Al Amr as legal experts creatively provide the legal evidence 
in the primary texts that supports their opinion and undermines the contrary evidence. The 
following Hadith is frequently cited as support of unlimited obedience to temporal power“…he 
who separates himself from the community (Jama’ah) by even so much as a hand span and dies 
(in this state), he will die the death of Jahiliyyah.” (Bukhari and Muslim). While the Qur’an and 
Sunna hold ample injunctions that demands Jihad for what is right.  
We have established already in earlier chapters that Al siyasah al shariah and the issues 
of the Imamah are secondary matters in Sharia and just a branch of Fiqh and not foundational 
rendering legal differences in opinion regarding the good or harm to the community as a normal 
outcome of legal debates outside the realm faith. Moreover, Sunni legal Ulama agree that the 
subject of the state and the nature of governance are not related to theological junctions. The 
scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr as legal experts is operative in the legal opinion that renders 
branches of the Sharia more important than the roots. To borrow a Marxist analogy, by 
demanding a total obedience to temporal power, Ulu Al Amr have put the Qur’an and the Sunna 
on their head. Wilayah al ahed have effectively reversed the priority of the primary texts 
according to what Ulu Al Amr consider the Maslaha of the Umma in a particular historical 
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moment. “According to Al-Ghazzali (450-505 AH/1058-1111 CE), they are able to do this due to 
their [the ulama's] principal political function, which has been the interpretation of shariah in 
terms of the problems facing the community, and by their approval of the sultan's choice of imam 
in the bay’a . . . and their fatwa, they expressed the functional authority of the shariah (Dabashi 
.92/Lambton 1989, 115).”  Only the Ulu Al Amr are historically able to shift the role and function 
of temporal power according to social and political change facing the Umma. This shift in legal 
opinion is indicative that “the caliph of the Sunnis [had] no authority to dispense spiritual 
instruction” (Dabashi 90 /Goldziher 1989, 182-83). Temporal power remained dependent on its 
entitlement from the Ulu Al Amr to rule over the Umma. Nevertheless, the Ulu Al Amr never 
claimed sovereignty over the interpretation of the legal source of sharia. Ulu Al Amr authority is 
the equivalent of an opinion by a legal expert, the province of the legal principle of Ijma 
(consensus). A consensus of opinion is legally binding if the majority agrees on a particular 
controversy or legal matter. While disagreements between the Ulu Al Amr have always been 
present and disputes among scholars over legal matters have existed and sometimes been 
debated, the principle of Ijma historically trumped those holding minority opinions. 
 Thus, legally the Khalifa cannot be the source of law and directly command obedience 
from the Umma. Instead, temporal power remained limited to Sharia in their governance of the 
Umma. This is the central character in understanding how government functions in Sunni Islamic 
political and legal writings. This local Sunni character directly redefines the scope of authority, 
obedience, emancipation, autonomy, equality, and freedom in the particular local context of 
Sunni Islam. Hence, the khalifa “as ruler […] is nothing but the successor of the one who 
preceded him . . . and not entitled by the qualities inherent in his personality” (Dabashi 90 
/Goldziher 1989, 182-83). Accordingly, God is the only Sovereign and all subjects are equal in 
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distance and value to his reign thus depriving temporal power of any supernatural qualities. 
Obedience to temporal power is based only on the Khalifa’s adherence and implementation of 
the law. Clearly, the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty has no roots in Islamic political and legal 
thinking, which stands in contrast to Western political thought with its secularized but Christian 
roots.  
In Islam the sovereign God remained invisible. Consequently, Islamic political and legal 
writing historically and legally lacks the Incarnation Christian quality in the evolution of its legal 
concepts and institutions. In Islam, God the sovereign, who is invisible, forbids iconic 
representations or impersonation of his divine qualities.  This rejection of an incarnation of godly 
presence effectively denied the Ulu Al Amr the power to attribute divine qualities to their actions. 
With temporal power fleeting and without sovereignty the Khalifa occupied the legal domain of 
Sharia without a specific mandate from the Qur’an or Sunna. As a result, Ulu Al Amr legally 
adopted Fiqh al siyash al shariah to accommodate changing historical circumstances and with it 
the role of transitory power that governs a city state, empire, or fragmented competing 
principalities. This was possible by developing Wilayah al ahed, a legal principle that cannot be 
found in the Qur’an, Sunna, or the early founding period of the Four Guided Caliphs. Perhaps 
“we are here in a universe of guile which should remind us of what the Islamic tradition knew 
and developed under the name of hila… (Mondzain 2005, 6).  How this religious trick or guile is 
central theme of this chapter.  
 
Before we examine the historical record, I would like to the focus first on the linguistic 
meaning of the term Wilayah al ahed so that a clear correspondence in the English language is 
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developed and explained. First, the term Wilayah al ahed is a composed of two words, Wilayah 
and Ahed.  According to Thouaqan:  
The first section of the term, Wilayah, is derived from the root verb Wally and when it is said a 
person is Wally something, means that person responsible for that matter and in its service. Ibn 
Jarir al-Tabari (224 – 310 AH; 838–923 AD) explains the meaning of the word Al-wlliah from the 
following verse in the Qur’an: Unquestionably, [for] the allies of Allah there will be no fear 
concerning them, nor will they grieve (10:62) as those who allied with Allah, the most sincere of 
the believers due to their affinity with God through obedience. And the Wally (ally) is called 
Wallyyan (ally) due to his Mowallat (allegiance) and obedience to God’s command. Also the term 
Al-willaiah linguistically means those who are closer in position…And the word Willayah means 





Linguistically the term Wilayah in Arabic confers a sense of guardianship and responsibility over 
something that requires the ability to deliberate and execute in accordance with the good of that 
thing.  
 The second part/section of the term, Al ahed (promise), is derived from the root verb 
Ahed meaning Wassiah (commandment/will) and when it is said a person delegated Ahed it 
means Awssah or made it conditional; thus Al ahed is Al wassyyah (Thouaqan 2005, 46).
73
 The 
term appears in the Qur’an as Aheed (enjoin) and Aheedna (plural for made a promise). The 
following two verses illustrate the idea:  
Did I not enjoin upon you, O children of Adam, that you not worship Satan - [for] indeed, he is to 
you a clear enemy. 36:60 And We had already taken a promise from Adam before, but he forgot; 
and We found not in him determination . 20:115 
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م به و الولي هو الحافظ و الناصر ... ويفسر ابن جرير الطبري انشقت كلمة والية من الفعل الثالثي ولي، فيقال ولي الشيء بمعني ملك أمره و قا 
 سبحانه بطاعته و األولياء في قوله تعالي: "اال ان أولياء هللا ال خوف عليهم وال هم يحزنون" بأنهم أنصار هللا، و هم خلص المؤمنين، و ذلك  لقهم من هللا
ي متابعته لها.   وتحمل كلمة الوالية معني االمارة م السلطان و التي تشعر بالتدبر و القدرة اجتناب معصيته، و سمي الولي ولياً من مواالته الطاعات ا
 والفعل، و تحتاج اليها ليتمكن صاحبها من القيام بواجب هذه اإلمارة
73
صيةاشتقت كلمة العهد من الفعل الثالثي عهد بمعني أوصي، فيقال عهد اليه بمعني أوصاه و شرط عليه، فالعهد هو الو   
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And the term Ahed (covenant) also means to attend to a matter and attain peace and harmony as 




 Thouaqan explains that by combining the two terms Wilayah and ahed “means ruler-ship 
and governance while the second term means covenant, the combination of those two terms 
Wilayah al ahed means the covenant and the heir of the throne … thus the term Wilay al ahed 
was used to refer to the person who follows the ruler and inherits the throne and governs after the 
state due to fulfilling the covenant that was given to him from those who could legally give 
Bay’a to the Khalifa” (47).
75
 Hence, the closest thing that corresponds to the term Wilayah al 
ahed in Western legal and political thought is “binding covenant.” 
 
 To illustrate the political and the legal context before the appearance of Wilay al ahed in 
Islamic legal discourse I focus is on the period from the death of the Prophet in “11 AH (632 CE) 
until 73 AH (692 CE)” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 6).
76
 First, Al-Mutairi argues that Islamic legal and 
political discourse can be divided into three distinct historical periods in which legal discourse is 
tied to the political system and governance of each particular period. Political discourse is “the 
total sum of the legal rulings and principles that guide the Islamic state rules and regulations” 
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 كما جاء في قوله تعالي: ما وجدنا ألكثرهم من عهد 
75
لملك و و بما ان الوالية تحمل في معانيها اإلمارة و السلطان، و العهد يحمل معني ال وصيه فقد ظهر مصطلح ولي العهد ليعني الوصي او الوارث ل 
 ذلك النه ولي الميثاق الذي يؤخذ علي من بايع الخليفة
76





 With each historical change in the mode of governing, the legal discourse 
changed accordingly.  
 
Before the advent of Islam, the Arabs of central Arabia never had a unified government. 
They were united for the first time under the leadership of the Prophet and produced a new 
entity, Umma. “The establishment of umma as the Islamic community was the most significant 
expression of Islamic solidarity against traditional tribal structures” (Dabashi 1989, 76). 
“Without a succession plan the death of the Prophet (11 AH- 632 CE) presented a challenge to 
the unity of the umma  and a vacuum in leadership” (Donner 2010, 146).  (Shia scholars dispute 
that the Prophet did not select a successor.)  According to Donner: 
On the death of Muhammad in 11/632, the Believers in Medina agreed to recognize Abu Bakr as 
their political leader. This act not only secured the succession but also institutionalized the notion 
that the Believers should remain a single, united community. We also noted that Abu Bakr was 
succeeded by 'Umar ibn al- Khattab (ruled 13-23/634-644) and then by 'Uthman ibn 'Affan (ruled 
23-35/644-656) and how under these leaders the first great wave of expansion of the Believers' 
movement took place. (146) 
 
But how did the Umma choose its leader and what conditions were required in a leader? 
The political matter was left to the Umma, and as a result, Fiqh al siyash al shariah as a branch 
of the Sharia developed and evolved. As long as both political leadership and the state help in 
implementing Sharia and remain under its junctions, then they are necessarily legal. The matter 
is left entirely to the Umma.  
 It is important to point out that during the founding period the class of Ulu Al Amr had 
not yet formed. Most of the Companions of the Prophet possessed a direct knowledge in 
religious matters from the Prophet. Therefore, the First Four Guided Caliphs represented 
                                                          
77
إلى  -و هو منظومة األحكام و القواعد التي يقوم عليها نظام الحكم في الدولة اإلسالمية  -يمكن تقسيم المراحل التاريخية للخطاب السياسي اإلسالمي  
المراحل األخرىثالثة مراحل رئيسية ، لكل مرحلة مالمحها و معالمها التي تميزها عن   
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temporal power and Ulama as well. The class of Ulu Al Amr crystalized only in the second 
period and with the appearance of Wilayah al ahed. 
 What are the conditions that must be available in the person who governs the community 
affairs? It seems that the issue of piety is the supreme condition in the Khalifa. Certainly, 
dynastic rule based on blood and family rule were out of the question during the founding period. 
Even when the tribe of Quraysh claimed that they were the first Muslims and as such they should 
rule, their assertion was not primarily based on the superiority of their tribe over other tribes; 
instead it was based on their proximity to the Prophet during the thirteen years in Mecca when 
He was propagating His message. The First Caliph Abu Baker gave the following speech once he 
received the Bay’a from the community: 
"I have been given authority over you but I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me, and if I 
do ill, then put me right. . . . Obey me as long as I obey God and His apostle, and if I disobey 
them you owe me no obedience." (Ibn Hisham 1955, 687) (Dabashi 1989, 83) 
 
Hamid Dabashi disagrees. He argues instead that tribalism after the death of the Prophet 
dominated the political process and that the first violation of equality appeared between Arab and 
non-Arab Muslims. He contends:  
The selection of Abu Bakr was not bound to any particular stipulation of Muhammad's authority, 
the Qur'an, or the Hadith but was a designation framed primarily within tribal rivalries as well as 
affiliations. The intricate relationships among the Aws, Khazraj, and Quraysh fundamentally 
shaped the outcome of the tribal council in Saqifah Bani Sacidah, as discussed in previous 
chapters. (83) 
 
Dabashi fails to clarify that what took place in the Saqifah Bani Sacidah was a nomination 
process and not actual Bay’a. The actual Bay’a was given in the mosque in front of the Umma or 
to Abu Baker by the Umma or more precisely, by those who inhabited the Medina during that 
time. Only after the Umma gave Abu baker Bay’a was he able to give the above speech. Muslims 
who were present in the mosque may have very well refused his leadership if they wanted to, 
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especially because the Medina was a city of Aws and Khazraj, not Quraysh, and they could have 
overwhelmed the Qurayshi vote. Furthermore, the first Caliph Abu Bakr (573 - 634 CE) was the 
closest lifetime companion of the Prophet before and after Islam. Thus, the issue of piety was the 
main reason behind the selection. As well, once the Bay’a was given to Abu Bakr, there were no 
signs of discontent with his leadership. Donner further argues “the First Civil War had involved 
economic and other practical issues but was fundamentally a debate over the nature of future 
leadership in the community of Believers, particularly its relationship to issues of piety and 
morality” (Donner 2010, 167). Yet, Dabashi’s claim has some justification since nothing in the 
Qur’an or Sunna gives Quraysh, despite their claims to be the first Muslims, this right.  
 This chapter sets out to prove that the post of temporal power originally created after the 
death of the Prophet was to serve the Umma, the good of the community, and faith; the focus 
later shifted 180 degrees. Despite the conflict that ensued in the wake of the Prophet’s death, 
particularly during the time of the Third ('Uthman ibn 'Affan 577 – 656 CE) and Fourth Caliph 
(Ali ibn Abi Talib 601 – 661 CE), Sunni Muslims hold this founding period, next to the period in 
which the Prophet was the leader of the Umma, as embodying the highest of the ideals of Islam. 
It is this early period (1- 73 AH) that ideally should be used for Qiyas (reasoning by analogy, a 
source of Islamic law) in Fiqh al siyash al Shariah for future generations of Ulama. Instead, 
historically, the Ulu Al Amr, in developing Fiqh al siyash al shariah, relied on the period of 
Taweel (73- 1350 AH) (allegorical interpretation or departure from the manifest [Zahir] meaning 
of a text in favor of another meaning where there is evidence to justify the departure) as the 
primary source upon which legal rulings were made and not the period of the founding.  
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 According to Al-Mutairi, “the period of revealed political legal discourse (Mounazel) 
with its distinctive interchange of ideas spans the dates from 1 AH- 622 CE to 73 AH- 694 CE” 
(8).
78
 He argues that there are legal principles that underlie the entire period and were used as 
references to solve recurrent political crises the Umma faced. His contention is primarily relevant 
to Fiqh al siyash al shariah. At the time, Fiqh al siyash al shariah, as a branch of Sharia, was in 
its infancy and did not exist as an independent field in Fiqh. It was closest to the original sources 
in the Qur’an and Sunna. He argues that these legal principles that were established in the period 
achieved Ijma among the Umma during that particular period, so no one disputed these legal 
principles among the Islamic groups that were then developing. Al-Mutairi lists nine principles 
of the Mounazel period as follows: 
1. The necessity of the state for the establishment of the faith religion 
2. The necessity of a governing authority 
3. Government authority is based on the legal principle of Bay’a. Consequently, no Imam can 
legitimately rule without a Bay’a  
4. The Bay’a is conditioned on the consent of the Umma. 
5. And consent of the Umma is conditioned upon Shura (consultation among the members of 
the community) among Muslims 
6. Shura is conditioned on freedom to deliberate and consult 
7. Absolute Hakemyah (sovereignty) and obedience belongs exclusively to Allah and the 
Prophet 
8. The realization of justice and equality among Muslims 
9. The realization and protection of individual and collective rights and duties. (8-32)79 
 
The nine principles were woven into the tapestry of Sharia and existed before the advent 
of Fiqh al siyash al shariah. They were general in character and represented the main aim of the 
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و سلم ، هذه المرحلة االولى : مرحلة الخطاب السياسي الشرعي المنزل :  و هي المرحلة التي تمثل تعاليم االسالم كما نزل علي النبي صلى هللا عليه  
م إليها ، الى آخر عهد خليفة صحابي و هو عبد المرحلة التي تبدأ تاريخيا بقيام الدولة االسالمية في المدينة المنورة، بعد هجرة النبي صلى هللا عليه و سل
١٣هللا بن الزبير سنة   
79
و انه ال  -٤ضرورة عقد البيعة، فال إمامة بال عقد   -٣ضرورة إقامة السلطة و أنه ال دولة بال إمام   -٢ضرورة الدولة للدين و أنه ال دين بال دولة -ا  
و أن  -١و انه ال شورى بال حرية  -١بال شورى بين المسلمين في أمر اإلمامة و شئون األمة   و ال رضا -٥عقد بيعة اال برضا األمة و اختيارها  
حماية الحقوق و الحريات اإلنسانية الفردية و الجماعية و صيانتها -٩تحقيق مبدأي العدالة و المساواة   -٨الحاكمية و الطاعة المطلقة هلل و رسوله    
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political struggle and strife among Muslims in the early period. The breakdown of the Umma 
into small groups and the eventual outbreak of the First Civil War were the results of 
disagreements about how these general principles were to be applied. Donner argues that the 
piety of the Khalifa was a central issue leading up to the First and Second Civil Wars.  
 It is also important to highlight the role of the public in choosing the Khalifa via Bay’a as 
the main source of the legitimacy of governance. Legitimacy flows from the Umma, which limits 
the role of the Khalifa through the principles of Bay’a and Shura. During the founding period, 
both principles legitimated temporal power’s ability to secure obedience. This process prevented 
a reversion to pre-Islamic monarchical rule, which had guaranteed temporal power based on the 
blood of the tribe. Arab tribes were united under the message of Islam because it explicitly 
denied the superiority of any group based on lineage. Conversely, Islam emphasized piety as the 
metric that differentiates Muslims. Dabashi illustrates this point further by explaining that:  
The ten most distinguished companions of the Prophet, to whom he had promised paradise 
(al~asharah al~Mubashsharah), were Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali, Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf, 
Abu Ubaydah, Talhah, Zubayr, Sa d of Zuhrah, and Sa id, the son of Zayd the Hanif (Lings 1983, 
329). To these one might add Salman the Persian and Ammar, of whom a prophetic hadith says 
"for three doth Paradise long, for Ali, Ammar, and Salman" (ibid.), and Bilal the Abyssinian, the 
slave whom Muhammad bought and released and who then became famous for his beautiful 
voice to which the Prophet loved to listen when reciting adhdn (the Muslim call to prayer). 
Salman and Bilal were particularly important, being non-Arabs, for symbolically signifying the 
supratribal solidarity of the Islamic community. (78) 
 
These individuals shared positions of high status due to their proximity to the Prophet. Among 
these ten individuals were the Four Guided Caliphs, whose piety proved Donner’s point that 
devotion was essential to command obedience from the Umma.  
 The Four Guided Caliphs were revered due to their piety, not tribal affiliation. In 
addition, there were Companions, some of whom belonged to the highest tribal power, who were 
not included among Four Guided Caliphs; a prime example is Mu’awiya, the fifth Khalifa who 
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was the founder of the Umayyad dynasty and ruled from (661-680 CE). These companions were 
recognized as pious because of their close proximity to and struggle with the Prophet to establish 
Islam during its founding phase. It is precisely “this proximity [that] later became the source of 
authority for these companions” (Dabashi 1989, 78).  
 Finally, those companions, during the founding, established the political practices of 
Bay’a and Shura to include the public in the social and political matters of the Umma. Without 
going into further details regarding the justice that was achieved during their rule, the period of 
the Four Guided Caliphs is historically held in high regard (at least among Sunni Muslims) 
because the Umma was included in political matters. Furthermore, as Al-Mutairi explains, “The 
third principle of the Mounazel political discourse in the founding period of Islam was closer to 
the spirit of the faith where the relationship between the Umma and the Imam is based on a 
contract. In this contract the Umma is the principle actor and the Imam is a Wakeel (a 
representative) running the state. Thus governance and authority are not divinely ordained or 
hereditary; instead, the relationship is based on a contract (Bay’a)” (16).
80
 This fact illustrates 
that the office is primarily for the service of the Umma and not a prize to be captured and 
exclusively reserved for a dynasty. This legal condition would change when Wilayah al ahed 
appeared.  
 
  How and why did the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed appear? The obvious obstacle to 
the adoption of Wilayah al ahed was that it contradicted the legal principles of Bay’a and Shura 
that had been established in the founding period as a condition for the legitimate transfer of 
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الخطاب السياسي الشرعي المنزل في المرحلة االولى التي تمثل تعاليم الدين الحق، فالعالقة بين األمة و االمام  و هذا هو األصل الثالث من أصول 
اإللهي و ليسا  تقوم على أسا عقد بين طرفين، تكون األمة فيه هي األصيل، و اإلمام هو الوكيل عنها في إدارة شئونها، فالحكم و السلطة ليسا بالتفويض
وث، بل بعقد البيعة بين األمة و االمام و بهذا سيق االسالم الغرب في تحدي األسا الفلسفي الذي يتم بموجبهبالحق المور  
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temporal office. These principles guaranteed that the Caliphate serve the Umma as it was 
originally intended. In this sense Muslims were equal since the office was not a monopoly of one 
family or tribe. Conversely, the Caliphate functioned primarily as an executive (in modern terms) 
to facilitate the services needed to run a state.  
Wilayah al ahed, in contrast, legitimated the seizure of the Umayyad Caliphate. Wilayah 
al ahed violated the reason and justification for why the office was created. Logically, this 
change creates an environment of contention and competition over who is entitled to rule. More 
important, Wilayah al ahed, where one clan or tribe has an exclusive right to rule the community 
without a legal justification in the Qur’an or Sunna, violates legal equality among Muslims. The 
question is: How can a Muslim or the Umma obey a person who claims that his clan or tribe has 
a right to office by blood but lacks consent from the Qur’an or Sunna? This question has yet to 
be answered directly. Not a single verse in the Qur’an or Sunna or Hadith speaks of the rule of a 
tribe, dynasty, or a clan over the Umma. This problem is still a source of legal challenges over 
monarchical legitimacy. The invention of Wilayah al ahed was the legalistic solution to the 
problem. Yet, as it is has been practiced it has created legal issues and contradictions that 
historically have been resolved by violence.  
  
 “Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan (647 –683 CE) was the first Khalifa to ask for Bay’a for his 
son, Yazid ibn Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan/ Yazid I (680-683 CE), and who ruled using Wilayah 
al ahed. The First Civil War was fought between Mu’awiya, who did not recognize Ali ibn Abi 





 The First Civil War was a renewal of old tribal animosities between Banu Umayyah/Abd 
Shams and Banu Hashim. More important, it produced the Sunni-Shi’a split among Muslims.  
Thouaqan argues that “the Umayyad tried to accomplish several goals by inventing the 
system of When Wilayah al ahed, thus Mu’awiya wanted in the year 60 AH-697 CE to secure 
the Bay’a for his son Yazid I before his death to prevent division and discord and secure the 
interest of the community” (51).
82
 I disagree with the author due to the fact that more bloodshed 
and civil war followed the legal adoption of the system of Wilayah al ahed. A power grab is a 
more accurate description to what occurred during Mu’awiya’s reign. The sons of the 
Companions challenged this principle because it imitated the non-Islamic Byzantium and Persian 
monarchies. Indeed, Mu’awiya ruled the Shaam province, which bordered on the Byzantium 
Empire. Wilayah al ahed first appeared among the Ulama of the Al-Shaam who accepted the 
idea of this legal practice according to sharia. When Mu’awiya openly asked for the Bay’a for 
his son the issue was met with great resistance. The struggle for Wilayah al ahed started in 53 
AH 672 CE. Its resolution was ultimately achieved on the battlefield. 
 What followed after the death of Mu’awiya was a violent campaign over Wilayah al ahed 
that is still painful to discuss openly among Muslims today. The gruesome violence 
institutionalized the historical memory of Fitnah (upheaval and chaos), which produced the legal 
opinions that discouraged the Umma from fighting injustice and illegal force. Hence, historically 
Ulu Al Amr regarded Wilayah al ahed as a source of stability that prevented violence and 
                                                          
81
 بن عمر، و عبد و لما أراد معاوية أن يبايع النا ابنه ، و يعهد باألمر إليه من بعده، اعترض عليه كبار الصحابة و فقهاؤهم تلك الفترة، و هم عبد هللا 
زبير، و عبدهللا بن عبا ، و عبد الرحمن بن أبي بكر، و الحسين بن عليهللا بن ال  
82
م( يرى في اخذه البيعة البنه يزيد ما 096-06سعي األمويون لتحقيق عدة أهداف من خالل ابتداعهم نظام والية العهد، فكان معاوية ابن  ابي سفيان )ت 
الحفاظ علي وحدتهم و مصلحتهم بعد وفاتهيمنع من اضطراب امر المساهمين و افتقارهم، و يعمل علي   
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bloodshed among Muslims. Wilayah al ahed was produced as a legal solution that allowed 
dynastic rule in exchange for stability and the prevention of bloodshed. A similar contemporary 
example of this legal rationale is the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed El-Tayeb’s justification of 
the 3
rd
 of July coup that legitimized the ouster of President Morsi of Egypt as the lesser of two 
evils (Malsin, 2014).  
 During the Second Civil War the Ulu Al Amr rewarded the Umayyad’s brutality and 
legitimated it with Wilayah al ahed. This principle in Fiqh al siyash al shariah is still practiced 
today in most Arab monarchies providing the legal legitimacy for hereditary rule. One could also 
argue that the principle of Wilayah al ahed saved Muslims from brutal civil wars and needless 
bloodshed; after all, Sharia is still developing by finding practical solutions to new problems that 
are neither addressed in the Qur’an nor Sunna. In other words, piety was replaced by stability 
and order, the avoidance of Fitnah. Such an argument is valid, but in the same breath one cannot 
maintain that Muslims are equal under Sharia. Historically, Wilayah al ahed created at least two 
classes of Muslims: one group with the right to rule and the rest with the obligation to obey, all 
based on lineage. This practice institutionalized and created further social and political classes 
and inequalities. Most important, Wilayah al ahed was the first legal step on the path to 
justifying the subservience of the Umma to temporal power. 
 
 In this section I would like to discuss the social and political changes that occurred with 
the adoption of the Wilayah al ahed. The conflict of who should rule the Umma was behind the 
First Civil War (35-40 AH /656-661 CE) and Second Civil War (60-73AH /680-692 CE). These 
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were wars that divided Muslims into groups and sects based on who should rule. The purpose of 
examining the historical record is to demonstrate that Wilayah al ahed was met with much 
resistance socially and politically and that much of this resistance was crushed on the battlefield. 
Thus, the argument here is that starting with Mu’awiya and ending with Abd al-Malik ibn 
Marwan (646 –705 CE), the fifth Umayyad Khalifa, who was the victor of the Second Civil War 
(60-73AH /680-692 CE) Wilayah al ahed became a foundational legal principle in Fiqh al siyash 
al shariah through force and violence. Moreover, the aim here is to illustrate that the Ulu Al Amr 
were not a unified and institutionalized class and that the upper hand was with the Ulama of 
Bilad al-Sham [Fertile Crescent, the center of power of the Umayyad dynasty] the Umayyad’s 
province. Those Ulama were institutionalized after the Second Civil War with the adoption of 
Wilayah al ahed, which later became orthodoxy in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Nevertheless, it is 
important to point out that violence forced a permanent change in Fiqh al siyash al shariah but 
not in Sharia itself. And this fact emphasizes the argument in Islamic legal and political thought 
that there was never a sovereign in a European sense. Temporal power was able to govern 
primarily by implementing Sharia as the Ulu Al Amr saw fit. In fact, the Abbasid’s major claim 
for toppling the Umayyad dynasty was for non-adherence to Sharia and its principle of justice. 
As a result, Muslims have historically been ruled by temporal power and not sovereignty, and 
this legal character is central to Islamic political thought.  
 The violence of the First and Second Civil Wars demonstrates the consequences of 
neglecting a community’s political life, including how it is organized and who is qualified to 
rule. Theologically, questions of governance were left to the Umma to decide under the guidance 
of Sharia, with its conception of justice and rights. Initially, after the death of the Prophet, 
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resolution of conflicts over who should rule was relatively peaceful; later, during the period that 
Wilayah al ahed appeared it faced resistance from the Kharijites sect and the Ulama.  
 One of the earliest groups that appeared as a consequence of the First Civil War was the 
Kharijites sect, which never recognized Mu’awiya as Khalifa. In fact, they were against Ali’s 
(the Fourth Guided Caliph) agreement to peacefully dispute the Caliphate with Mu’awiya. 
Because they never recognized the legitimacy of the Umayyad’s rule, they considered legal 
matters decided under the Umayyad heretical. For the Kharijites, the most important matter in 
the Khalifa was piety. They treated Wilayah al ahed as a legal heresy both in its source, which 
was the illegitimate Umayyad, and as a principle that ran against the Islamic belief in equality 
among believers. They did not believe in a class of Ulama since all Muslims must educate 
themselves as righteous members of the community (Thouaqan 2005, 86-88).  
 Al-Mutazilah, another group, disputed the legality of clan rule and refused to recognize 
the Umayyad’s claim as the rightful rulers of the Umma. They regarded Wilayah al ahed as 
heretical.  As rationalists, they rejected the philosophical claim behind Jabariyah (the belief that 
human action is foreordained by divine decree or purpose). Consequently, they held the 
Umayyad responsible for their indiscretion and condemned the principle of Wilayah al ahed as a 
corrupt innovation (Thouaqan 2005, 93-94). 
 Finally, there is Shia Islam, which appeared as a consequence of the battles of Karbala 
(61 AH- 680 CE) and Al-Harrah (63 AH- 683 CE), battles, ordered by Mu‘awiya, and later his 
son Yazid I, that took place in the First and Second Civil Wars, respectively. The Shia reject the 
Umayyad as legitimate rulers up to this day. Moreover, they considered the Umayyad as sinners, 
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if not apostates, who had to maintain their power by the sword. They claim that the Imamate 
belongs to the House of the Prophet and his offspring and do not recognize Wilayah al ahed as a 
legal or legitimate principle. In fact, Shia opposition to contemporary monarchies and kingdoms 
in the Middle East stems from their rejection of the legitimacy of these rulers as a pillar of the 
Shia doctrine (Thouaqan 2005, 81-86). 
 
 It is necessary to examine the reaction of the Ulama to Wilayah al ahed among the Sunni 
Ulama. The reaction of the Ulama was contradictory and can be divided in three geographical 
regions, Ulama of Bilad al-Sham, Mecca/Medina, and Al-Iraq [Baghdad, Basra, and Kufa].  
There are those who were in favor of and those who opposed Wilayah al ahed. According to 
Thouaqan, “the Ulama of the Muslim Umma were legally divided on the legality of Wilayah al 
ahed. The Ulama of Bilad al-Sham supported this new system and gave the Bay’a accordingly. 
On the other hand, the Ulama of Mecca, Medina, and Al-Iraq held mixed reactions. Some had 
supported Wilayah al ahed for the purpose of stability and the unity of Muslims. Others flatly 
rejected the system of Wilayah al ahed. Each side had justifications for their stand on the legal 
matter. Therefore, Wilayah al ahed never legally achieved consensus (Ijma) among the Ulama” 
(122).
83
 Thus, the legal principle was not unanimously accepted at its initial stage and was 
rejected by a group of Ulama who refused to recognize either Umayyad’s rule or Wilayah al 
ahed. Most important, these Ulama who objected to Wilayah al ahed were on the side of those 
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م و خاصة علماء و كان لعلماء األمة االسالمية مواقف متناقضة من نظام والية العهد، ففي حين أيد قسم منهم هذا النظام و بايع لخلفايهم و أولياء عهده 
م حيث مال قسم الي المهادنة و بالتالي تأييد نظام والة العهد، و ذلك الشام، نجد ان هناك تباينا في مواقف علماء مكة و المدينة و العراق من هذا النظا
ي القبول او حفاظا عل وحدة الجماعة، و لجأ القسم االخر الي رفض هذا النظام  عدم التعامل معه و رفض بيعة أولياء العهد، و كان لكل طرف مبرراته ف
 الرفض و بالتالي لم يكن عندهم إجماع علي هذا النظام
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who lost the Second Civil War. To the Ulama who supported the legitimacy of Wilayah al ahed 
the Umayyad’s victory was a sign from God that they were on the right path. While the Ulama 
on the losing side viewed Wilayah al ahed as an illegal innovation to be tolerated only as a 
Maslaha that ended the bloodbath of Fitnah. Nevertheless, once victory was secured both sides 
of the Ulama viewed the end of civil war as a Maslaha that ended the Fitnah. 
 
 The Ulama of Bilad al-Sham were the first to advise and encourage Mu‘awiya to pass the 
Caliphate to his son Yazid I. They helped propagate the legality of Wilayah al ahed in Bilad Al-
Sham and beyond. Its geographical proximity to and status as a former Byzantine territory made 
the idea of hereditary kingship familiar to Bilad Al-Sham’s Ulama. Furthermore, the Umayyad 
dynasty had its own close-knit Ulama, which were treated with generosity both financially and in 
status. The Umayyad dynasty had secured the loyalty of the Ulama by repeatedly seeking their 
advice and opinion. It was the Ulama of Al-Sham that encouraged the idea of clan rule on the 
grounds that doing so would avoid a Fitnah of repeated civil wars and the splitting of Jemaah 
(the collectivity of the Muslim community). The logic was that having Yazid I rule after his 
father was a way to forestall conflict and competition for the post of Khilafa. But this meant that 
Mu‘awiya had to ask for Bay’a for his son while he was alive and not on his deathbed; this was 
an innovation that contradicted the practice of his predecessors. Yet he was resisted by 
prominent members of the Umma at the time. In response, Mu‘awiya resorted to violence for the 
first time to secure a Bay’a for his son, which he failed to do. This practice of Mu‘awiya was 
later legalized by Ulu Al Amr and the practice of coerced Bay’a became a permanent feature of 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Historically, this practice had grave consequences legally, socially, 
and politically.  
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 Moreover, it was the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham who were geographically adjacent to the 
Byzantine Empire and among the first Ulama to institutionalize the legal justification of the 
unconditional obedience to the Khalifa as equivalent to obedience to God. If the Umma does not 
approve who governs it, through Wilayah al ahed, they are still legally required to obey the new 
ruler. Even if the new Khalifa turns out to be a tyrant, the Umma must be patient and obey. These 
injunctions comport with Donner’s argument that the qualities of who should rule the community 
had shifted, and that by the Second Civil War the issue of piety became secondary to 
institutionalized expansionism (190).   
Furthermore, “the Umayyads relied on the theological view of Jabariyah [Ulama who 
deny free agency of the individual] to emphasize their right to rule the Umma in the face of 
opposing forces. Moreover, they used this theological view as a justification to give Bay’a to 
their offspring. And if Mu‘awiya was the first to introduce Wilayah al ahed, he is also credited 




The idea was “Mu‘awiya must rule because God enabled him to rule” because everything 
was determined by the will of God and that the actions of the individual had no intrinsic will of 
its own independent from that of God’s. In other words, freewill contradicts the all-knowing 
powerful God. The tyranny and evil of the Umayyad rulers are to be tolerated because they are 
ordained by God, and people cannot change the will of God. Unjust governance is a punishment 
ordained by God and the best the Umma can do is to be patient and pray. Now, it is important to 
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اعتمدوا  مثلما استند األمويون علي مذهب الجبر لتأكيد حقهم في الخالفة و االحتجاج علي المعارضين لهم، فانهم اعتمدوا عليه أيضاً لتسويغ حقهم و 
ة العهد، فانه أيضاً عليه أيضاً لتسويغ حقهم في عقد البيعة ألولياء عهودهم و االحتجاج به. و اذا كان معاويه بن ابي سفيان هو اول من جاء بنظام والي
يرة من اول من استند علي الفكر الجبري لمواجهة خصومه الذين عارضوا استخالفه يزيد حيث يقول: "ان امر يزيد قضاء من القضاء و لي للعباد الخ
 "أمرهم" كما أعاد قضية االختيار الي هللا و في هذا يقول: "إنما هو الملك يؤتيه هللا من يشاء
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note that it is not Mu‘awiya literally who developed these views even though he is a Companion 
of the Prophet. This is the work of legal experts of the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham. 
 
Second, the legal views of the Ulama of Al-Hejaz regarding Wilayah al ahed were 
mixed. Two reasons for agreeing to give Bay’a based on the principle of Wilayah al ahed stand 
out. First, there was the priority given to avoiding Fitnah and bloodshed. The second was the call 
for the Umma to remain in Jemaah, the unity of Muslims as one body. For example, Thouaqan 
argues that “Sa'id Ibn Al-Musayyib (642-715 CE) is an example of the Ulama who resisted every 
type of pressure from the Umayyads rulers to accept their reign and Wilayah al ahed” (Thouaqan 
2005, 101).
85
 While Abdullah ibn Umar (614 – 693 CE) “after the death of Mu‘awiya gave 
Bay’a to Yazid I fearing Fitnah and division among Muslims” (Thouaqan 2005, 101).86  
Donner’s historical accounts confirms the division between Ulama of Al-Hejaz were over 
Wilayah al ahed and dynastic rule on the legal ground of Maslaha. Donner confirms that by the 
Second Civil War the matter of piety was secondary and no longer a primary condition as it was 
during the First Civil War (189). For example, “Abd Allah Ibn Abbas (3 AH - 68 AH/619–620 
AD) refused to give bay’a to Abd Allah Al-Zubayr (73 AH 624 – 692AD) who was contesting 
Marwan Ibn Al-Hakam (623-683 AD) the fourth Umayyad Khalifa, because Al-Zubayr did not 
know his friend from his enemy; while Yazid, who for his commonsense, was more fit for the 
post” (Donner 2010, 99). Furthermore, he campaigned for the Bay’a of Wilayah al ahed in Al-
Hejaz to prevent Al-Zubayr from becoming the Khalifa. Yet, it is Yazid who was the first to 
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المسيب موقفه الخاص من نظام والية العهد الذي جاء به األمويون، ففي حين عاب ابن السيب علي معاوية بن ابي سفيان أحداثه نظام كان لسعيد بن  
 والية العهد، و تحويل الخالفة الي ملك
86
 اال انه بعد وفاة معاويه بايع يزيد بل خالفه 
136 
 
destroy the Kaaba (the Sacred House) in his campaign to capture and kill Al-Zubayr and enforce 
Wilayah al ahed and his right to rule the Umma.  
 
 Finally, in the Al-Iraq region the reaction of the Ulama represented the greatest resistance 
to the Umayyad’s reign. The most influential of the Ulama of Al-Iraq is Sa'id bin Jubayr (665-
714 CE) who was a Mawaly (non-Arab). His position in regard to the Umayyad’s reign and 
Wilayah al ahed is a good example of how the Ulama outside Bilad al-Sham were forced to 
accept the reality of power and choose the best outcome from the worst choices. Ijma, and hence 
legitimacy of the principle of Wilayah al ahed, was achieved by force and not on clear 
theological principles. “Sa'id Ibin Jubayr was openly critical of the evils of the tyrannical rule of 
Abd al-Malik and his clan. He resisted their rule by galvanizing an insurrection against them” 
(Thouaqan 2005, 108)
87
 He personally joined the fight with Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash‘ath (died 
704 CE), an Umayyad general who abandoned the dynasty and became the celebrated leader of 
the revolt (699–701CE) against the governor of Iraq, Al-Hajjaj (661 -714CE). His views of the 
Umayyad’s reign and Wilayah al ahed are summed up in the speech he gave in the decisive 
battle of Dayr al-Jamajim (701):  
Fight them for their tyrannical rule and their offenses against religion. Fight them for their 





The battle of Dayr al-Jamajim was lost, and Ibin Jubayr was captured. “He recanted his legal 
views under pressure and accepted the Umayyad reign and ratified Wilayah al ahed. The rest of 
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األمويين، و حذرهم من المشاركة في الفتنة، و أمرهم باتباع الجماعة و كان من ابرز و كان البصري قد نفر النا عن االلتحاق بالثاءيرين علي  
 علماء العراق في الدعوة الي ذلك
88
و قد صرح ابن جبير بعيوب عبدالملك و ذكر شرور و شرور قومه، و مساويء حكمهم، و حرض علي قتالهم و قال في دير الجماجم "قاتلوهم علي  
هم من الدين، و تجبرهم علي عباد هللا، و اماتتهم الصالة، و استقاللهم المسلمين"جورهم في الحكم و خروج  
137 
 




Contrary to Ibin Jubayr in the Al-Iraq region, Al-Hasan Al-Basri (642–728 CE) a 
prominent Alim, supported the Umayyad’s rule. Ultimately, Al-Basri accepted the legality of the 
practice of Wilayah al ahed not for religious reasons but based on Maslaha, the best outcome of 
the worst of choices. He theological views were obedience and patience, even if a ruler was 
unjust. He chose to pray and increase one’s own piety instead of revolting. Apparently, he saw 
that revolt had feeble chances to change political conditions.  
 
In sum, the Ulama during the period that Wilayah al ahed appeared were not unanimous 
in their view over the legality of hereditary monarchy. The Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham encouraged 
the practice of Wilayah al ahed and argued for its legality based on the stability for the Umma. 
Some were not comfortable with the change of Khilafa to a kingship, but in the end they agreed 
on the legality of the matter. While both the Ulama of Al-Hejaz and Al-Iraq had mixed reactions, 
ultimately those who disagreed were coerced into accepting the legitimacy of Wilayah al ahed. 
As a result, Bay’a and Shura practices during the early founding period were replaced by the 
new and coerced type of Bay’a of Wilayah al ahed to avoid bloodshed and Fitnah and remain in 
Jemaah. The nature of Fiqh al siyash al shariah allowed for such practices to be adopted, but the 
matter was left for the Umma to decide as long as they implemented sharia, which most Khalifas 
did. Consequently, the nature of tyranny in Islam has had a different character than in other 
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systems of thought because while violence and arbitrary practices were part of the fight over who 
should rule, once a ruler was in place Sharia was respected and implemented.  
Finally, one could argue that those who shed the most Muslim blood and were most 
willing to fight, by, for example, destroying holy sites or killing members of the Prophet’s 
family, were rewarded with Wilayah al ahed. Yet, it did not end the bloodshed over who should 
rule.  
After Abd al-Malik secured victory in the Second Civil War and consolidated his power 
he implemented Wilayah al ahed with the legal support of the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham. The 
popular view is that God chose Abd al-Malik and bestowed victory on him, which consequently 
legitimized Wilayah al ahed. It was only during this period that Wilayah al ahed became the 
orthodoxy in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. 
  “Although Mu'awiya had emerged in 40/661 as the victor of the First Civil War, the basic 
questions over leadership that had been at issue during the war had never really been settled; they 
had rather been made temporarily moot by the fact that the logical claimants for leadership at 
that time had been reduced to one” (Donner 2010, 177). Mu'awiya introduced Wilayah al ahed at 
the end of his reign to at least the Muslims Bilad al-Sham who gave him Bay’a and recognized 
him as the Khalifa after his victory over Ali (the Fourth Guided Khalifs) in the First Civil War. 
He asked those who had given him Bay’a to extend it to his son. He wanted to secure the elite’s 
agreement to Wilayah al ahed by making it publically clear that it had Ijma, that the Umma 
supported it unanimously. Yet there was no such Ijma. In fact there was opposition to Wilayah al 
ahed, primarily concentrated in Medina. “It was in the year 65 AH -686 CE when Mu'awiya 
asked to give Wilayah al ahed to his son Yazid, most senior Companions of the Prophet and 
Fuqaha objected to his request; among them Abd Allah ibn Umar, Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, Abd 
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Allah ibn al-Abbas, Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr, and Husayn ibn Ali” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 
116).
90
 Interestingly, Abd al-Rahman was the son of the First Guided Caliph, Abd Allah was the 
son of the Second Guided Caliph, and Husayn was the son of the Fourth Guided Caliph. One 
could argue that the rejection was twofold; it could be ambition or because their fathers never 
nominated any of them to become Khalifa, and as such Mu'awiya was claiming the spoils of the 
First Civil War for his son. 
Nevertheless, Wilayah al ahed was rejected, and what Mu'awiya actually did was sow the 
seeds of the Second Civil War. He never secured for his son Bay’a that was based on the legal 
principle of Wilayah al ahed.  Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr turned out to be the staunchest 
rejectionist among the Companions; he openly questioned Mu'awiya’s speech, accusing him of 
rejecting the Sunna of the Prophet and instead following the Sunna of Heracl (the term used by 
Arabs at the time to designation the Byzantine Emperors) and Kissra (a designation of the 
Persian kings).  Finally, they all fled Medina quietly fearing death from Mu‘awiya who wanted 
to extract their Bay’a for his son with the sword of necessity.  
Yazid, as mentioned before, fought two of the most traumatizing battles in the history of 
Islam: the Battle of Karbala (61 AH- 680 CE), where Husayn ibn Ali (the grandson of the 
Prophet) was killed with every single member of his family, and the Battle of Al-Harrah (63 AH- 
683 CE), where Yazid ordered a three day pillage of Medina that enslaved members of the 
Prophet’s family. And finally, there was the siege of Mecca in 683 CE when the holy site of 
Ka'ba was burned to the ground. Yazid’s sudden death prevented an Umayyad’s victory and 
saved the life of Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr. Al-Zubayr’s death came at the hands of Abd al-
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، و يعهد باألمر إليه من بعده، اعترض عليه كبار الصحابة و فقهاؤهم تلك الفترة، و هم عبد هللا بن ١٥النا ابنه يزيد سنة و لما أراد معاوية أن يبايع  
 عمر، و عبد هللا بن الزبير، و عبدهللا بن عبا ، و عبد الرحمن بن أبي بكر، و الحسين بن علي
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Malik’s forces on the battlefield in 692 CE when the Ka'ba was destroyed a second time. It was 
only then that the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham could carry out Wilayah al ahed.  
 
What are the consequences of the acceptance of Wilayah al ahed as a legitimate legal 
principle in Fiqh al siyash al shariah? More important, is force a legitimate means to rule the 
Umma? The victory of Abd al-Malik and the conclusion of the Second Civil War 
institutionalized and legitimized a role for violence. This major event became a foundational 
moment in Fiqh al siyash al Shariah where force and violence are legitimate to dynastic rule or 
Wilayah al ahed. In this case, the Ulu Al Amr, which at the time were outside the scope of Sharia 
itself, made the killing and bloodshed of Muslims in pursuit of temporal power a special category 
under the principle of Maslaha.  
Ulu Al Amr’s success at instituting Wilayah al ahed can be explained by two contending 
but not necessarily contradictory variables; the first was sheer exhaustion from the level of 
violence and savagery that spared neither religious symbols nor the family of the Prophet. 
Donner explains: 
The civil wars were striking for the savagery with which they were carried out. There are many 
episodes in which our sources describe captives being executed in cold blood, in which sons are 
executed before their fathers, or men killed by, or at the order of, their relatives (Amr ibn al-
Zubayr by his brother Abd Allah; Amr ibn Sa'id by Abd al-Malik), in which the vanquished were 
massacred in large numbers (Nahrawan, Khazir, Mukhtar s followers in Kufa, Battle of the 
Harra). This may have something to do with the crude temper of the age and with the brutal 
manners of many participants, who were rough and unrefined bedouins or peasants. But it surely 
also owed much to the ideological character of many of the conflicts within the civil wars. This 
led people to demonize their opponents as the very embodiment of evil and also made them 
keenly aware that a defeated enemy who had not fully repented was, for ideological reasons, 
always a threat to rebel again, so it was safer to eliminate him. Moreover, the intensely 
ideological character of the early Believers' movement made the elimination of such "allies of the 
devil" morally acceptable, even praiseworthy, in peoples' minds. (189) 
 
Accordingly, Wilayah al ahed created much needed stability and peace and was a testament to 
the genius of the flexibility of the Fiqh al siyash al shariah as an expression of Ulu Al Amr. It is 
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important to reiterate that historically most of the rulers actually respected Sharia and 
implemented it according to what Ulu Al Amr proposed but constantly violated and reshaped Al 
siyash al shariah. 
 A second plausible variable is that Wilayah al ahed is the result of victor’s justice.  Once 
Abd al-Malik was able to eliminate all of his competitors, the guile of the Maslaha-oriented 
Ulama of Bilad al-Sham provided the dynastic rule of the Umayyads a rule that required the 
Umma’s obedience.   
 Regardless of which variable had a greater effect on the introduction of Wilayah al ahed, 
its presence in Fiqh al siyash al shariah had enormous legal and political consequences. The 
death of Abd Allah Al-Zubayr (73 AH) was the sign that Wilayah al ahed is a reality and 
dynastic rule had been established. Since then the right to Bay’a of the Muslim subject was taken 
away. Al-Mutairi argues that “from 73 AH to 1350 AH, the year the Ottoman Caliphate ended, a 
shift took place in the Islamic legal discourse from one that was revealed to Taweel” (44).
91
  
 Taweel is a self-enclosed period where legal references of the founding period are not 
included in producing legal opinions. Fiqh al siyash al shariah is based on precedents that were 
established in 73AH. Unlike Tafsir which is the literal meaning of a verse in the Qur’an or a 
Hadith, Taweel focuses primarily on the actual intent behind the verse or a Hadith and not the 
literal meaning. Thus, Taweel is a form of Ijtihad (independent human reasoning in Sharia law). 
Al-Mutairi argues that there are legal themes that are specific to this period and serve as a 
guideline to logical legal arguments. For example, “Al-Mawardi (972-1058 CE) is a good 
example of the Abbasid’s Fiqh that uses legal sources during the period of the Companions not 
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لخطاب المؤول من حكم مروان بن الملك الي سقوط الخالفة العثمانيةانتهي الخطاب المنزل و استقر ا 67باستشهاد الزبير عام    
142 
 
to change the status quo but to provide legitimacy to the political practices of his time” (Al-
Mutairi 2003, 45).
92
  Historically, “it is this type of Mawardian Fiqh that provided the legal 
grounds for political tyranny and allowed it to spread by imitating the Sunna of Heracl [Caesar] 
(the term that Arabs used when referring to a Byzantine Emperors) and Kissra (a designation of 
the Persian kings) as the Prophet predicted in the Hadith (45). 
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 Al-Mutairi argues that there are four main themes in the Taweel discourse:  
1. The usurpation confiscation of the right of the Umma to choose its leader and the 
transformation of rule by Shura to hereditary rule (37)
94
 
2. The confiscation of the right of the Umma to participate in political decision making via 
Shura and Ra'y (personal opinion in adapting Sharia law) (47)
95
 
3. The Umayyad reign marked the end of public oversight of Bayt al-mal (House of money or 
wealth” the treasury  that is responsible for the administration of the wealth generated by war 
booty, taxes, and Zakat [that which purifies"
 




4. The decline of the Umma’s role in the face of corruption and injustice (51)97 
 
These four themes, absent in the founding period, set new precedents in Fiqh al siyash al 
shariah. Despite a consensus among Sunni legal scholars that the founding period represented a 
period of ideal government, the Ulu Al Amr responded to the immediate aftermath of the period 
with Wilayah al ahed, a practice that permanently trumped all other principles from the founding 
period. The Taweel period of Fiqh al siyash al shariah served up violence and bloodshed. This 
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 -يوظف النصوص من حيث ال يشعر في خدمة الواقع بخالف الصحابة الذين صاغو الواقع  -و هو يعبر عن فقه العصر العباسي  -لقد كان الماواردي  
يملي مفاهيمه التي يجب تأويل نصوص الشريعة من أجلها، و من أجل بحسب ما جاءت به النصوص اي صار الواقع هو الذي  -أو أرادو صياغته 
 إضفاء الشرعية عليها، ال العك 
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 و بمثل هذا الفقه الماواردي شاع اإلستبداد السياسي، و إستقرت سنن هرقل و قيصر كما أخبر بذلك النبي صلى هللا عليه و سلم 
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ختيار اإلمام و تحول الحكم من شورى إلى وراثةمصادرة حق األمة في ا -١الخطاب السياسي المؤول      
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   الثاني: مصادرة حق األمة في المشاركة في الرأي و الشورى 
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 الثالث: غياب دور األمة في الرقابة على بيت المال 
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 الرابع: تراجع دور األمة في مواجهة الظلم و اإلنحراف 
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shift of discourse guaranteed Wilayah al ahed in perpetuity and denied a return to the legal 
discourse of the founding period.  
Sociologically, this movement also represented the gradual institutionalization of Ulu Al 
Amr into a class that was influenced and controlled by temporal power. A suggestive piece of 
evidence was the Khalifa’s provision of Ulama salaries. The Khalifa now arbitrarily controlled 
the wealth of Bayt al-mal without oversight. Dabashi sketches out the formation of the class of 
Ulu Al Amr:  
Another major office which gradually developed in the Islamic state apparatus, again due to the 
exclusively political and administrative limitation of the caliphal authority, was that of the ulama 
(religious scholars). A firm and extensive knowledge of the religious sciences—the Qur'an and 
Hadith in particular—provided the ulama with a crucial area of expertise and thus authority. As 
the custodians of institutionalized Islam, this class of religious scholars and their religious 
authority had to be recognized. (92) 
 
The scope of Ulu Al Amr’s authority is clearly demonstrated in the historical change of the 
discourse of Sunni Islam. A good example of their authority is in the change in discourse that 
Ulu Al Amr adopted to delegitimize rebellion against temporal power.  Al-Mutairi argues that 
these Ulama “who hold the Taweel discourse viewed Khurooj (rebellion) and political protest 
movements from a reductionist and negative one-sided view. Historically, they viewed these 
movements as a cause Fitnah that cause bloodshed and destruction of property and overlooked 
the role of these movements in resistance to tyranny and injustice that may result in making the 
Umma prone to be conquered by the enemies of Islam” (61).
98
 They are able to change the 
political discourse by applying their legal expertise to social and political conditions and inflate 
the legal injunctions that promote their view and deflate others according to what they perceive 
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و اإلحتجاج السياسي نظرة سلبية من زاوية واحدة، هي ما يحدث بسببها من فتنة قد يذهب لقد نظر أصحاب هذا الخطاب المؤول إلى حركات الخروج  
ذي قد يؤدي بها بعض النفو و األموال، دون نظر إلى ضرورة قيام مثل هذه المقومات التي تحول بين السلطة و بين الظلم و االستبداد و اإلنحراف، ال
رجيإلى سقوط األمة كلها تحت سيطرة عدوها الخا  
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as Maslaha of the Umma. For example, “Al-Mutairi argues that some of the reasons behind the 
spread of the Taweel discourse are the emphasis on the Hadiths that discuss secession, upheaval, 
and chaos to prove their fatalistic views about the future as worse than the present. Thus, later 
generations of Ulama adopted theological views to maintain the statuesque and discourage 
political change out of fear of the future” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 64).
99
  Lambton argues that “their 
[the Ulama's] principal political function was the interpretation of sharia in terms of the 
problems facing the community, and by their approval of the sultan's choice of imam in the bay’a 
. . . and their fatwas, they expressed the functional authority of sharia” (Lambton 92) (1981, 
115). The authority to interpret Sharia according to the changing political and social 
circumstances guaranteed the dependence of temporal power on the authority of Ulu Al Amr, 
especially in the matters of obedience and the use of force. 
  
  Perhaps the most important consequence of the adoption of Wilayah al ahed was the 
change in the relationship between temporal power and the Umma. “A legal dispute arose in the 
second period of Taweel regarding the legality of the person who was acting as a Khalifa. Was 
he acting as a Wakeel (deputy or agent) or a Waley (guardianship)” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 177).
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Accordingly, in the first period the Khalifa was acting as a Wakeel since the Bay’a was given by 
the free consent of the Umma. Al-Mutairi “explains the legal consequence of capturing of the 
Khilafa by force changes the nature of the post from one where the Khalifa is acting as a deputy 
on behalf of the Umma to a guardian acting as a parent on behalf of minors (Al-Mutairi 2003, 
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ر منه، دون و من األسباب التي آذت الى شيوع هذا الخطاب السياسي المؤول أيضاً : شيوع أحاديث الفتن، التي تؤكد أنه ال يأتي زمان إال إذا بعده ش 
من الحاضر كما تؤكد  فهم لمعناها الصحيح، فصار أكثر المتأخرين يعملون على ترسيخ األمر الواقع، و الدفاع عنه، خوفا من المستقبل الذي هو أسوأ
 ذلك النصوص
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 This legal opinion ushered the new method of wlayah al qaher or capturing the post of 
Khliafa by the sword. Moreover, “the Khalifa cannot be removed from the post by the Umma 
since the guardianship of the Khalifa changed the legal status of the Muslim subject to the status 
of a minor or child” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 177-178).
102
 Accordingly, this legal change altered the 
nature of authority/obedience in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah from a contractual legal 
relationship that is conditional and can be dissolved, to a paternal relationship that is natural and 
an unalterable.  Al-Mutairi argue that change in the nature of discourse led to a change in the 
legal quality of “the Imam quality changed with the change of discourse from a Wakeel (deputy 
or agent) that the Umma can legally remove form office; to a Waley (a guardian) that cannot be 
removed according to the Taweel political discourse” (178).
103
 Precisely, Wilayah al ahed is the 
legal tool that furnished the change with the legitimacy of dynastic rule and ended legal equality 
among Muslims, turning their relationship from contractual to paternal one.  
 Thus, the legal shift in the nature of the Khalifa coincided with a major legal shift in Fiqh 
al siyash al shariah from an emphasis on the priority of Bay’a and Shura to giving priority and 
legal backing to avoiding Fitnah and remaining in Jemaah. Consequently, the two civil wars 
served as the basis for a public retreat to security, order, and peace. Historically, Fiqh al siyash 
al shariah has more or less supported a state of war locked in a permanent state of emergency. 
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ابنه القاصر، ا بصفة و هكذا أدى القول بأن اإلمامة تنعقد باإلستيالء و القهر إلى القول بأن تصرف االمام عن األمة بصفة الوالية كوالية األب على  
 الوكالة عنهم؛ النه توالها بالقوة بال اختيار منهم كالولي، و ليست الوكالة كذلك؛ إذ الوكيل ال يكون إال بإختيار الموكل
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وليهم؛ اذ ليست ترتب على هذا عدم عدم إمكانية عزله؛ اذ لي لألبناء الصغار و ال للمراءة عزل -أي أنه يتصرف بصفة الوالية-فلم قيل بهذا الرأي 
 والية األب على أبنائه باختيارهم، فال يمكن له عزلهم، و كذلك إذا ثبت ذلك في اإلمامة لي له عزل نفسه أيضا
103
إلى وال ال يمكن عزله في الخطاب الثاني  -كما كان عليه الحال في مرحلة الخطاب السياسي األول  -و هكذا تحول اإلمام من وكيل يمكن عزله  
!  و هذا الرأي أدى بدوره إلى القول بأن اإلمامة عقد دائم ال يمكن توقيته، بل اإلمام يظل إماما حتى الموتالمؤول ؟  
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Capturing the post of Khilafa and maintaining it created a temporal appetite for bloodshed and 
cruelty.   
 
 Finally, some concluding remarks follow regarding the legal consequence of Wilayah al 
ahed on Fiqh al siyash al shariah. This chapter argues that historically Ulu Al Amr provided the 
legal legitimacy for the shift in the role of temporal power: from a servant of the community or 
executive of Sharia to a condition where Sharia is subservient to temporal power. This was 
possible by introducing the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Most 
important, the legitimacy given to the use of force and violence to capture the post of Khilafa 
changed the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Wilayah al ahed could be 
praised for finally putting an end to Muslim bloodshed, especially during the Second Civil War, 
but violence was rewarded by locating it in an area outside any legal accountability. Nothing in 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah refers to the possibility of subjecting the ruler to a crime committed ex 
post facto after capturing the post of Khilafa. In fact, Fiqh al siyash al shariah is mute on this 
subject, contrary to the Qur’an and Sunna which clearly prohibit the unjustified shedding of 
blood and equates it to the killing of all the people on Earth. Without a doubt such a practice 
creates two classes: those who are weak and judged for their actions and those who use force and 
escape with massacring the Prophet’s family. The Maslaha principle could be the genius of Fiqh 
al siyash al shariah in particular and Sharia in general, but it can also lead to grave injustices 
and inequalities. For example, one could argue that from the Second Civil War to the present 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah has actually been under legal emergency status. For example, the Ulu 
Al Amr, who are fully institutionalized in the modern Arab nation-state, called upon Muslims not 
to revolt against their presidents in Egypt, Libya, and Syria during the 2011 Arab Spring. Their 
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statements make it clear that the vocabulary of avoiding Fitnah and remaining in Jemaah has 
been carried over from the historical experience of the Second Civil War. This period became the 
permanent reference of Fiqh al siyash al shariah, but a question remains: When will it be 
possible to restore a state of normality? Paradoxically, when contemporary Muslim scholars ask 
about the greatness of justice in Islam, they immediately refer to the period of the Four Guided 
Khalifs and the ideal conditions that Muslims then enjoyed. But why does the Ulu Al Amr still 
accept Wilayah al ahed under the principle of Maslaha as a permanent principle in Fiqh al siyash 
al shariah? Modern reformers from outside the institutionalized establishment of Ulu Al Amr, 
starting with Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839 – March 9, 1897), challenged deeply 
















          CHAPTER V 
                                 Ulu Al-Amr, Modernity, Sovereignty, and the Modern State 
 
“Since December 2010, the Middle East has been undergoing upheavals that have 
challenged despots who have held onto the reins of power for decades. These uprisings 
underscored the sovereignty of the people, a significant majority of whom supported the 
implementation of Shari’a in some form” (Ahsanuddin 2013, 12). Due to factionalism and 
partisanship among political forces, it is clear that in this post-revolutionary period “Arab 
Spring” states are struggling. These difficult and tumultuous conditions have been exacerbated 
by the ideological commitments of Islamist and secular political parties. Domestic and 
international counter revolutionary forces, which are trying to stifle the success of the 2011 
revolutions, further complicate the situation.  
   Divisions between these political parties generally relate directly to ideological splits 
between the Islamists and secular political groups over constitutional principles of civil rights 
and liberties and the role of the state in the public and private spheres of its citizens. The 
differences mainly concern core political and economic issues, which have resulted in 
irreconcilable political divisions. These ideological gaps have been and still are exploited by the 
domestic (the former regimes of Tunis, Egypt, and Yemen) and international (Saudi Arabia, 
United Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain) counter revolutionary forces. International forces 
have exploited the ensuing turmoil to contain and reverse the spread of the revolutionary change 
into their own states.  
In the wake of the Arab Spring, Islamist political parties met with initial success. 
Egyptian parliamentary elections in January 2012 resulted in Islamist parties winning 71.5 
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percent of the seats, and five months later, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was 
elected president.  In Tunisia, leaders like Rachid Ghannouchi sought to emulate the 
conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey (Ahsanuddin 2013, 12-13). In the 
case of Egypt the MB rule came to an abrupt halt when the military jumped at the first 
opportunity to regain its historical role of ruling Egypt.  Moreover, since the July 3
rd
 2013 
Egyptian military coup many voices in Western and Arab academic circles and media have 
argued that “today, what we are facing in a post-Arab Spring and post-Turkish model Middle 
East is a new type of failure for political Islam's future” (Taspinar, 2014). Some academics 
reached similar conclusions after the Algerian military coup of December 1991 toppled the 
Islamic Salvation Front. In his 1992 book, The Failure of Political Islam, French social scientist 
Olivier Roy argued that political Islam as a project of governance, politics and public 
administration had precious little to offer. Such academic and media voices have wasted no time 
declaring that political Islam, freedom, equality, citizenship, and other ideals of modernity are 
impossible to reconcile. They point out that the military coup in Egypt was backed by millions of 
Egyptians discontented with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) under President Morsi and opted for 
the return of the old regime, similar to Mubarak’s, of military rule behind a civilian mask. 
Accordingly, the military coup received the support and backing of oppositional political figures 
across the political spectrum, including: the secularists of the National Salvation Front lead by 
Mohamed ElBaradei; Pope Theodoros II of the Coptic Church; Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad El-
Tayyeb, the President of Al-Azhar University; and the Salafist Al-Nour party (backed by Saudi 
Arabia), which praised the military coup as a correction in the path of the revolutionary change. 
In Tunis, the Al-Nahda Party (NP) is facing similar opposition but the military, thus far, has 
decided not to interfere. Those forces unhappy with the rule of the MB have united with 
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elements of the “deep state” or the old regime to halt the success of the democratically elected 
Islamist governments from succeeding in ruling. Consequently, the military coup in Egypt, at 
least for the time being, brought the Arab Spring to a complete stop. Leading the attack on the 
Islamist parties of the Arab Spring states are Gulf States whose religiously conservative 
monarchies continue to justify their autocratic rule with the legitimacy of Wilayah al ahed. At 
the forefront of the coalition is the Islamic Saudi Kingdom, the most conservative force in Sunni 
Islam and the center of Salafi Islam in the world.  Since the advent of the Arab Spring the Gulf 
monarchies (with the exception of Qatar) are actively assembling political influence and 
petrodollars in the West to insure the failure of political Islam. For example, “[t]he United Arab 
Emirates has thrown its support behind neighboring Saudi Arabia's decision to label the Muslim 
Brotherhood a terrorist organization, increasing Gulf Arab pressure on the Islamist 
group”(Associated Press, 2014). In fact, the Gulf monarchies were instrumental in exploiting the 
ideological divide between the Islamist and liberal political forces that appeared once Ben Ali, 
Mubarak, and Saleh of Yemen were toppled.  
While the news out of Egypt is grim, in other parts of the region it is less so, “on January 
26
th
, 2014, the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly approved a new constitution. Contrary to the 
Egyptian experience, Tunisians, in partly preserving the goals of the Jasmine Revolution, 
managed to overcome their country’s security and political challenges” (Farhoui, 2014). After a 
difficult protracted struggle among organized political forces “the Tunisian constitution, a 
carefully worded comprise between Islamic identity and modern day concepts of human rights 
and good governance, has been described as one of the most liberal constitutions in the Arab 
World” (Tunis Times, 2014). Rival political factions signed the document signaling a 
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compromise on its basic civil rights and liberties.  Thus far, Tunis seems to be the most positive 
case as the Arab Spring states struggle for democracy, but that may change at any moment.  
Conflicts in this transitional period indicate that toppling decades-long dictators is easier 
than managing the challenges and obstacles in achieving the goals of the revolution. Histories of 
revolutions are full of difficult transitions. Without a central mediating force promoting a unified 
idea of the good, revolutions bring to the surface contentious ideological commitments. 
Ideological divisions turn yesterday’s revolutionary partners into today’s mortal enemies. I argue 
in this chapter that the current ideological divide between organized political groups in “Arab 
Spring” states has its roots in the nineteenth century displacement of the foundational Sunni 
conception of authority by the colonial European concept of sovereignty. Modernity and its 
corollary European colonialism have changed the social and political reality of Muslim physical 
and metaphysical realms. Through military force, European colonialism displaced the core logic 
of historical political, economic, and social institutions that were organized around the Sunni 
conception of authority. The core the concept of sovereignty displaced the Sunni conception of 
authority mainly via physical and metaphysical force.  
European colonization’s main consequence was the rearrangement of global colonial 
territories according to the logic of the modern nation-state. It physically redrew the Islamic 
geographical map under international law and according to the logic of Western conceptions of 
sovereignty. Consequently, the construction of modern nation-state was not historically organic 
to Muslims; on the contrary, physical and metaphysical violence imposed the nation-state on 
Muslims and forced a new reality that led to the rise of configurations of identities based on 
racial and linguistic origins emphasizing new loyalties to the national territorial state.  The 
process of constructing the nation-state in the postcolonial period fell to local elites.  
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To illustrate the argument I have chosen the contemporary Islamic legal scholar Wael B. 
Hallaq as my interlocutor in this chapter. Professor Hallaq’s brilliant scholarship on the Sharia 
and Islam makes him an ideal candidate for this task. There are similarities between our 
approaches regarding the significance of sovereignty and modernity but more importantly, we 
differ in the scope of sovereignty in relation to the Sharia or more precisely Sunni authority.  
Similar to my approach, Hallaq appreciates the profound impact of the European 
colonialism on Muslims and the impact of the European legal system on the Sharia which is 
central to Muslim subjectivities and system of meaning. He illustrates in the following quotation 
the impact of European colonial experience and the change that was imposed on local 
populations in the post-independence nation-state structure: 
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of 
power they had inherited from the colonial experience and that, as a rule and after gaining so-
called independence for their countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial 
policies they had fiercely fought against during the colonial period. They inherited from Europe a 
readymade nation-state (with its constitutive power structures) for which the existing social 
formations have not been adequately prepared. The paradigmatic concept of the citizen, without 
which no state can last, has been slow in coming, and the political lacunae have not been properly 
filled. (16) 
 
Largely, the militaries of newly independent states constructed the nation-state based on the 
same colonial military model of governing. The process by which newly independent Arab states 
constructed the modern nation-state represented a top-down European colonial style of 
governing, which lacked organic local characteristics. This is truer of the Arab postcolonial 
republics than the conservative monarchies in the Middle East.  In short, modernity through 
European colonialism displaced archaic Muslim identities based on religious membership in 
favor of new subjectivities based on the modern logic of European sovereignty. Accordingly, the 
nature of the legal system: 
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Until the early nineteenth century, and for twelve centuries before then, the moral law of Islam, 
the Sharia, had successfully negotiated customary law and local customary practices and had 
emerged as the supreme moral and legal force regulating both society and government. This ‘law’ 
was paradigmatic, having been accepted as a central system of high and general norms by 
societies and dynastic powers that ruled over them. (Hallaq 2013, 8) 
 
Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the role of Sharia ended in public life as 
European colonialism, or local elites themselves, successfully introduced the modern codes of 
law. More important, in nineteenth and twentieth century Islamic political thought a link was 
made between European domination and the decline of the role of the Sharia in public life. New 
European laws were introduced as rational laws necessary for the construction of a modern 
national homeland. The new codes were constructed according to the logic of the nation-state 
where national rather than religious loyalties were the moral end of law. Dealing with this legal 
rupture was a major theme that subsequent Muslim thinkers had to address. Wael Hallaq 
explains the significance of this change: 
The political, legal, and cultural struggles of today's Muslims stem from a certain measure of 
dissonance between their moral and cultural aspirations, on the one hand, and the moral realities 
of a modern world, on the other---realities with which they must live but that were not of their 
own making. In one sense, the entirety of this book seeks to substantiate this claim. The West (by 
which I mean here mainly Euro-American) lives somewhat more comfortably in a present that 
locates itself within a historical process that has been of its own creation. It lives in an age 
dictated by the terms of the Enlightenment, the industrial and technological revolutions, modern 
science, nationalism, capitalism, and the American-French constitutional tradition, all of which, 
and much more, have been organically and internally grown products. The rest of the world has 
followed or, if not, has felt the pressure to do so. There is in effect no other history but that of 
Euro-American, not even pre-Enlightenment European history. (17-18) 
 
The self-confidence of the European empires sought and succeeded in shaping the world through 
its moral and technical superiority. The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt (1798-1801) exemplifies 
European self-confidence in relation to the declining Muslim Empires. Edward Said in his study 
of Orientalism argues that Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt symbolized European hegemonic power 
over the Muslim subject. He contends that this invasion “although it was almost immediately 
preceded by at least two major Orientalist projects, Napoleon’ invasion in 1798 and his foray 
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into Syria have had by far the greater consequence for the modern history of Orientalism” (Said 
1977, 76). Said is referring to the metaphysical consequences of this colonial expedition on the 
European subject, who is able not only to conquer a territory but to use the local population as 
the subject of the European sciences. This type of domination has no parallel in the history of 
Islam. Consequently, any form of local resistance had to cope with this nascent domination or 
hegemony in a physical/metaphysical totality that constructs the world according to the logic of 
sovereignty.  As such, invasions and decline are not new phenomena in the history of Islam; their 
impact has always been physical at the material level but unable to change the metaphysical core 
of Islam and its values.  Both the Mongols and the Crusades conquered Islamic Empires and 
occupied large geographical territories, but they were unable to impact the metaphysical core of 
the legal system, e.g. Sunni authority of Ulu Al Amr and the Sharia. For example, Mongols 
converted into Islam during their rule over Muslims and the Crusades ended their venture 
without impacting the central role of Sharia in public life. But starting with Napoleon’s invasion 
of Egypt, “it soon became apparent that Western challenges were more fundamental and that 
even the attaining of modern military capabilities required wide-ranging social, economic and 
even political reorganizations. Between the mid-nineteenth century and the end of the First 
World War, almost all parts of the Muslim world were touched by this process, which amounted 
to a remoulding of Islamic societies in a modern European cast” (Nafi 2008, 36).  This remolding 
was by force and required the restructuring of physical and metaphysical aspects of Muslim 
reality. The change crushed historical economic, social, and political ties in favor of new ones. 
Social and political classes declined and new classes accumulated massive political and 
economic power. Moreover, prominent Islamic cities such as Damascus experienced dramatic 
decline due to the rise of new coastal cities that were at the center of urban and economic 
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systems in the region. Physical changes were accompanied by metaphysical changes. The 
introduction of European legal codes, which governed the state and the economy, produced the 
novel legal logics. Wael B. Hallaq explains this unprecedented change:  
However, beginning in the nineteenth century, and at the hands of colonialist Europe, the 
socioeconomic and political system regulated by the Sharīa was structurally dismantled, which is 
to say that the Sharīa itself was eviscerated, reduced to providing no more than the raw materials 
for the legislation of personal status by the modern state. Even in this relatively limited sphere, 
the Sharīa lost its autonomy and social agency in favor of the modern state; Sharīa was henceforth 
needed only to the limited extent that deriving certain provisions from it—provisions that were 
reworked and re-created according to modern expediency—legitimized the state’s legislative 
ventures. (8) 
 
The dismantling process was through the centralizing policy of the colonial powers’ military 
might, which enabled them to impose their legal and political will on the colonies. Consequently, 
the nineteenth century colonial experience was a unique and unprecedented event in the history 
of Islam changing its physical and metaphysical characteristics, which were held intact by the 
Sharia. The scope of decline at the metaphysical level presented Muslims with the challenge of a 
reality lacking any reference point in the Sharia or history of Islam to guide them out of the 
colonial crisis. Because the nineteenth century decline was hegemonic, Muslim states were 
unable to thwart the European physical and the metaphysical system of meaning.  Consequently, 
there was no Sunni system of meaning that could any longer impose its will in the physical 
world. Instead it receded to a ceremonial role. This moment in history we call modernity 
represents modern Islam’s decline.  
This study will utilize Eduard P. Archetti’s conception of modernity by arguing that: 
Modernity refers to a historical period which began in Western Europe with a series of cultural, 
social and economic changes during the seventeenth century, and it is usually characterized by 
three features: first, culturally, a reliance on reason and experience conditioned the growth of 
science and scientific consciousness, secularization and instrumental rationality; Second, as a 
mode of life it was based on the growth of industrial society, social mobility, market economy, 
literacy, bureaucratization and consolidation of the nation-state; and third, it fostered a conception 
of the person as free, autonomous, self-controlled and reflexive. Opposed to traditional forms of 
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thought and life, modernity can be conceptualized as a mode of social and individual experience 
that is shared by many men and women all over the world due to the expansion and prestige of 
scientific enquiry, technological innovation, political models of democracy and nation-state 
boundaries, and subjective drive for self-development. Modernity is inherently globalizing. 
Giddens (1991) has argued that the globalizing tendencies of modern institutions are 
accompanied by continuous changes in the perception of the self and redefinition of identities. 
(546) 
 
This dissertation recognizes modernity as an extension of the Christian medieval Europe and not 
a rupture with the past. More precisely, secular conceptions of the subject as “free, autonomous, 
self-controlled and reflexive” are genealogically medieval and Christian. They eventually were 
secularized through struggles and unrest in the social, economic, and political history of Europe, 
but the internal configuration remained intact.  Most important, this dissertation claims that 
sovereignty is the core concept and continuous thread that connects medieval Christian Europe 
with secular modernity which later is universalized over the globe via European colonialism.  
Moreover, “sovereignty is a historical innovation of certain European political and religious 
actors who were seeking to escape from their subjection to the papal and imperial authorities of 
medieval Europe and to establish their independence of all other authorities, including each 
other. It is a post-medieval and, indeed, anti-medieval arrangement of governing authority. It is 
one of the defining markers of the modern world” (Jackson 2007, 6). Thus, this dissertation holds 
that while modernity has produced universal principles that should be embraced and celebrated 
globally, the context of these principles is local in character. Mainly, modernity is structured 
around the unfolding logic of sovereignty in the social, economic, and political domains. More 
precisely, modernity unleashed the physical/metaphysical logical forces that framed the 
historical struggles of the European subject against power and exploitation.  The logic of 
sovereignty provided the modern subject with the claims of national sovereignty, sovereignty 
over the self and body, which framed the logic of autonomy, freedom, equality and dignity. 
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Thus, the local character of European sovereignty is saturated throughout with the emancipatory 
universal struggles for human rights and human dignity. 
This logic of sovereignty presents fundamental obstacles to other peoples and cultures 
that share emancipatory struggles against power but frame the struggle according to local 
historical ideas such as Sunni Islam authority. A problem arises when human rights and dignity 
claim universality regardless of the local character of sovereignty that is the outcome of 
historical, political, and social circumstances that have arisen from medieval Europe. 
Consequently, insisting on universalizing the local character of autonomy, freedom, and equality 
in a European context undermines the very universality of the concepts.  
 
The sovereignty of science, the state, the economy, and the self are particular European 
expressions of the emancipatory principles of resisting power and exploitation of the weak. By 
insuring freedom and equality to all based on the dignity of the subject. It is the aim of this 
chapter to demonstrate that emancipatory universal concepts may be realized if the local 
characteristics of European sovereignty and Sunni authority are understood and included.  But 
first we must analyze the physical and metaphysical of both concepts.  
Insisting on the local qualities of sovereignty as universal and ignoring the local historical 
quality of authority in Sunni Islam is further proof that human rights are a tool in the hand of 
aggressive Western powers to advance the interest of their own imperial states.  It is a fact that 
the advent of modernity with its universal claims coincided in the case of Islam with European 
colonialism and decline of the Muslim Empires. Thus, with European sovereignty at its core the 
universality of the modern subject as “free, autonomous, self-controlled and reflexive” becomes 
a discourse of human rights and wrongs according to the logic of the sovereignty of the self, the 
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nation, and the state while other forms of authority were excluded and absent from these 
universal notions. Thus, the role of colonial Western empires was central in forcing a European 
model of sovereignty upon other cultures and collectivities by force. The best example is 
international law that governs am international community based on the logic of European 
sovereignty. Wael Hallaq describes European domination at the physical and metaphysical 
realms by arguing: 
Africa and Asia, in most cases, continue to struggle in order to catch up, in the process not only 
foregoing the privilege of drawing on their own tradition and historical experiences that shaped 
who they were and, partly, who they have become but also letting themselves be drawn into 
devastating wars, poverty, disease and the destruction of their natural environment. Modernity, 
whose hegemonic discourse is determined by the institutions and intellectuals of the powerful 
modern West, has not offered a fair shake to two-thirds of the world's population, who have lost 
their history and with it, their organic ways of existence. (18) 
 
This dissertation disagrees with Hallaq that there is a history to be lost and with it an organic way 
of existence. Instead, I claim that the history of Islam is a history with struggles and resistance 
based on local forms of authority and obedience. It is the legal logic of Sunni authority that 
produced the history of Islam without an authentic history to be recalled or a moment to which to 
return. What is important in Hallaq’s insights is the claim that the modern West depends on its 
ability to shape the world according to the European concept of sovereignty and creating a world 
that is hostile to other forms of authority. It legally requires adherence to European international 
law and the concept of the territorial nation-state for membership in the international system. 
Modern state sovereignty entails maintaining a centralized bureaucracy, a defined territory, and a 
fixed population.  Moreover, the modern nation-state runs on taxation and exploitation of natural 
resources on its territory.  
In sum, understanding the emancipatory discourse that spread globally through European 
colonialism requires an analysis of the local character of European sovereign and how the 
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discourse produces hegemonic power whose  consequence is the physical and metaphysical 
domination of the local subject. In insisting on framing universal emancipatory discourses on 
European sovereignty, modernity necessitates a particular kind of subject, an autonomous 
individual with a European sense of self-authorship as its reference point. Consequently, unless 
the subject abandons local traits and adopts the European conception of the self, that subject is 
incompatible with modernity. Hallaq, argues that “as an anthropocentric entity, the state 
possesses a metaphysic that resides within its own sovereign will. The metaphysic generates its 
own meanings, which is to say that its particular views of the world are of its own creation and 
bound by its own standards however changeable these standards may be” (Hallaq 2013, 183). 
Sharia in the context of the environment that produced the nation-state became an alien creature 
that governed by alien environment. Consequently, the environment of the nation-state 
constitutes a unified different subject according to its laws, regardless of culture. As a result, the 
European subject is the only natural and compatible creature with modernity. Thus, modernity 
with its emancipatory universal projects is framed according to a local European environment 
and as such it is impossible to universalize. Hallaq illustrates the consequences of this change as 
follow:   
Modern Muslims are therefore faced with the challenge of reconciling two facts: first, the 
ontological fact of the state and its undeniably powerful presence, and, second, the deontological 
fact of the necessity to bring about a form of Sharia governance. This challenge is further 
complicated by the recognition that the state in Muslim countries has not done much to 
rehabilitate any acceptable form of genuine Sharia governance. The constitutional battles of the 
Islamists in Egypt and Pakistan, the failures of the Iranian Revolution as an Islamic political and 
legal project, and other similar disappointment amply testify to this proposition. Yet the state 
remains the favored template of the Islamists and the ulama (so called Muslim clergymen). (9) 
 
Overall, Hallaq’s description of the predicament of political Islam in the twentieth century is 
accurate; it even applies to the Islamist struggle during the Arab Spring.  Yet, his account of 
what constitutes “genuine Sharia governance” begs the question: When and where did Sharia 
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governance genuinely existed. In fact, the body of the Sharia since the death of the Prophet grew 
according to accommodations to the changing social and political circumstances that faced the 
Umma.  In fact, the split of Islam into two main rival groups; Sunni and Shia is a testament of 
“genuine Sharia governance” that Hallaq claims never existed. Furthermore, the legal principles 
of Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah as are response to the 
fact that the Sharia is moot on the subject of temporal power and obedience.  
This dissertation views Fiqh al siyash al shariah as series of legal harmonizations 
between the changing physical world and the metaphysical ideal of Islamic monotheism. The 
violence in the history of Islam and especially in the early founding period as chapter four 
demonstrated was a history of compromise producing the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed 
under the legal principle of Maslaha. This historical period is what Donner dubbed the “First and 
Second Civil Wars” due to the violent nature and struggle against temporal power and 
governance of the Umma in early Islam.  
Moreover, Hallaq exaggerates the concept of Islamic governance where implementation 
of Sharia was primarily grounded in an attempt to realize the “ought.” Modern states, in contrast, 
debased considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously sanctified 
the doctrine of progress. Chapter four of this dissertation demonstrated that the “ought” was not 
necessarily followed in Fiqh al siyash al shariah, instead, the authority of Ulu Al Amr to decide 
on the expedient as a compromise under the Maslaha was the norm and not the exception.  While 
this dissertation agrees with some aspects of Hallaq’s conception of Western sovereignty, the 
central reservation is related to his methodological commitments. Accordingly, he explains 
sovereignty as follows:  
Inasmuch as it is inescapable for the modern state to be a historical contingency and thus of a 
context-specific provenance, it is also—if we speak of it as we must—a constructed entity; that is, 
161 
 
it must consist of something or things, whether these are real or fictional, material or conceptual, 
mythical or symbolic. The concept of sovereignty is one such form-property that remains, despite 
the changes the state has undergone over the last two centuries or so, one of its hallmarks. While 
all premodern rule was sustained by certain political and ideological structures, the modern state 
is unique in its impersonal character, an abstract concept that lies at the heart of its legitimacy. 
The abstractness of sovereignty therefore requires the evaluation of the state not only as an 
empirical set of differentiated institutions but also as an ideological structure that both pervades 
and orders the state’s social matrix. (Hallaq 2013, 27-28) 
 
That sovereignty is an enduring core concept of modernity means that it orders the physical and 
metaphysical according to its logic. Thus, non-European people must confront modernity as a 
political and social fact that holds a different logic from that of their local culture. For Sunni 
Islam, this condition requires changes and reorganization in the role of Sunni authority in public 
and private realms, which logically produces new legal and political order around new 
legitimacies in relation to the modern nation-state according to the logical necessities of 
sovereignty.  
 
This dissertation disagrees with Hallaq’s understanding of Islam and modernity on the 
ground that he uses the logic of sovereignty in his method to explain the condition of Muslims in 
modernity. Accordingly, he uses a European methodological model constructed around a 
sovereign core and then applies the logic of his method to Islam ignoring how Sunni Islam 
constructs subjectivities according to the logic of Sunni authority. He borrows from Carl Schmitt 
the methodological notions that are constructed around European sovereignty and applies them 
directly to describe Islam and Muslims. Ahsanuddin clarifies the point:  
In framing his argument, Prof. Hallaq utilizes Carl Schmitt’s notion of “central” and “peripheral” 
domains, or the primariness/secondariness of certain communal pursuits, to assess the 
weltanschauungs that define the modern state and premodern Islamic governance. According to 
Schmitt, the central domain defines a worldview because the objectives of the central domain 
constitute the primary objectives for the worldview. The peripheral domain, on the other hand, 
includes objectives of lesser importance: “the problems of other domains are solved in terms of 
the central domain – they are considered secondary problems, whose solution follows as a matter 
of course only if the problems of the central domain are solved.” Yet Hallaq distinguishes his 
162 
 
approach from Schmitt by emphasizing “the centrality of the values adopted in the central domain 
as ideal values that remain the distinctive desiderata and the locus of purposive action and 
thought,” even though the values and ideals may not be realized. (Ahsanuddin. 14) 
 
Thus, Hallaq constructs a method of analysis around the logic of European sovereign core where 
the “Truth” of the system guides the entire system of meaning as a paradigm. In contrast, this 
dissertation argues that authority of experts in Sunni Islam constructs different subjectivities and 
notions of the self than those constructed around European sovereignty. This is the logical 
justification of the role of Ulu Al Amr in the Sunni Fiqh. Their role was primarily as harmonizers 
similar to Islamic philosophy that harmonized Greek philosophy around God. Consequently, 
there is no body or a church in Sunni Islam that can claim “Truth” knowledge in Islam.  
 
Once Hallaq constructs his method on the Schmittian notion of “central” and “peripheral” 
domains of power and knowledge he differentiates his method by claiming that:  
While Schmitt is right in insisting on the central domain as a driving force, our account of 
paradigm emphasizes the centrality of the values adopted in the central domain as ideal values 
that remain the distinctive desiderata and the locus of purposive action and thought, even when 
their application and realization are not always achieved and even when the competing forces 
within the domains constituting the paradigm undermine such application and realization. For 
paradigms represent fields of “force relations,” encompassing opposing and competing discourses 
and strategies. This is what led Foucault to declare that these discourses of power, in their 
oppositional trajectories, are inseparable, for discourses “are tactical elements or blocks operating 
in a field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the 
same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy 
to another, opposing strategy.” If power is to deserve the name it bears, if it were to produce 
effects over its subjects, then its processes and strategies—in their confluence and opposition—
must yield such effects that both directly and obliquely flow from these processes and strategies. 
(Hallaq 2013, 17) 
 
This is precisely the reason behind his claim that an Islamic state will always stand in 
contradiction to modernity since European sovereignty of the “modern states debased 
considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously sanctified the 
doctrine of progress considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously 
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sanctified the doctrine of progress. This preference of “is” over “ought,” of progress over 
morality, is perhaps most visibly demonstrated in the destruction of the environment and the 
various inequalities and ills that plague society” (Hallaq 2013, 13). Consequently, the European 
subject sits comfortably in a world of political projects based on the “is” while the Muslim 
subject struggles hopelessly to achieve the “ought” rendering him incompatible with modernity.  
The aim here is to deny agency to both Western and non-Western subjects. Hallaq’s account 
renders emancipatory project and struggles against power such as the global left and feminism as 
meaningless achievements. Moreover, he nullifies the free, autonomous, and reflexive subject 
whether European or non-European.  
Conversely, this dissertation demonstrated in the previous chapter the struggles between 
temporal power and Ulu Al Amr to legitimize the dynastic rule of the Umayyad and the 
Abbasids. The absence of agency in his method I argue is due to his reliance exclusively on 
Schmitt’s method in explaining the core character of Sharia. In contrast, this dissertation uses the 
“exception” thesis of Schmitt but only in relation to the local core character of Ulu Al Amr and 
authority in Sunni Islam. Thus, the legal structure of authority in Sunni Islam operating via Ulu 
Al Amr demonstrates that Sharia is not a closed system applying metaphysical legal standards. 
Instead, historically the task of Ulu Al Amr is to harmonize the Sharia with the social and 
political changes the Muslims encountered in their history. And modernity and sovereignty is 
another phase in history. More precisely, Sharia is an adaptive form of authority relationships 
that changed in accordance to Maslaha and it was not an ideal system imposed on the material 
world. 
Thus, while throughout the dissertation the emphasis is on the difference between a 
system of meaning that is based on European sovereignty and a Sunni system of meaning based 
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on authority, human agency remains my central claim. The centrality of authority in the absence 
of sovereignty in Islam’s system of meaning was not the result of “paradigmatic Islamic 
governance” alone, as Hallaq claims, but the result of textual and historical circumstances that 
thrust Ulu Al Amr in the role of authority in Sunni Islam with its particular type of obedience. 
The following section will analyze the concept of European sovereignty in relation to Sunni 
authority while avoiding the absence of agency in Hallaq’s account.  
First, modernity produced fundamental changes in the physical and metaphysical realms 
on a global scale by holding time and space in a specific relationship that created new realities 
constructed around a specific logic of sovereignty. Carl Schmitt explains this claim as follow: 
All pre-global orders were essentially terrestrial, even if they encompassed sea powers and 
thalassocracies. The originally terrestrial world was altered in the Age of Discovery, when the 
earth first was encompassed and measured by the global consciousness of European peoples. This 
resulted in the first nomos of the earth. It was based on a particular relation between the spatial 
order of firm land and the spatial order of free sea, and for 400 years it supported a Eurocentric 
international law: the jus publicum Europaeum. In the 16th century, it was England that dared to 
take the step from a terrestrial to a maritime existence. A further step was taken with the 
industrial revolution, in the course of which the earth was newly conceived and newly measured. 
It was essential that the industrial revolution occurred in the country that first had taken the step 
to a maritime existence. This is the point at which we can approach the mystery of the new nomos 
of the earth. (49) 
 
Schmitt argues that the new terrestrial and maritime nomos changes the relationship between 
physical and metaphysical affect that is universal in character. Clearly, the new nomos depends 
on the military might of Great Britain whose global colonization redefined international law 
according to the logic of the new nomos of the earth, which has sovereignty at its core. More 
precisely, at apex of this nomos is the mysterious sovereign power “who decides on the 
exception” (Schmitt 2005, 5). This sovereign is above the law with emergency powers to decide 
when to suspend the law. Accordingly, “Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and 
indivisible, which cannot be participated in and admits of no degrees, and which belongs to the 
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Sovereign independently of the political whole, as a right of his own” (Maritain 1951, 38). Thus, 
the quality of the sovereign as an entity above and separate from the collective is central to the 
ability of the sovereign to disrupt the political process and suspend the laws even in democratic 
political systems. “Accordingly, law and legitimacy emanate for the agent who is at the same 
time a temporal and transcendental actor, the highest in power, the final power, general in effect, 
and finally independent” (Jackson 2007, 92-94).  The supernatural extraordinary powers of the 
sovereign are theological, and Christian qualities exist in contemporary modernity in secular 
qualities.  
How and why does the sovereign possess such qualities? Moreover, who is the 
sovereign? The answer is in the historical, social, and political conditions of Europe in its path 
from medieval Christianity to contemporary modernity. Thus, the medieval European holds the 
seeds of modern contemporary secular concepts of modernity. “The idea of sovereignty was 
expediently arranged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by European rulers in the course 
of their rivalries and struggles, religious and secular. Political and legal thinkers captured the 
idea, its modus operandi and its underlying principles, in commentaries on the subject. Those 
commentaries are interdisciplinary: the idea is at the heart of political and legal theory, 
diplomatic as well as religious history, constitutional law and international law” (Jackson 2007, 
1). As such, understanding contemporary political and legal concepts requires understanding the 
theological aspects that must be investigated and taken into account. In this context, the political 
writing of Carl Schmitt successfully captures the theological character of the contemporary 
secular concept of sovereignty. For example, he argues that:  
Whether God alone is sovereign, that is, the one who acts as his acknowledged representative on 
earth, of the emperor, or prince, or the people, meaning those who identify themselves directly 
with the people, the question is always aimed at the subject of sovereignty, at the application of 
the concept to a concrete situation. Ever since the sixteenth century, jurists who discuss the 
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question of sovereignty have derived their ideas from a catalogue of determining, decisive 
features of sovereignty that can in essence be traced to the points made by Bodin. To possess 
those powers meant to be sovereign. (10)  
 
Accordingly, the religious question regarding sovereignty remained the same throughout the 
evolution of the European legal system from emperor to prince and finally to the people. The 
religious qualities of God’s representative on earth share Divine characteristics that then 
transferred to the emperor, or prince, or the people in the modern era, “but it is not fixed and 
unchanging. On the contrary, it has evolved and taken on different personas over time: it has 
been reformulated periodically to fit the demands and exigencies of specific historical periods or 
episodes” (Jackson 2007, 1).  Yet, the enduring, supernaturally religious quality of sovereignty 
as a link between the physical and metaphysical realms transferred from God’s incarnation to 
emperor, prince, the people, and later the self, all of which are constituted as the same 
supernatural character of a Sovereign God contextualized in personalized, earthly emancipatory 
struggles against power and oppression. Jean Bethke Elshtain explains this personalization 
process in the following quote: 
This personalization of earthly rule is documented masterfully in Ernest Kantorowicz’s classic, 
The King’s Two Bodies, as he unpacks the king’s “twinned nature,” embodied in mortal “natural” 
man and the office which perdures in perpetuity with another “body” holding that office when a 
previous fleshy monarch dies: the King is dead. Long live the King! The king comes to supplant 
the pope as the mediator between the earthly and the divine. Thus, in the embodied account, “the 
king appears the perfect christomimetes … with regard to power, since his power is the same as 
that of Christ... the One who is God and Anointed by nature, acts through his royal vicar who is 
‘God and Christ by Grace.” The will of the ruler brings the body to life. The head must “literally 
by an individual mind or will. Most clearly of all, supreme power we cannot be except…in one,” 
else it would be supreme. (62)  
 
By sharing the qualities of a sovereign God, the earthly sovereign is able to rule over of his 
subject with laws that emanate from his body. Thus, the European masses in their struggle must 
possess the same supernatural quality to be successful in revolting against the sovereign’s laws 
and liberate themselves from his tyranny. Nevertheless, it is this supernatural quality of 
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sovereignty and the sovereign that holds sway in modernity. It is the ability to put the sovereign 
and the sovereign nation state above all as an article of faith. It is the link the holds the physical 
and metaphysical world together in a way meaningful to the subject who is now a citizen of the 
nation state. Susan Buck-Morss explains this essential quality as:  
The sovereign figure as personification of the collective demonstrates the power of the visible 
image to close the circle between constituting and constituted power, explaining why even when 
the illegalities of an individual sovereign are exposed, the faith of the believer is still not shaken. 
As long as the circle appears closed, sovereign power remains intact; likewise, and conversely, as 
long as sovereign power remains intact, the circle appears closed. The closing of the circle 
demands a miracle, and the icon of the sovereign figure provides it. (2) 
It is this enigmatic quality of the sovereign that persists in modernity. Accordingly, as “a 
metaphysical figure, the sovereign connects the world of lived politics with the Platonic world of 
eternal forms. The legitimacy of political power continues even in secular modernity to maintain 
this ideal connection” (Buck-Morss 2007, 3). It is this religious quality of sovereignty that is 
globalized with the advent of modernity, and it is the new environment that all non-European 
people around the world must configure accordingly to their local legal, political, economic, and 
social world.  Thus, “the truth of the matter is that politics and religion are never severed from 
each other so long as the figure of the sovereign holds sway. ‘All significant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,’ writes Schmitt, and none more 
so than sovereignty” (Buck Morss 2007, 3). The consequences of this conception of sovereignty 
are amplified further once it is transferred to other parts of the system of meaning.  
This is precisely the argument of Jean Bethke Elshtain who claims in “Sovereignty: God, 
State, and Self” that the birth of the new logic of sovereignty was historically a consequence of a 
change in the conceptualization of Western Christendom’s God from a God of love and miracles 
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to a willful God. Accordingly, this transformation of the Christian conception of a willful God 
was transferred to the state and finally to the self. Explaining her claim, she argues: 
A streamline version of my thesis would go like this: As sovereign state is to sovereign God, so 
sovereign selves are to sovereign states. Given that sovereignty in the political sense “names” 
self-determination for a territorial, collective entity, it is altogether unsurprising that this logic of 
sovereignty came unbound and migrated, becoming attached more and more to notions of the 
self. (159) 
 
Ipso facto, modern subjectivities and the self are embedded in the European characteristics of 
sovereignty. They are present in the universal concepts of justice, freedom, equality, and 
autonomy. These universal concepts are expressed in a European historical framework that, 
rightly so, attaches to them local qualities, which are necessary to make them meaningful.  
Herbert Marcuse provides a historical evolution of the rise of the modern sovereign, but 
in his example he argues that the Christian conception of freedom and its attitude toward 
authority necessitated the rise of the sovereign. Marcuse differs from Elshtain in regard to the 
causal direction of the evolution of the sovereign. In his case the Protestant conception of 
freedom and attitude toward the external world necessitate the rise of the sovereign and the 
territorial state. Nevertheless, Marcuse’s argument confirms the centrality of Christianity in the 
rise of the sovereign. It is with Immanuel Kant that the theological basis of modernity is 
secularized. The following quote illustrates the point:  
The Protestantism of Luther and Calvin which gave the Christian doctrine of freedom its decisive 
form for bourgeois society, is bound up with the emergence of a new, “young” society which had 
first to conquer its right to exist in a bitter struggle against existing authorities. Faced with the 
universal bonds of traditionalist feudalism it absolutely required the liberation of the individual 
within the earthly order as well (the individual free subject of the economic sphere later 
essentially became the model of its concept of the individual) – it required the liberation of the 
territorial sovereign from the authority of an internationally centralized Church and a central 
imperial power. It further required the liberation of the “conscience” from numerous religious and 
ethical norms in order to clear the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie. In all these directions an 
antiauthoritarian attitude was necessary…’ (Marcuse 2008, 9-10) 
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Thus, the rise of the sovereign required a theological notion of the self that would assert certain 
claims to autonomy and freedom against the church and the sovereign king. That autonomous 
self would, in turn, produce secularized conceptions of freedom in modernity.  
In sum, “to be sovereign means to exercise absolute power over one's self and one's fate. 
But another way of putting this is that the sovereign — whether it is a god, a king, a state, or a 
mere self — cannot be held answerable to anyone. When push comes to shove, sovereignty 
always trumps law and morals” (Adam Kirsch, 2008). This is precisely the local European 
characters of the universal concepts freedom, equality, and autonomy that should not be 
universalized on global struggles against power. More accurately, the European framing of these 
concepts is not the only process of development of modern subjectivity nor is it the 
universalization of these concepts. Thus, according to the European historical record, struggles 
against a sovereign with supernatural qualities are embodied in Western hostility to all forms of 
external religious and secular authority. This hostility is necessary to emancipate the self from 
the web of supernatural qualities and is precisely the local European context that requires the 
subject to act hostilely and skeptically to external authorities and constraints, which emanate 
from the sovereign. But that certainly does not mean the struggle is to be applied similarly 
without taking into account the local qualities and context of the struggles for justice, freedom, 
equality, and autonomy. The consequences of these supernatural qualities of the sovereign and 
sovereignty are enormous in terms of the formation of subjectivities and struggles against power. 
More important, these qualities are directly related to the project of the modern subject in 
relation to the external world, laws, and authorities.  
But what are the consequences of the absence of supernatural qualities in the Sunni Islam 
system of meanings? How are the formation of the subject and subjectivities constituted? What 
170 
 
obstacles frame the emancipatory project of the subject if the internal and external or the 
physical and metaphysical realms are framed absent of a sovereignty with supernatural qualities? 
If the Christian subject “as ‘internally’ free being man is born into a social order which, while it 
may have been posited or permitted by God, by no means represents the realm in which the 
existence or non-existence of man is decided upon. Whatever the nature of this order may be, the 
inner freedom of man (his pure belief and his pure will, provided they remain pure) cannot be 
broken in it. ‘The power of the temporal authority, whether it does right or wrong, cannot harm 
the soul’” (Marcuse 2008, 9).   
 
Conversely, subjectivity in Sunni Islam is constituted and framed according to the 
subject’s understanding of the relationship between the physical and metaphysical realms or the 
internal and external world as they stand in relation to one another. This dissertation claims that 
the absence of duality in Sunni subjectivity nullifies the role of a temporal sovereign in the Sunni 
system. Hence, freedom and emancipatory struggles are not framed dualistically, as they are 
Protestantism, in a relationship of sovereignties, which set the trajectory of the unfolding of 
modernity. Marcuse argues that Christian subjectivity constitutes the world as dual oppositional 
realms internal/external. The consequence of his theological account ultimately leads back to the 
Fall. According to Marcuse:  
The Christian doctrine of freedom pushes the liberation of man back until it pre-dates his actual 
history, which then, as the history of his unfreedom, becomes an “eternal” consequence of this 
liberation. In fact, strictly speaking there is no liberation of man in history according to this 
doctrine or, to put it more precisely, Christian doctrine has good reasons for viewing such a 
liberation as primarily something negative and evil, namely the partial liberation from God, the 
achievement of freedom to sin (as symbolized by the Fall)…As “internally” free being man is 
born into a social order which, while it may have been posited or permitted by God, by no means 
represents the realm in which the existence or non-existence of man is decided upon. Whatever 
the nature of this order may be, the inner freedom of man (his pure belief and his pure will, 
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provided they remain pure) cannot be broken in it. “The power of the temporal authority, whether 
it does right or wrong, cannot harm the soul.” (8-9) 
It is precisely these local qualities that frame the universal emancipatory project and 
subjectivities in a particular order that must be taken into account to construct a global struggle 
against power and the oppression of the weak. Overlooking such local qualities usually leads to 
the confirmation of Ali Mirsepassi’s claim that modernity and modernization are mere discourses 
of power to dominate the other. By insisting on universalizing the local qualities of European 
sovereignty in discussions and debates about universal projects of struggles and emancipation 
leads to discourses of power that:  
(1) [define] the “Third World” as a singular essentialized entity not in terms of its own existing 
qualities, but in term if “First World” qualities which it lacks… 
(2) [define] contemporary conditions in the Third World in terms of abstracted conditions of 
European historical experience; the Third World is seen as embodying aspects of Europe’s past 
(feudalism, etc.)…  
(3) [make] the assumptions that only one essential path to modernity exists in the world, and 
Europe has experienced this path in advance of non-Western world. (Mirsepassi 2000, 8) 
 
Accordingly, the insistence on looking at the world exclusively form a European subjectivity as 
the only “True” self, is to nullify global emancipatory projects and struggles again the oppression 
of power. Oppression is universal but unfolds in a local context based on geographical frames of 
reference. Thus, this dissertation claims that there is much to gain from theorizing the 
commonalities in Sunni Islam and European subjectivity for a dialogue about social justice, 
tolerance, freedom, equality, and dignity.  
Similarly, the conception of the self in Sunni Islam frames the subject according to local, 
historical, social, and political conditions. Absent a sovereign in the European sense, Sunni Islam 
situates the formation of the self against the backdrop of its own local, historical circumstances.  
In this case, the duality of the internal and external world in relation to liberty has no significance 
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in Sunni subjectivity.  The physical and metaphysical divide as a problem in the mind of the 
subject is absent. The question of the return to Adam’s innocence before the Fall as the original 
the ideal condition for emancipatory struggles against power is not present in Islamic subjectivity 
in general. To explain this point further the Islamic political theorist Eltigani A. Hamid gives us 
an account of the Fall according to the Qur’an and its political consequences. He chooses Surat 
al-Araf (chapter seven) and divides the chapter it into sections for the purpose of understanding 
the origins of political thought in the Makkan (the chapters and verses that were revealed during 
the first ten years of the Qur’an in Mecca). This verse in the Qur’an:  
Presents a conceptual framework of the reality of the human condition. It deals with the relations 
between humans and God, human beings and themselves, and human beings and the universe. 
Two main concepts can readily be defined: 1. All human beings are created from a single soul, 
and have a sound innate nature (fitrah salimah). God has established them on earth, and made it a 
source of sustenance for them. 2. All human beings are under God’s command. He sends 
messengers to humankind chosen from among themselves, to convey His commands to them; and 
the people must renounce all other forms of allegiance, follow the guidance of their messenger, 
and devote themselves fully to their Creator and sole Sovereign…All human beings are created 
from a single soul, and have a sound innate nature. God has established them on earth, and made 
it a source of sustenance for them. (Hamid 2004, 32-33) 
 
The material/spiritual or the physical/metaphysical realms are not separate, and with a different 
narrative of the Fall, they do not stand in binary opposition. Subjectivity is based on a continuum 
between the two realms in relation to the liberty, resistance, and dignity of the subject. Therefore, 
the Sunni subject does not frame liberty and resistance to power based on the Protestant divide of 
internal/external; instead, obedience to external authority is the frame of resistance against 
arbitrary temporal power. That obedience prevents temporal power from legislating moral laws 
or locating itself above the moral. More precisely, the subject’s constitution of the self unfolds 
against the background of the local quality in which there is an absence of a supernatural or 
enigmatic earthly power.  
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In this context the interpretation of Sharia via the external authority Ulu Al Amr is the 
subject’s field of struggle against oppression and a constraint on power. The historical struggle in 
Sunni Islam is over the usurpation of Sharia by temporal power’s bending of the meaning of the 
Qur’an and Sunna attempts to legitimize oppression and injustice. Thus, the central difference 
here is that temporal power in Sunni Islam never achieved the supernatural status of the 
European sovereign.  The historical dilemma of temporal power in Islam is how to usurp Sharia 
and the authority of Ulu Al Amr. The lack of religious icons or a miracle of incarnation in Sunni 
Islam’s system of meaning deprived temporal power of the ability to acquire sacred or 
supernatural qualities. Thus, the entire edifice of Fiqh al siyash al shariah revolves around the 
question of the legitimacy of temporal power and why and when Muslim subjects must obey or 
disobey. Moreover, the very same condition devolves on Ulu Al Amr as experts who decide on 
the legal conditions of obedience, which is what in Sharia lends it legitimacy. On the other hand, 
in Islam temporal power achieves legitimacy through realist accounts and compromise based on 
the legal principle of the Maslaha of the Umma, i.e., the good of the community. This task is in 
the hands of members of the community, the Ulu Al Amr, whose legitimacy is based on legal 
expertise not supernatural qualities. Therefore, in Sunni Islam the subject’s autonomy, freedom, 
and equality are attached to the interpretation and meaning of the law. Historically, the success 
of emancipatory movements against temporal power and oppression depends on the ability to 
hold temporal power to the movements’ interpretation of Sharia. Hence, it is absolutely central 
for any Muslim emancipatory project that the authority of Ulu Al Amr remains free from the 
usurpation of temporal power. This is precisely the unfolding of struggle in the history of the 
Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah.  
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This dissertation argues that the root difference between Sunni authority and Western 
sovereignty finds its articulation in the Christian and Islamic accounts of the Fall. It follows that 
accounts of the Fall are relevant to conceptions of sovereignty. Embedded in the European 
subject are attitudes about how power in the external world is framed, and that framing is related 
to the presence of a supernatural sovereign with supernatural qualities. This discussion will be 
revisited again later in the chapter but for now the focus is on the consequences of the 
displacement of Sunni authority by the European concept of sovereignty. 
 
For Islam, modernity and colonialism share the same historical roots of violence. They 
have made the European sovereign nation-state an unavoidable historical fact. Thus, “as far as 
the Middle East was concerned, it was generally the dominant colonial power that first created 
the essential features of a modern state, by giving it a centralized administration, a legal system, 
a flag and internationally recognized boundaries” (Owen 1998, 6). As a result, new identities of 
national language and geographical territories were constructed according to European notions of 
the self. Furthermore, “the new states were also given new bureaucracies and a new emphasis on 
homogeneity and equality. There was now to be one center of authority, issuing standard rules 
and regulations which were supposed to be applied equally to all those who lived within its 
boundaries as citizens” (Owen 1998, 10). At the same time, it was the presence of the military 
and its use of force that made these new states possible and created a legacy of states structured 
by oppressive modern armies.   
Violence displaced Sunni authority and put in place new European constructs, that is to 
say the modern sovereign state, without organic, local negotiations.  The ripple effect of this 
modernization can still be observed in the ideological divide that haunts the Arab Spring states. 
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The response to the historical moment of European colonialism and domination divided local 
responses over how best to reform and challenge this new reality making it a critical junction for 
the reform movements in the region. Historically, local responses can be divided around the 
ideological spilt that divided Islamist and national projects. These ideological divides were 
fundamental and produced different subjectivities based on a European sovereignty of universal 
principles and values or Sunni authority.  
The intensity of the ideological divide varied geographically from one region to another 
and varied according to whether  political system were kingdoms,  monarchies, or republics. In 
Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen divisions were overlapping, while in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf monarchies the division was less pronounced. Furthermore, the intensity of this division 
varied within the same republic or monarchy with the in split urban centers clearer than in rural 
areas.  
 
In this section I will focus on the Ottoman Empire with its principal Sunni political 
structure the Sunni Caliphate. The declining Ottoman Empire was a member of an international 
system in which major European powers were expanding globally. These major powers 
redefined the international system according to their domestic legal codes and customs. Once 
they expanded globally, they defined international law according to the core logic of their own 
laws.  These external forces and constraints shaped the Ottoman Empire to structure itself 
according to European conceptions of sovereignty.  This globalized process has created a modern 
epoch of European hegemony, which codified European conceptions of sovereignty in 
international law through agreements such as the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
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and Duties of States. Accordingly, a sovereign state has a fixed population, a defined territory, 
and a functioning government.    
Consequently, in response to European powers the Khalifs of the Ottoman Empire 
embarked on the modernization of domestic institutions with the goal of emulating centralized 
European bureaucracies. The resulting institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr in the person of the 
Grand Mufti in the state bureaucracy was a logical outcome of the modern-state. The Ottoman 
Empire was willing to endanger historical institutions that eventually lead to the unraveling of 
the logic of Sunni authority. Nafi and Taji-Farouki describe this process as follow:  
With the rise of the bureaucratized Islamic empires in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, two 
major developments came to affect the position of the ulama. First was the incorporation of a 
large segment of the ulama class into structures of the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul states. 
Second was increasing identification of the Sufi tariqas with the ulama institutions. While leading 
to a marked reduction in intellectual diversity within the ulama class as a whole, and limiting the 
degree of freedom they enjoyed relative to that ulama of preceding centuries, these developments 
did not diminish the influence of the ulama. On the contrary: the pervasive diffusion of Sufi 
tariqas in Muslim society and the instrument of the state that had thus become available of 
“official” ulama in fact consolidated and added further dimensions to the ulama’s status and 
influence in society. By the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, sweeping 
transformation produced by the modernisation programs and the experience of European 
imperialism were leaving their impact on the position of the ulama, opening the doors for the 
eventual emergence of new spokesmen for Islam. (Nafi/Taji-Farouki. 6) 
 
Interestingly, the authors claim that the authority of the Ulama was further strengthened and 
consolidated once they became an institutionalized body of the Empire. Yet, by turning Ulu Al 
Amr into a tool of temporal power the consequence of this political maneuver historically 
undermined the paradigmatic legal concept of Sunni authority that underlay the entire legal, 
social, and political system. Similarly, Esposito and Voll argue that “in some major areas, like 
the Ottoman Empire, the ulama had become an institutionalized part of the ruling system. This 
gave real power to the scholar but opened the way for the organizations of scholars to become 
closely tied to political institutions that were subject to decline” (14). And that “by the era of 
peak of power of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, the ‘official’ ulama were a 
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significant part of the state structure and the institutions of the status quo” (Esposito/ Voll 2001, 
9). Historically the Ottoman Empire established close ties between temporal power and the 
institutional Ulu Al Amr.  Actually, the Ottoman Empire provided the tool that was essential to 
later political entities erected on its ruins. The institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr, which later 
established the post of the Grand Mufti, effectively created a church and an official state religion. 
The Grand Mufti was elevated to the role of sole speaker on behalf of the faith instead of the 
class of Ulu Al Amr who may disagree with one another. The new post could be easily turned 
into a rubberstamp of temporal power. The entire process and change, in the guise of a legal 
principle, usurped the legitimacy of Ulu Al Amr authority through the violence of temporal 
power. This was a central moment in the history of Sunni Islam where for the first time temporal 
power was at the apex of the political structure, and force was effectively exercised over Sharia 
and justified by Sharia. Yet, it must be noted that Ottoman Caliphate were able to introduce 
drastic changes to the Empire as long as they appeared to adhere during the process to “the most 
fundamental duty of a Muslim ruler, and that which both expressed and strengthened his 
alliances with the Muslim population, was to maintain the shari’a” (Hounrani 1991, 223).This 
could not have been achieved unless temporal power was free from historical ties to the authority 
of Ulu Al Amr. Consequently, only a change in the legal logic of the entire system would allow 
such a massive scale of change and enable the empire to introduce foundational changes in all 
aspects of life. A similar process was taking place in independent Egypt and other parts of the 
region. Consequently, these new modern changes undermined the remaining authority of Ulu Al 
Amr or the Grand Mufti effectively marginalizing them/him form the social, political, economic, 
and legal structure of the Empire.  For example: 
Modern education brought with it new disciplines, depriving the ulama of their centuries-old 
monopoly of the educational process. At the same time, it produced new types of professionals 
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and intellectuals, for whom the traditional Islamic knowledge of the ulama was becoming 
increasingly irrelevant. Similarly, modern court systems based on foreign legal procedures and 
laws, and the appropriation of the legislation process itself by the centralized state, undermined 
the law. The waqf sector, a major source if the economic power of the ulama and of their 
economic independence, was largely taken over by the modern state in the nineteenth century, 
and finally abolished in many Muslim countries during the course of the twentieth century. (Nafi/ 
Taji-Farouki 2004, 6) 
  
Similarly, Mohammed Ali Pasha (1769-1849) single handedly embarked on the task of 
modernizing Egypt (once a part of the Ottoman Empire) into a nation with a central power and a 
modern bureaucracy. Consequently, a massive project was established displacing traditional 
institutions on an unparalleled scale. It dismantled the social, economic, and political sectors of 
society that depended on Sharia for its legitimacy. Esposito and Voll illustrate this process of 
decline in the legal role of the Ulama: 
The majority of the ulama in the most Muslim societies emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century as a declining conservative force. The educational institutions under their control lost 
resources, students, and influence and in many places were simply taken over by the states, which 
were increasingly dominated by secularist modernizers. Perhaps the major symbolic culmination 
of this trend was the nationalization in 1961 of the great historic Islamic university of al-Azhar in 
Cairo. The justification was the need to “train a new generation committed to and capable of 
contributing to modernization and development. As a result, the university lost much of its 
independence both academically and politically. (Esposito/Voll 2001, 15) 
 
Moreover, in Tunis the dismantling process took the shape of uprooting Islamic centers such as 
“the Zaytouna, a famed center of Islamic learning in North Africa and the Muslim world, was 
closed. The ulama were debilitated, rather than, as occurred in many Muslim countries, coopted 
by the government” (Esposito/Voll 2001, 92). The symbolism signifies a divorce from the past. 
Al-Zaytouna had produced over its history important Muslim scholars such as Ibn Khaldun. The 
signal here was that these learning centers and institutions were no longer needed due to their 
“backwardness”. More important, specialists in Islamic law were no longer needed after the 
adaptation of French law to regulate personal and public life.   
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Once European imperialism conquered the Muslim empires and ruled over them, it was 
logical that the legitimacy of the entire system including Islam and its institutions was put in 
doubt and questioned by Muslim reformers. Consequently and for the first time ever, questions 
about the role of Islam in public life and the place of Islam as a state religion became central to 
those who wanted to reform the state. They became legitimate discussion topics and occupied 
center stage among contemporary reformers. More important, the hegemony of Sharia in public 
and private spheres was questioned and gradually replaced by the introduction of European laws. 
These practices marked a turning point in the history of Islam. It is important to note that such 
challenges to social and political reality were true to all non-European people who had their 
reality redefined and shaped in accordance of international law and at its core the European 
conception sovereignty, the nation-state. It was this new identity that the ruling elite of the 
Middle East adopted and that was imposed on the public as modernizing project for the state to 
achieve. Hallaq explains this process by arguing that “elsewhere, I have suggested that the 
postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of power they had inherited from the 
colonial experience and that, as a rule and after gaining so-called independence for their 
countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial policies they had fiercely 
fought against during the colonial period. They inherited from Europe a readymade nation-state 
(with its constitutive power structures) for which the existing social formations had not been 
adequately prepared” (16). 
 
The questions regarding the role of Islam and Sharia in public life and the state were 
never resolved intellectually or theologically. Furthermore, the institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr 
was an inevitable outcome of the legal exceptions of Wilayah al ahed leading to Wlayah al qaher 
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in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. The outcome of such judicial opinion produced permanent legal 
exceptions for temporal powers to use force under the legal category of Maslaha, as I illustrated 
in chapter four. This legal concession to temporal power set in motion an evolutionary legal 
trajectory that increased the power of the Caliphate and brought about a decline in the 
independence and authority of Ulu Al Amr. Thus, once temporal power was able to expand its 
domain of power under Sharia there was no turning back to a smaller role in the social and 
political spheres. Thus, following the steps of the Umayyad and the Abbasid empires, the 
Ottomans Caliphate were set on the path of increasing its power via more exceptions and 
concessions, thereby undermining the independence of Ulu Al Amr’s authority. This historical 
change in the legal and political structures resulted in a paradigmatic change in the relationship 
between power and authority in the Sunni legal structure. Temporal power in the nineteenth 
century was finally above Sharia shaping according to needs and necessities of the modern 
nation-state. Accordingly, the institutionalized Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti became a tool of state 
power to legitimize the state monopoly of the use of force regardless of Sharia.  Thus the 
replacement of Sunni legal concepts of authority with European sovereignty was never 
negotiated or open to a debate. Instead, force was the dominant instrument to impose the new 
change both by the occupying imperial powers and the local elites that ruled the region in the 
postcolonial era.  
Yet, all monarchies and republics that resulted from dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
followed the footsteps of the Ottoman Empire by institutionalizing the Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti 
as a component of the modern state apparatus and turning it into a mouthpiece to state-power. 
This phenomenon presents us with an interesting question: Why self-professed secular states 
such as, Turkey or Tunisia, establish state institutions such a ministry of theology and a Grand 
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Mufti? This dissertation argues that the answer is in the process of how European sovereignty 
displaced Sunni authority. More precisely the institutionalization Ulu Al Amr as part of the 
apparatus of the sovereign nation-state undermined the legitimacy of their legal authority in the 
eyes of the Sunni Muslims throughout the region. Thus, imposing the legal concept of European 
sovereignty led to the democratization of the post of Ulu Al Amr which eventually led to the rise 
of political Islam in the twentieth century as a reform movement challenging legitimacy of rulers 
and the state. This dissertation labels this reforming class of Ulu Al Amr the “modern Ulu Al 
Amr” and argues that modernity and sovereignty forced Islamic empires to reorganize their 
domestic structures to institutionalize Ulu Al Amr and effectively establish a church as part of the 
state bureaucracy, which dismantled the authority of the entire system. Consequently, the 
delegitimization of Ulu Al Amr’s authority undermined state institutions in economic, social and 
political matters. Thus, the ruling power unintentionally provided the new Ulu Al Amr an 
opportunity to be a new class in charge of reconciling Islam with the universal concepts of 
modernity such as sovereignty, democracy, equality, and freedom.   
 
In chapter three we discussed the concept of authority and the nature of obedience in 
Sunni Islam that made authority and not power the paradigmatic legal concept that entire system 
is constructed around. This problematic of power is directly related to the question on how and 
who legitimately rules Muslims. As the Prophet did not designate a ruler or a designate a system 
of governance for the community, this task was historically developed in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al 
shariah according to the legal of Maslaha or expedience according to what is good for 
community. The Qur’an as a primary source of the Sharia made no demands on Muslims to 
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obey a king, emperor, Sultan, or Khalifa.  Instead, the only command in the Qur’an is obedience 
to Ulu Al Amr and only according to the teachings of God and the Prophet.  
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. (4:59) 
 
The violence that followed the death of the Prophet, what Donner has dubbed the First Civil War 
(35-40 AH /656-661 CE) and Second Civil War (60-73AH /680-692 CE), is a testament to the 
inability of temporal powers to enforce a sense of legality without the sanctions of the authority 
of Ulu Al Amr.  The ripple effect of the violence committed in the early history of Islam is still 
present with us today dividing Muslims into Sunni and Shia Islam. Thus, Wilayah al ahed and 
Wlayah al qaher are not commands or injunction in the Qur’an and the Sunna. Instead, these 
legal principles were developed via legal authority of Ulu Al Amr under the legal principle of 
Maslaha or expedience. Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (1263 – 1328 CE) noted that the 
more Muslims departed in history away for the founding period of Islam the more they need to 
rely on  Fiqh al awalyyat (i.e. legislating in accordance of the expedient rather than what is legal 
according to Sharia). Fiqh al awalyyat is based on sacrificing a legal principle expediently to 
implement a more important principle according to Maslaha e.g. the good of Umma the 
community. Accordingly, Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah and ultimately the body of Sharia is a 
product of the centuries Ulu Al Amr’s rulings in accordance to Maslaha or expediency in specific 
historical moments and not a set of divine injunctions. Moreover, he comments on how Ulu Al 
Amr authority avoided direct clash with temporal power especially after the Second Civil War by 
emphasizing the three principles that the evolution of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah is based 
on. The first principle is the spread of Islam; the second is the legality of the temporal power; 
and finally the unity of the Umma. He further argues that all three principals were present during 
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Prophetic rule and the Guided Caliphate. During later periods it was impossible to implement all 
three principals at once thus the legality of Khalifa was sacrificed on the condition that the other 
two principles are implemented. Hence, Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher were invented 
legal principles in accordance with Maslaha.  
 
 By the nineteenth century the decline of Muslim empires undermined the historical and 
legal justification of the Khalifa post rendering it meaningless and outdated. As I argued in 
chapter four, the legal exception granted to temporal power, is no longer applicable to the 
modern conditions of Muslim empires.  It was precisely the logical explanation behind the 
institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti during the Ottoman period that eliminated legal 
opinions that may have questioned the legitimacy of the Khalifa. The temporal powers of the 
Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul Empires followed the same legal process of institutionalizing Ulu 
Al Amr and effectively blocked any possible dissenting juridical opinions that may undermined 
the legitimacy of their power. Thus by institutionalizing Ulu Al Amr as a part of the state 
bureaucracy the outcome was the establishment of a state-church speaking on behalf of the 
sovereign who was no longer constrained by Sharia. Moreover, the sovereign is the new author 
of Sharia. As a result of this change in the pragmatic nature of Sunni authority any possible 
reform to the establishment was prevented since it would eventually lead to questioning the 
legitimacy of temporal rule. This apparent stagnation and lack of genuine reform in the 
established church of Ulu Al Amr and the empire set the stage for new energy and a reformer-led 
evolution in Islamic legal and political thought. Thus, while modernity was responsible for the 
paradigmatic shift in the nature of authority in Sunni Islam by simultaneously providing the 
physical and metaphysical force of institutionalizing Ulu Al Amr according to the logic of 
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sovereignty, it also allowed for the challenges to role of the modern Ulu Al Amr. Hence, this 
dissertation claims that the modern Ulu Al Amr are those reformers who appeared in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries setting the stage for the rise of political Islam. Their primary 
authority stems from their ability to challenge orthodoxy by appealing to new interpretation of 
tradition and calling for Ijtihad. They have been successful in capturing the public imaginary by 
clothing reformist thought in the language of Islam. The establishment Ulu Al Amr were and still 
are prevented from addressing the new challenges due to the replacement of Sunni authority with 
state sovereignty. As a result it is difficult to hide that they are state bureaucrats who are 
appointed for the purpose of sanctioning state action as Islamic in accordance with Sharia.  
The task of facing the new challenge has been further complicated by the intrusive nature 
of the modern state, which dominates every aspect of the life of its citizens. This domination was 
further amplified by the types of states that were established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire 
and postcolonial rule. They were authoritarian, intrusive, and undemocratic and further 
undermined the legitimacy of the institutionalized Ulu Al Amr’s authority. Moreover, the 
intrusive nature of the modern-state contradicts the minimal role of the state under Sharia, which 
regulates the state and keeps temporal power at check by governing Muslim social and economic 
lives. Thus, modernity, and the new class of Ulu Al Amr or nineteenth century reformers who 
were the products of modernity, and the legal concept of sovereignty, was directly responsible 
for the rise of the modern Ulu Al Amr and ultimately what came to be called Islamism or political 
Islam.  
This dissertation claims that advent of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839 –1897) and 
his disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849– 1905) signaled the arrival in the nineteenth century of the 
challenge of the modern Ulu Al Amr. Their key task was to be critical of the status quo, to 
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criticize simultaneously the establishment Ulu Al Amr, propose reforming the entire system, and 
call into question the legitimacy of the Khalifa. But certainly we are speaking here of a matter of 
degree from one person to another. But overall, they were critical of the established institution of 
Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti. They challenged their/his legal juridical justification of temporal power 
on the basis of fundamental physical and metaphysical questions. Nafi illustrates this new class’s 
critical challenge to the establishment: 
At the heart of the reformists’ call for ijtihad is their belief in the notion of ta ‘lil [definition], of 
intelligibility of God’s injunction…the reformist call for ijtihad became a modern-Islamic 
celebration of the objectivity of the law in Islam… Yet, reformist thought was not a mere 
reflection of theological and juristic preoccupation; it was not an idealist intellectual exercise, but 
rather an undertaking embedded in a specific socio-political context. Never since the Umayyad 
and early Abbasid periods was Islamic thought so interconnected with, and so expressive of, the 
socio-political questions of the time as reformist thought was, almost every single major idea of 
the reformists had socio-political implications. The reformist rejection of predestination (‘aqidat 
al-qadar, as Abduh put it) was not only an attack on the Ash’ari-Sufi ethos but essentially a 
denunciation of political despotism and its perceived inevitability. (43) 
Appealing to tradition to justify contemporary decline is no longer acceptable to the new class of 
individuals. They dismiss the appeal to authority and appealed to the Qur’an and Sunna as a 
source of authority by passing Fiqh al siyash al shariah and producing new legal arguments that 
they feel are adequate to addressing the crisis and decline. 
Thus, the question that requires further elaboration is: Who are the members of Ulu Al 
Amr and what do they have in common?  This dissertation claims that the modern Ulu Al Amr 
have four common characteristics. First, they are critical reformers and by definition they 
challenge the authority of the establishment and the state over the social, economic, and political 
conditions, and the direction of reform led by the state. Second, they are able to capture the 
imaginary mind of the public and have followers that share their views and hold them in high 
regard. Third, they use Qur’an and the Sunna to challenge the establishment and capture the 
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public mind. Finally, they don’t necessarily hold formal training in Sharia and Fiqh. This is 
precisely the democratizing consequence of modernity where religious/political matters are open 
for discussion and critique in the Muslim public sphere.  Accordingly, the modern Ulu Al Amr 
ranges from Al-Afghani, Al-Banna, Al-Ghannush, to Malcolm X. Or, it could be someone like 
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi “the leader of the self-proclaimed Islamic state that stretches across 
eastern Syria and much of northern and western Iraq...” (Rubin, 2014). The leader of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is an example of a return to the Ulu Al Amr during the founding 
period of the Four Guided Caliphs by uniting temporal power once more with piety by appearing 
in public for the first time leading the July 5
th
 Friday sermon in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. 
Al-Baghdadi tactically demonstrated his intensions during Friday sermon broadcast by all major 
global satellite Arabic news channels. He used the same words used by the First Caliph Abu 
Baker (573- 634 CE) in his well-known speech to the Umma by asking “for the congregation’s 
support and struck an almost humble and pious tone... ‘I was placed as your caretaker, and I am 
not better than you,’ he said” (Rubin, 2014). This demonstrates the importance of the founding 
period of Sunni Islam which is directly tied to the authority relationship between the authority 
and the Muslim Subject.  
Modernity and at its core European sovereignty, produced the modern Ulu Al Amr who 
are the “new spokesmen for Islam, lawyers, teachers, journalists or modern professionals, lacked 
the formal training of the ulama class along with its established criteria of learning and piety. 
Above all, they lacked the world-view of this class. What contributed yet further to the rupturing 
of traditional Islamic authority was the powerful case made by the Muslim reformers for 
reasserting the primacy of the foundational texts, the Qur’an and Sunna” (Taji-Farouki/ Nafi 
2008, 10). They assert their newly founded authority against the establishment Ulu Al Amr’s 
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claim on authority by appealing to a higher source of authority than the traditional foundations of 
Fiqh al siyash al shariah. We are back to the central verse 4:59 in the Qur’an, which concerns 
the conditions and the limitations of obedience to those in authority, for example, Ulu Al Amr in 
Sunni Islam. The modern Ulu Al Amr claim that once earlier members of Ulu Al Amr disagreed 
about the body of Sharia they produced new laws according to Maslaha, which then called for a 
return to the primary sources of the Qur’an and the Sunna. That return to primary sources is 
justified according to the Qur’an: 
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59 
 
Furthermore, since “those in authority among you” are regular learned individuals and are 
neither saints nor supernatural beings, their opinion once challenged is conditioned by the 
situations and cases to which they are applied. In this sense, a disagreement arises from the 
applicability of Fiqh al siyash al shariah to the social and political crises of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. This legal maneuver and usurpation of authority is explained further by Taji-
Farouki and Nafi: 
As the salafi idea of returning directly to the founding texts gradually displaced the assumptions 
of the ulamatic traditions of learning as the necessary credentials for speaking on behalf of Islam, 
the Islamic cultural arena became wide open to an assortment of voices, reflecting new notions of 
authority. Alternative modes of authority were derived from the dominant and pervasive 
influence of modern education and professions, form political activism, and from the power and 
influence of modern information technology and modes of communication. In many cases, the 
intensifying conflict between the ruling classes and political Islamic forces even the modern 
nation-state to appropriate for itself the authority to speak on behalf of Islam. (10) 
Accordingly, they used Ijtihad to bypass the tradition of Fiqh al siyash al shariah to undermine 
the authority of the establishment Ulu Al Amr. The tool of Ijtihad allowed them to present new 
solutions that are independent from the colonial and temporal power. To further illustrate the 
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commonality among the members of modern Ulu Al Amr, Shireen Hunter argues that the 
“reformist Islam,” or what this dissertation labels as modern Ulu Al Amr, share the following 
common characteristics: 
1. Islamic reformists argue that what they are trying to reform is not Islam per-se, but 
human understanding of Islam.  
2. All reformists are dissatisfied with traditionalist class of ulmma who are insisting on 
the taqlid and refuse ijtihad to maintain the statues-quo. 
3. All thinkers all advocate ijtihad.  
4. They emphasize the difference between Shari’a and fiqh. They further argue that this 
distinction is ignored by traditional class of ulmma.(12) 
 
In sum, all four conditions demonstrate the tacit claim on authority to speak on behalf of the 
public and Islam and the genuine voice of Islam. It is important that this claim is recognized by 
the masses and captures the public imaginary in form of mass movement. Otherwise, the 
reformer is just a public intellectual who expresses dissenting views against the establishment. 
Thus, the public sphere becomes the essential tool for reforming and organizing the public 
around political demands and claims over economic, social and political demands on power. Of 
course, some individuals resort to violence against states and society at large. These individuals 
take it upon themselves and with a following to dismantle the entire system both domestically 
and internationally. This variety of approaches is also a consequence of Sunni conceptions of 
authority and the absence of a church in Islam. For example, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, or Al-Baghdadi who consider themselves authoritative voice speaking on behalf of 
Islam and Muslims; if they are able to capture the public imaginary then the outcome leads to 
murderous attacks on innocent civilians. But the principle of authority in Sunni Islam allow for 
different and contending interpretations that consider such acts un-Islamic. The problem is to 
judge such a phenomenon using the logic of sovereignty and consider Islam in general sanctions 
the killing of innocent civilians. After all, it is modernity with the logic of state sovereignty at its 
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core that created the contradictions that necessitate the institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr and the 
intellectual forces that challenge authority and demand renewal and reform. Most important, this 
condition is global and not solely Islamic. The condition that specifically affected Islam was that 
the legal concept of European sovereignty, which caused a paradigmatic change that displaced 
the Sunni conception of authority. Muslims live today under the conditions of modernity, which 
are global and in sovereign territorial nation-states, whether they agree to them or not, but it is 
precisely this condition that has brought about the Sunni authority and it’s opposite, the modern 
Ulu Al Amr, a necessary condition to address modernity.   
 
 
In Conclusion, the consequence of European sovereignty at the physical and 
metaphysical realms modernity challenged and changed the legal conditions around the logic of 
Sunni authority.  The most important change is the rearrangement of international law according 
to the legal logic of sovereignty with the nation-state as its fundamental basic unit. Consequently, 
the logic of sovereignty produced new notions of the self that frame the world in relation to the 
territorial nation-state and the sovereignty of the body. Gradually, these subjectivities were 
globalized and universalized emancipatory struggles according to the logic of sovereignty. 
Similarly, Sunni Islam produced subjectivities that frame emancipatory struggles against 
arbitrary power in the context of the authority Ulu Al Amr. Thus, this dissertation argues that 
while resistance to arbitrary power via emancipatory struggles of the subject is universal, these 
struggles must be understood in the context of the local logics and frames of reference. 
Therefore, overlooking the these local characters renders the universality of human rights a  
top/down Western hegemonic discourse of power that impose Western values as the only 
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genuine subjectivity and conception of the self. Instead, the aim should be to focus on the 
commonalities in the struggles against the oppression of arbitrary power which is universal. The 
most important obstacle in the “Arab Spring” between the Islamists and secular political forces is 
the absence of a vision of common platform that holds the secular modern subject and the 
Muslim subject in their resistance to arbitrary power and oppression. This understanding is 
important to a global dialogue that is based on mutual understanding and appreciation and the 
possibility of a common global project overlooking the “clash of civilization” thesis.  
Finally, this chapter argues that the consequence of modernity was twofold. First, due to 
the logic of sovereignty the nation-state centralized the Ulu Al Amr by institutionalizing the class 
as a part of state bureaucracy. Consequently, the logic of state sovereignty undermined Sunni 
authority undermining Ulu Al Amr’s legitimacy. Second, as state sovereignty undermined the 
legitimacy of the institutionalized Ulu Al Amr leading to the rise of the modern Ulu Al Amr who 
opposed to traditional establishment rejecting Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher with the aim 
of reinterpreting Fiqh al siyash al shariah free from tradition as autonomous and reflexive 
agents. Thus, modern Ulu Al Amr are as much a product of modernity as feminism, civil rights, 
civil liberties, or the global left resisting oppressive power and global capitalism. Thus, 
modernity provided modern or reformist Ulu Al Amr the physical and metaphysical conditions 
that undermine the traditional pro-establishment Ulu Al Amr is a central feature of Sunni Islam in 
the epoch of modernity. This explains the rise of political Islam as challenge to autocratic rule in 
the Muslim world.  
This precisely explains the panic of traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, which 
are the guard of the establishment Ulu Al Amr, and have the most to lose if their authority is 
undermined. Thus, it is understandable that the Gulf monarchies are clear in their intention to 
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defeat any reform by modern Ulu Al Amr. As long are Sunni Muslims are willing to look 
elsewhere for authoritative voices that speak on behalf of Islam modern Ulu Al Amr are going to 
thrive.  
Finally, Hallaq’s account of the impossibility of the Islamic state would be accurate if 
had a “true” Islamic state did exist since the Prophet’s death, but historically that is not the case. 
Thus, this dissertation argues that Fiqh al siyash al shariah is a testament to the authority of Ulu 
Al Amr as the agency that harmonizes the ideals of Islam with the ever-changing concrete world. 
It is precisely the role of agency that is absent from Hallaq’s “paradigmatic Islamic governance” 

















                   CONCLUSION 




The following are concluding remarks related to contemporary events in the Arab world 
in the light of the findings of this dissertation. When research commenced on this dissertation, 
the self-immolation of the street vender Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia and the Arab 
Spring had already been underway. While the change took everyone by surprise it was a 
welcomed moment for many who argued that democracy has finally arrived to a region lagging 
in democratic rule, social justice, and basic respect for human rights. Yet, soon the optimism and 
the aura around the populist uprising of 2011 eroded, and many questioned whether the Arab 
Spring had turned into an “Arab Winter” (Totten, 2012). One thing for sure is that the domino-
effect of change that seemed to be spreading in the region overwhelming everything in its path 
had been effectively halted and reversed. Vulnerable states such as Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, 
and Sudan that experienced popular demonstrations and were on the path of revolutionary 
change are much more stable at the moment than they had seemed in 2011. These regimes seem 
to have survived the revolutionary wave, but not without eliciting panicky decisions such as:  
the announcement in mid-May [2011] by the newly appointed Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
secretary-general, Abdul Latif al-Zayani, that Jordan and Morocco had been invited to discuss the 
possibility of membership of the bloc seems to have been on the initiative of the Saudi king, 
Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud. Given Jordan and Morocco's status as Arab Sunni hereditary 
regimes, it appears that the king is concerned that, should these states succumb to the regional 
popular clamour for change, the Arab wave could would be more likely to sweep the Gulf than at 
present (The Economist 2011).”  
 
While the idea did not materialize into an enlargement in the GCC, it was indicative of the mood 
at the time. 
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Currently, the Saudi king is openly on the offensive with the United Arab Emirates 
monarchs declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization (El Gamal 2014).  At the 
moment counter revolutionary forces are solidifying their gains where “a proposed donor 
conference to support Egypt's economy is expected to dominate Saudi King Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz's talks with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi in Cairo … The talks will also 
focus on regional developments, including the situation in Iraq, the Palestinian cause and the 
Syrian and Libyan files …” (El Gamal, 2014). In fact, “Saudi Arabia had been among the first 
Arab countries to welcome the army ouster of President Mohamed Morsi last year following 
opposition protests, and [Saudi Arabia] offered billions of dollars to prop up Egypt's foundering 
economy (El Gamal, 2014).” A monarchy that claims to be Islamic has been instrumental in the 
overthrow of the first democratically-elected Islamist government. The obvious justification for 
the actions of the Saudis is that they acted out of fear that the winds of change would arrive in 
the Kingdom and loosen their dynastic grip on power. But the question becomes how and why? 
Why can’t the Saudis follow the footsteps of neighboring Qatar and embrace the Muslim 
Brotherhood? The findings of this dissertation are helpful in answering some of the questions 
that may have been overlooked by the conventional realpolitik approach to the region.  
This dissertation claims that the Arab Spring as it stands today has been effectively 
transformed by Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, turning back the clock on the 
Arab Spring and turning it into a Sunni/Shia war reminiscent of the Second Civil War (60-73/ 
AH 680-692 CE) and reviving the question of the legitimacy of who should rule over the umma. 
Certainly the United States government is acting accordingly dealing with the region. For 
example,  “the United Sates, Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to allow Iraq's Prime Minister 
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Nouri Al-Maliki to stay in office for a third term, Al-Araby Al-Yawm newspaper reported ” 
(Middle East Monitor, 2014). 
 The fear of both states of the sweeping changes that engulfed the region since 2011 
turned the basic demands of social justice, good government, and human rights into a sectarian 
war. Strategically, rallying Sunni/Shia support domestically and regionally was an effective 
strategic path that both states took to ensure their own legitimacy domestically and regionally. In 
Bahrain, the Sunni monarchy marginalized its local population by depicting their grievances as a 
Shia sectarian war. Indeed, it is the exact strategy that the Saudi monarchy follows domestically 
and acts upon regionally in its claim as the sole representative of Sunni Islam.  
Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran projects itself as the sole representative of Shia 
Islam. In fact, fighters from Iran and Hezbollah of Lebanon are already in Syria helping Al 
Assad in his battle against domestic and foreign fighters (Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer 2013). 
Consequently, the Shia support that Assad’s Bathist secular government is receiving is reigniting 
the clash of the Second Civil War. Now the war is portrayed as Shia from Iran, Iraq, and 
Lebanon helping their Alawite brethren in Syria. As a result, this aid is reinforcing Iran’s 
revolutionary goal to replace the Saudi Sunni monarchy as legitimate Islamic state for all 
Muslims. The current war in Syria and Iraq is presented as a correction to the historical injustice 
that the Umayyads committed against the legitimate rulers of the Umma. Many observers of the 
region consider this discourse as mere rhetoric; but this is hardly the case. In fact, the basis of 
this discourse is legal, and legitimacy and authority are central to the political systems in Saudi 
Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, this dissertation hopes to demonstrate that such 
claims are present with us in a world governed by territorial European sovereignty. The Sunni 
and Shia authority of Ulu Al Amr and not sovereignty is central to the legitimacy of both states 
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today. In fact, the proxy war unfolding in the region between the Saudis and Iran is at its base a 
protection of the Wilayah al ahed and Wilayah al faqih. The absence of a constitution in Saudi 
Arabia and the role of Ali Hosseini Khamene, the current Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic, lend importance to the role of the authority and legitimacy that Wilayah al ahed and 
Wilayah al faqih play in both states. The danger of the Arab Spring for both states follows from 
the precarious nature of the two doctrines and the threat they face to their legitimacy. 
In fact, the Saudi monarchy claims the Qur’an and Sunna are the Kingdom’s constitution. 
Only in 1992 did the Kingdom decide to list basic principles, “The Basic Law of Governance.” 
The following are related provisions:  
Chapter I, Article 1: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its 
constitution is Almighty God's Book, the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet 
(PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital. 
 
Chapter II, Article 5: 
•  Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
•  Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. 
•  The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and 
His Messenger's Sunna (Traditions).  
•  The Crown Prince shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Crown Prince and shall 
perform any other duties delegated to him by the King.  
•  Upon the death of the King, the Crown Prince shall assume the Royal powers until a pledge of 
allegiance (bay'a) is given.  
Article 6: 
In support of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger (PBUH), citizens shall give the 
pledge of allegiance (bay'a) to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship and ease.  
Article 7: 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the 
Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the 
other laws of the State.  
Article 8: 
Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality 
according to Islamic Sharia. (The Basic Law of Governance - Saudi Arabia) 
 
 
The “sovereign Arab Islamic State” mentioned in Article One is not the basis of the legitimacy of 
the Royal family to rule over the Kingdom. Clearly, the term serves the purposes of international 
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law. Interestingly, there is no mention of political parties, elections, or a participatory role for 
citizens in governance. This is precisely the challenge that the Arab Spring presented the Saudi 
monarchy; Bay’a based on Wilayah al ahed is no longer viable. Most important, having Islamist 
political parties run elections and form governments based on the will of the people is surely an 
idea that must be fought and eliminated.  
So what is the cost of turning the Arab Spring into a regional clash between Wilayah al 
faqih and Wilayah al faqih? First, sovereignty and national identities have suffered a return to the 
Shia/Sunni form of loyalties. These new loyalties and identifications are evident in Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. Even in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt where there is no sizable 
Shia population, the Gulf States (including Qatar) led by Saudi Arabia fueled the split between 
the Islamist and secularist political forces on the ground. The petro dollar was essential in 
bankrolling the secular/Islamist divide exploiting the absence of political language that can 
bridge the sovereignty/authority misunderstanding and prejudices. The Saudi Kingdom and Gulf 
monarchies realize that the spread of the “Arab Spring” to the east means the end of the authority 
of the establishment Ulu Al Amr and with it Bay’a of Wilayah al ahed, which will effectively end 
the legitimacy of family rule in the region.        
Second, they labeled terrorist those “Islamist politicians [who] swept elections across the 
region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, [who] stepp[ed] close to power in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Morocco and undermin[ed] the thesis of Qaeda-style militants that violence offered 
the only hope for change” (Kirkpatrick 2014). The consequence of the war waged between 
Saudis and Iran as a sectarian war is the rise of the rigid Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
which is unlike the moderate new Ulu Al Amr that hope to harmonize modern European 
sovereignty with Sunni authority. These Ulu Al Amr of Ayman Al Zawahiri and ISIS intends to 
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replace European sovereignty all together and views the harmonizing efforts of the new Ulu Al 
Amr and politicians such as Rashid al-Ghannushi as hypocritical.  “Today, those politicians are 
in frantic retreat from Riyadh to Rabat, stymied by their political opponents, stalked by generals 
and plotted against by oil-rich monarchs. Instead, it is the jihadists who are on the march, roving 
unchecked across broad sections of North Africa and the Middle East. Now they have seized 
control of territory straddling the borders of Iraq and Syria where they hope to establish an 
Islamic caliphate (Kirkpatrick, 2014).” More important, the Saudi/Iran war as a means to stifle 
the “Arab Spring” conflates the two types of Ulu Al Amr into one terrorist camp and 
consequently reproducing the myth of the “Clash of Civilizations.”  
  Finally, there are alarming signs in the region that the consequence of the Sunni/Shia war 
is that the petro dollar that is financing and fueling the rise of fascist state in Egypt and other 
states in the region. It is shocking to witness the speed of the transformation of Egypt form the 
“Arab Spring” of the revolution in 2011 to the extreme nationalistic or fascist political discourse 
clothed in the “Egyptian War on Terror.” The same discourse is currently used in Syria, Libya, 
and Tunis. The Islamist intellectual al Huwaidi describes the situation in Egypt as follow:  
From whichever angle you look at it, the situation in Egypt is unbelievable. It is unfathomable 
that three years after the Egyptian revolution, for which 1,000 martyrs paid with their lives, 
torture has become prevalent in our society. The re-emergence of torture not only constitutes a 
serious violation of human rights and dignity, but also marks the return of the Mubarak regime 
and the security state…What is no less dangerous than torture, which is a crime against humanity 
in every sense of the word, are the online voices that no longer question or deny the state's claims. 
Anyone who reads such comments made in response to accounts of torture, imprisonment or 
death sentences, will be shocked by the degree of brainwashing and lack of social consciousness; 
some people even claim that it is the victims of torture who violate the law and that death, torture 
and tyranny are deserved punishments that fit the alleged crimes …This type of thinking brings to 
mind the Nazi ideology of 1940s Germany, in which no one blamed or questioned the regime for 
its belief in the superiority of the Aryan race and its attempt at the ethnic cleansing of the state. 
The problem lies in the fact that such blatantly racist ideology had many supporters in German 
society. We find ourselves facing a similar situation in that the revolution that was launched 





Certainly, the recent mass hysteria of the Egyptian judiciary reflected in the mass sentencing of 
hundreds of Egyptians to death confirms Huwaidi’s premonition that Egypt is on the verge of 
sliding into a fascist state. Yet Western liberal democracies welcomed Sisi’s election as president 
of Egypt. If their reaction is to be taken seriously, it is a sign that we have not learned the lesson 
of the horrors of fascism in the twentieth century and a sign that in a moment of crisis the rise of 
fascism is always on the horizon. Only a sovereign state may become a fascist state. It is this 
unintended totalizing quality that is at the horizon of economic and political crisis that allow that 
sovereign state to vent excesses on a particular group. It is the aim of this dissertation to provide 
the political language between the European sovereignty with other form of authority to avoid 
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